And what a stability that is! Near the Elon Moreh village fence, the army detained an Arab with a knife. Other Arabs were detained near Tapuah intersection for carrying knives and explosives.

Now the interesting part. Jews took protesters who had been injured near border crossings and checkpoints into Israeli hospitals, even though the rioters were technically in the Palestinian zone. As Rabbi Kahane used to say, Jewish guilt is like cancer; now we feel guilty for stopping the rioters.

There were no losses among the Palestinians. Constrained by crazy orders, the Israelis could not open fire on the murderous crowd, though live fire would have stopped the Arabs immediately and prevented further incidents for some time.

It’s a bit silly to compare popular support for armed struggle during peacetime to popular sentiment at the peak of Intifada, but something else is important. The 29% figure reflects more than a million Palestinian Arabs ready to actively support terrorism. At the peak of popular Palestinian support for terrorism, no more that 20 to 40 thousand people were actively involved in it.

The Israeli explanation seems false, however, because airport and TV frequencies differ substantially, general electronic emissions are insignificant, and the stations had been operating for some time without causing any disruption in air traffic.

We can gather that in this case, as in several other before it, the raid was conducted for political reasons, to press the PA to coordinate its air frequency licenses with Israel. If the PA, obligated to Israel for its economic and military survival, rejects that basic coordination, we can fairly assume that an independent Palestinian state would cause us similar trouble.

The Israeli move is entirely symbolic. The tax transfers have not been lost, but merely postponed. They amount to just about $27 million. The Israeli government lied, claiming that without the transfers the PA won’t be able to pay the salaries of 180,000 state employees—who surely receive more than $150 a month.

There is no chance that any such riots will occur. The Palestinians are tired politically. They have grown cynical about promises, they do not trust their government to evict the Israeli army, and they have begun to tacitly acknowledge their total economic dependence on Israel. The Palestinians have a bigger problem with Fatah’s corruption than with Israel’s settlements.

And in any case, the best preparation for riots would be to distribute weapons to the settlers, many of whom lost their guns in police crackdowns.

The West Bank aquifers will fall to the PA under any peace treaty, and Israel uses them very little. But Abbas’s government does not want to confront its thieves, and has arranged for the IDF to do the dirty work.

Meshaal, meanwhile, implied in a WSJ interview that Hamas’ militant actions will be now be coordinated with Fatah’s—in other words, they will be abandoned. That continues Hamas’ policy of relative moderation; almost all terrorist attacks from Gaza are staged by other militant groups.

But Hamas’ moderation is irrelevant to tax transfers. Israel must continue refusing them for the simple purpose of asphyxiating the Palestinian state. The Muslims must be punished for the covert unity deal which they concluded against Israel’s wishes. As long as they are totally dependent on Jews economically, they must be subject to our political whims.