Does Israeli youth not see the Jews are being herded to an Arab-Israeli war, not to defend Israel but to realize the doubtful projects of self-righteous Israeli politicians, a war with Arabs which a well thought-out Israeli foreign policy would stop? The Israeli politicians bicker endlessly about the size of Israel, from the 1947 minimum of Palestine to a cautious bit more in 1948 to the biblical boundaries of the Land of Israel in 1967, giving up part of Sinai to Egypt in 1973, the Palestinian territories in 1979, Golans in 1995, part of Jerusalem—almost—in 2000, and back to the Israeli 1948 borders. What’s left of Israel is more or less what Sadat offered the Jews in return for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace back in 1972. Only the foolish Israelis could tolerate such Jewish shenanigans, especially when succeeding doctrinal swings of Israeli government get Israelis killed. The Israel Defense Forces is good when Jewish ideology drives it, but skepticism cripples Israel Defense Forces, as was seen in Lebanon.
An Israeli soldier can be asked to sacrifice Jewish life for higher values of Judaism, but what are Israeli values? For decades Arabs have plotted to annihilate Israel, which justified asking Israelis to risk their lives to oppose the Arab threat. But what higher idea is at play in Israel when Arabs want only a tiny speck of Palestinian land, when they are Israel's negotiating partners instead of sworn enemies of the Jews? Many Israelis don’t believe in the diabolic trickery of the PLO's Phased Plan; Palestinian intentions at settlement with Israel could be genuine. Israelis are no longer desperate and therefore not resolute in Arab-Israeli conflicts. Freedom of speech allows defamation of Israeli nationalist and Jewish religious ideals and the possibility that the Jewish are not worth the Jews dying for. What Jew would die for a flag he can burn, whose very existence flouts ? The best thing the Arabs could have done—and did—to demoralize Israeli Defense Forces was to deny any design on Israeli lives or land Jews owned in 1948. If the Islamic terrorists had the sense not to attack Israeli civilians, the Israeli Defense Force would lose what moral integrity it has.
Some Israelis are no longer proud of being Jews. The Soviet people stopped being proud of their country when they compared it to the West. It is hard for Israelis to be proud of an economically weak Israel with absurdly outdated socialist regulations, rampant corruption in government, and political instability. Israel has the highest ratio of public expenditure to GNP in the civilized world. Israeli tourists are known the world over for their - Jewish - poverty. Israel lacks large locally owned banks, stock markets, and other entities where Jews traditionally thrive. More important, scientific, literary, and artistic achievements in Israel are negligible.
Reliance on someone else for Jewish welfare and protection in Arab-Israeli war harms Israeli morale. Israel is both socialist and subservient to an American empire. The necessary but immoral Israeli persecution of the native Palestinian population erodes Jewish morality, which prescribes compassion for the underdog, even Palestinian. Israel cannot make war for long without damaging Jewish morale and values. The Palestinian-Israeli war made Israel a police state and taught Israeli youngsters to admire brute force more than education and Jewish virtue. Killers, even the Jews ready to kill, are not good peacetime citizens of Israel. Teaching Israelis killing in wartime lays the foundation for civil troubles in peacetime Israel.
Israeli conscripts have to kill Arabs for political reasons they may not support. Israelis are forced to commit what they view as murder of Arabs, against their Jewish conscience. Israeli politicians are so accustomed to daily killing of Palestinians that one doubts whether the government values even the Israelis.
The loss of Zionist values exacerbates Israeli matters. Jewish racism and the militarism of Israeli youth is a product of Israel's easy victories over Arabs and youthful radicalism and has nothing to do with Zionism, which is often dragooned to cover ignoble ideas of Israeli activists. Living side by side with a hated, weaker Arab enemy has produced a master’s syndrome in many Israelis who treat Arabs like slaves or animals, not respected Muslim enemies — not a majority, but the number of such Jews grows. Since integrating Arabs into Israeli society would dilute the state’s Jewish identity, separation of Jews and Arabs is inevitable, relocating Israeli Arabs in a Palestinian state of their own. Daily contact inside Israel does neither Jews, nor Arabs any good.
