Samson Blinded: A Machiavellian Perspective on the Middle East Conflict
[ Israeli policy toward Arabs ] [ Judea, a second Jewish state ]
Israeli deterrence works only with Arabs who value themselves. Poor Arabs who live in refugee camps, like the Palestinians, do not fear Israeli missile attacks, which rarely target the homes of Arab civilians. The futility of Israel Defense Forces bombing Arab paupers was demonstrated in Egypt, Lebanon, and Palestine, where Israeli bombardment was hardly noticeable amid the pervasive Arab poverty.
Increasing the Israeli brutality to scare Arabs is Israel's one option. Another is Israel making the Arabs richer to make Israeli brutality more threatening. Israel could threaten rich Palestinians and destroy their villas instead of Arab villages. Wealthy Arabs would pressure common Palestinians to stop supporting the Islamic terrorists. An international public relations campaign, shaming other Arabs for not helping their Palestinian brethren, could force the foreign Muslims to pay for building an affluent society in Palestine. Affluent Arab societies are not prone to Islamic terrorism. Fruitful employment reduces Arab propensity to war, while Palestinian poverty and unstructured free time foster Islamic aggression. Welfare engenders Palestinian spongers with plenty of time for Islamic radicalism, and Israel should push the UN relief organizations from Palestine. A civil infrastructure built by other Arabs in Palestine would be a target for Israeli retaliation for Islamic terrorist acts.
Saddam killed many more Kurds than Israel has killed Palestinians and razed villages while moving inhabitants to concentrations camps. That policy did not quench the Kurdish resistance. Violence is a mode, not a policy, and is only an important auxiliary to relocation.
Islamic law, sharia, condones many actions which seem harsh to Israelis. Jihadi may not kill enemy women and children—unless they attack first, as in anti-Israeli riots. Muslim conquerors may claim all the property of the vanquished enemies and their families; Israelis reciprocally need not compensate the Palestinian refugees and may exile subversive Israeli Arab population. Muslims are not required to check who opposes them and who does not; Israel could similarly apply collective responsibility for Islamic terrorism to Arab enemies. Muslims can fight their brethren, if rebels, and so have no excuse for tolerating Islamic terrorists.
The Islamic terrorist Abu Hajer asserted that it is perfectly legal to kill civilian Muslims who happen to be present at the scene of a military action. That, of course, is what the Palestinian terrorists accuse Israel of doing. Abu Hajer’s justification also applies to assaults by Israel: good Muslims go to paradise, bad ones go to hell; so if they die, there is no problem.
Sharia condones discrimination against non-Muslims. The Umayyad caliphate, the Wahhabis’ model, gave no political rights to non-Arabs or even to half-breed Arabs.Why should Israel?
Israel can use many features of Islamic fundamentalism. Its condemnation of the state as an instrument of oppression and a promoter of inequality could undermine Arab support for their governments and foment insurrection—which would keep the Islamic governments hostile to Israel busy with their own problems.
On other hand, Israel could search the large body of hadith for condemnations of Islamic terrorism and killing women and children, as well as instructions to respect Jews. Quoting the sharia to people who hate Israel will not change them, but some might see that they do not betray Islam by refusing to support the jihadi.