In any such operation, NATO jets would mostly provide air cover for rebel forces. Under no circumstance would the Russians shoot NATO planes. Three ships are woefully insufficient for even the smallest combat operation, but the main reasons are political and financial: the corrupt Russian government, whose leaders depend on the West’s turning a blind  eye to their financial dealings, cannot afford a major confrontation with NATO.

Both sides are bluffing. Even if the Russians were to shoot down NATO planes over Syria, there would be no Western sanctions on Russia. But our bet is that the Russians won’t dare to intercept NATO jets because, in the end, an EU attack on Syria is no good reason for Russia to clash with NATO.

There is similarly no way that Russia would destroy NATO C&C centers in Central European countries to disable NATO’s ability to intercept Iranian missiles in the event of Israeli attack on Iran. While NATO would probably shrink from retaliating against Russian installations, such a daring provocation is beyond Russia’s current regime.

Due to its mammoth influence, Chabad manages to preserve a love-hate relationship with Russian authorities despite winning a lawsuit in the United States a year ago ordering the Russian government to return the religious movement’s library. The books initially were taken by the Nazis, and the Soviets got them subsequently.

Russia remains one of the few countries that staunchly refuse to return Jewish artifacts looted by Nazis to their heirs.

We lose much more from the White House’s restrictions on our weapons sales than we gain from the US aid.

For two months, the Russians were trying to broker peace between Gadhafi and the rebels, acting in conjunction with Washington. Now it has transpired that the CIA worked behind their backs to bribe Gadhafi’s generals. Theoretically, that was a contingency plan in the event that diplomacy failed, but NATO activated it without informing Russia. Putin predictably sensed foul play and has now returned to Russia’s traditional policy of opposing whatever the US is doing in the Middle East.

And sure enough, Secretary Clinton slapped travel bans on a number of Russian officials implicated in the death of a Russian whistleblower. To boot, the US Senate adopted a resolution which slammed Russia for its occupation of parts of Georgia.
These American decisions were odd: the whistleblower died in prison more or less naturally, and the disputed parts of Georgia are settled by a Russian-speaking population. An idealistic human rights position would be great, if not for the fact that the White House often finds common ground with Putin, Assad, Zardari, and Gadhafi, and scores of other ugly figures.

The Russians wasted no time in retaliating. They stopped negotiations with Gadhafi, propped their contacts with Maher Assad in lieu of the current leader, and restricted NATO access to Afghanistan.

It took the White House hardly a week to broker a deal with Russia to somehow compensate it for its losses in Libya. Why was not a similar deal reached on Iran?

The Russians demanded knowledge about Israeli UAVs in return for refraining from the sale of S-300 to Iran. But we did not bomb Iran, so why the fuss about S-300?

By supplying UAVs to Russia, Israel lost its competitive edge in this field and received nothing in return.

On a separate note, if S-300 are so much in demand worldwide, why don’t we reengineer them?

A question remains: If the Israeli government knew the names of these Russian scientists, why are we not assassinating their families in Russia to force them to return?

The aid is insignificant and unlikely to materialize. The US usually checks Russian expansion in the Middle East. It took the Russians years for Israel to approve their gift of a few APC’s to the Palestinians, and Lebanon is an even more sensitive area.