As IAF ran out of Hamas targets on Shabbat, less than twenty airstrikes took place on Sunday morning. The most important thing in a lopsided military campaign is to maintain initiative and suppress the enemy’s coordination by staying on the offensive. In small Gaza, such a standard tactic cannot be carried out because destruction reaches the saturation point very quickly.
As the militants recover from the first shock and get used to the fact of the Israeli invasion, they will re-group. It is unclear yet whether IAF destroyed any significant weapons stores: there were no major or prolonged blasts, thus Hamas weapons caches seem to have survived the first attack.
Ehud Barak, a political traitor and failed strategist but a brilliant tactician, executed an excellent deceit to cover Israel’s attack on Gaza, and caught Hamas off-guard. Egyptians collaborated with Israel and assured Hamas of continued calm just hours before the Israeli attack they knew was coming.
Apparently, Barak had been planning the Gaza invasion for the last six months. The level of information-gathering and preparation is incomparable to what was done in 2006. Still, it remains to be seen whether the invasion can defeat and, more importantly, demoralize Hamas into submitting to Fatah. A few knocked-out Israeli tanks or downed helicopters would boost the guerrillas’ morale through the roof.
A wave of suicide bombings by Hamas is unlikely as IDF, police, and citizens are on high alert. After the ceasefire ensues, Hamas would not grossly violate it with suicide bombings.
For the first time, Ashdod is hit by Hamas rockets.
Both Hamas and IDF officials went underground, each in their own bunkers. The reason for IDF/IAF generals to open the underground bunkers in Tel Aviv Kirya HQs is unclear: apparently, the generals are simply playing war games.
Only fifteen civilians are reported dead in Gaza, only 7 percent of the total toll—an incredible accuracy which came at staggering cost. The operation, which involved more than 100 aircraft, expensive smart bombs, and guided rockets, cost Israel close to $0.5 billion on the first day only, vastly exceeding Hamas’ all-time expenses.
Short of a diplomatic statement, Russia didn’t provide any support for Hamas, which it recognizes as the legitimate Palestinian government.
The Israeli operation depends on Hamas accepting a “live and let live” approach, where Israel and Gaza remain hostile but don’t attack each other. According to Jewish logic, Hamas cannot put up with massive devastation and would end the hostilities. This is so far the case: Mashaal, who rejected a ceasefire a week ago, has now announced his commitment to it. But the policy might not hold in the long term: Israeli retaliation will look less assured, some Gazan militants welcome war regardless of costs, and the attacks from Gaza will resume.
Israel’s biggest strategic problem in Gaza is avoiding civilian targets. But as long as Gaza’s civilians feel themselves largely immune from Israeli strikes, they have no reason to rescind their electoral support for Hamas.
Depopulation of Gaza, a political solution with Hamas, or long-term low-level cross-border violence are the alternatives.
watch this video. you can see at least one rocket going off after Israel bombs the building.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rYGus7o_FqI