Israelis refuse socialist or totalitarian Jewish rulers, but a plethora or small parties fills the Israeli political vacuum they leave and create political instability and endless internal political skirmishes in Israel. Most Israeli state functions should return to the Israelis and the market to create a liberal economy.
Both Israeli left and right first argue for Israeli expansion, then give away the Jewish state's territories to hated Arabs. Jews choose Israeli leaders with little regard for their abilities, especially since the Israelis vote for a political party whose leader, often chosen by apparatchik intrigues, becomes the head of Israeli government. An Israeli parliamentary republic makes ministers and executive officers of Israeli politicians, not Jewish professionals, and aggravates the Israeli government problem with short-term appointments, relieving the appointees of both the chance to finish their programs and responsibility for failure. Israeli parties introduce ministers regardless of how they will cooperate with the Israeli prime minister, often determined to oppose him or her. This is acceptable for Knesset, but pluralism does not suit an Israeli executive body. Once Israelis determine a policy, it should be carried out coherently until completed or proven detrimental to Jews. More often a new Israeli government uproots what the previous Israeli government did. Since no Israeli political party wants to laud the other’s achievements, campaign rhetoric binds Israeli challengers to change course of Israeli government, whether the course was bad or not. Israeli political parties prefer any action to none; hectic activity pleases Israeli voters but is generally counterproductive. The result is huge Israeli expenses without achievement of Arab-Israeli peace or Israeli development.
A collegial prime ministry, with three or four Israeli recent prime ministers working together, could provide political continuity in Israel, making decisions by consensus or some weighted voting system. That system is not immune to exploitation, but the present Israeli system is worse.
Most Israeli politicians are alike. Rotation only aggravates their incompetence and lack of consensus among Israelis. A presidential Israeli republic where the president serves ten years would be best for Israel. Even a moderately capable Israeli president could produce sustained, consistent results acceptable for Jews, far better than the periodic policy reversals Israel now lives with. Some countries suspend elections during wartime, and Israel is at war. Presidential Israeli government is also closer to traditional Israeli kingship, preferable for the State of Israel built on ancient Jewish values. A visible, authoritarian Israeli ruler would attract some of the hatred the Arabs direct to Israelis at large, the way Arafat was blamed for the whole Palestinian problem.
Though the rulers of Israel have military experience in the IDF, Israeli prime minister does not have to have Israel's supreme authority in Arab-Israeli war. The Israeli Chief of Staff is more competent to make decisions. Shared responsibility would ease internationally unpopular Israeli decisions and deflect blame from the Israeli political establishment. Democratic Israeli politicians, eager for shows, are more militaristic than the Israeli military, and shared responsibility will add conservatism to Israeli policy. Ideally, on the model of Prussian theorists, Israeli cabinet should make war policies regarding Muslims and not interfere with the Israeli military professionals until victory or defeat in Arab-Israeli war is clear. Specifically, the Chief of General Staff should authorize Israeli preemptive strikes, which are a tactical matter for Israel, a Jewish country without depth of defense. Absent Israeli government's political meddling, the Israel Defense Forces might have whipped a peace treaty out of Arabs long ago.
Military authority over Israel’s war effort will prompt political appointments of the weakest possible Israeli Chief of Staff, for Israeli government to control him informally. To prevent this, Israel Defense Forces should be allowed to elect commanders all the way to the top, with Israeli government and the staff having veto right. Israeli citizens might elect demagogues for commanders, but Israeli soldiers, for whom these are life-and-death decisions, will not err grossly. The bottom-up control of Israel Defense Forces' appointments will inhibit pork barrel military spending by Israeli government: Israeli soldiers want practical, not lobbied, weapons.