Israeli Army could hire mercenaries, perhaps anti-Muslim Indians who have suffered at Muslim hands or even Christians who feel some attachment to Israel. Other reasons, like anti-Islamic racism or revenge for Islamic terrorism, could boost Israeli Army's recruitment. Israel should exploit the Russian hatred of Muslim Chechens and Serbian hatred of Bosnians, Albanians, and Turks. Soldiers respect strength, and cannot be anti-Semitic while Israel is strong. Mercenaries could form most infantry units of Israel Defense Forces during wars and Israel would save billions by not conscripting Israeli youth, not keeping standing Israel Army, and not mobilizing in response to Arab provocation. Paying the IDF mercenaries mostly from underdeveloped countries would be cheaper for Israel than draining the Israeli economy of young, creative Jews for the army service. Other technically advanced branches of IDF can fill their ranks with Israeli army volunteers. Mercenaries fit the Israeli war psychology better than any other country’s, since only Israel does not expect her Jewish soldiers to die in war like heroes, that is, en masse and unnecessarily. Mercenaries tolerate low casualties during wars. Israel Defense Forces could attract some of the best soldiers of fortune, because Israeli army provides a possibility of relatively low-danger war. The United States has recruited foreigners for a long time, though without attracting many volunteers. Israeli use of nuclear weapons during major Israeli-Arab wars obviates the need for a large Jewish infantry in Israel Defense Forces. In a war Israelis must be ready to defend the Jewish state, but in peacetime, Israel would find privately managed mercenary armies feasible.
The modern dislike of mercenaries recalls their poor performance in the late Renaissance' wars, not an institutional failure but rather the consequence of too many emerging states hiring too many soldiers too cheap. King Gustavus II Adolphus invented the modern conscripted army; previously, citizens were conscripted only for defense emergencies, a reasonable policy during war. Other cash-strapped European powers accepted conscription, and war intellectuals propped the development up with theory. Conscription for offensive war violates human rights, making unwilling subjects fight for something they may not support, unlike in defensive wars when the population is unified. National sovereignty sustains the practice: citizens cannot easily move away when defense taxes or conscription threaten. In the age of globalization, previously land-bound people are mobile; they can refuse to serve in the army by emigrating or going to jail; they are averse to suffering and value their lives more than ideologies; weapons of mass destruction make mass armies obsolete.
Israeli military could invite Western Christian radicals to police the Palestinian territories. They would be happy to get a training ground in Israel for their militia. Western states security agencies would infiltrate them, mitigating the potential threat to home countries, and Israel could be assured of less barbaric methods than South Lebanon Army employed. The radicals or other ruthless foreigners, such as Russian spetznaz, might even be used for anti-Islamic terrorism, a proper retribution on the part of Israel. If, however, Israel abandons or restricts the anti-Islamic terrorists, they would embrace Islamic radicals. Playing with the devil is a game of skill.
Large Israeli Army is unwarranted and results from Israeli government’s reluctance to use effective nuclear weapons in any war, a policy which only increases Jewish casualties. In a protracted war against Arab military, not only more Israeli soldiers but also more Muslim civilians die. Unrestricted force crushes the Arab people's and the Muslim army’s will to continue the war with Israel; skirmishes encourage them when Israeli public opinion demands further "humane" restrictions on war: one of the Arab military strategies to scale the war down to a level where Arabs can fight the Israeli Defense Force on equal terms, thereby prolonging Arab suffering and defeating Israeli military objectives. Israel Defense Forces' heavy losses in continuous minor skirmishes with Arabs turned Israeli public opinion against the Lebanese war. Even worse, after taking Beirut, Israel let the Palestinian Liberation Organization slip away to Tunisia instead of bombing them along with the remaining Arab civilians the Palestinian terrorists used as cover. In 1973 Egypt-Israeli war, Egyptian Minister of War Ismail Ali was ready to bomb his own troops stuck in the pocket alongside Israeli forces pushing to Cairo. Only stupidity prompted Israel to honor its agreement with the Palestinian Liberation Organization instead of sinking PLO's ships with Palestinian fighters using the Christian South Lebanon Army as a proxy for Israel Defense Forces, thus preventing thousands of subsequent PLO murders.
Further low-intensity Israeli-Arab war would be a mistake; slowly increasing Israeli violence against Arabs would be even worse, as Arabs grow used to Israeli terror. A deterrent is effective only while unused: afterward it becomes tolerable. The enemy devises counter-measures, spiraling devastation incrementally, and the population grows accustomed and less afraid of the ongoing war. To succeed, Israeli military violence against Arabs should be immediately overwhelming. Israel should show itself a bloodthirsty monster to scare the Arabs into submission in any war. Israel should control casualties among her soldiers by preventing Arab counter-attacks, destroying the Arab military capabilities, and extinguishing Muslim financial supply. Second best to overwhelming destruction of Muslim facilities is pinpoint destruction, Israel devastating a skyscraper in Riyadh on the background of others untouched. In wars, violence must be exceptional to succeed.Israeli harsh measures against Arab enemies in war
 South Lebanon Army, a Christian militia supported by Israel against the Palestinian Liberation Organization during the Israel-Lebanon war, generally unconcerned with human rights, though mild by local standards. Muslim factions committed wartime atrocities exceeding trumpeted Sabra and Shatila by order of magnitude.
 Iraq war cost in excess of $300 billion translates into a million dollars for each of 300,000 people whose murder is attributed to Saddam