Dweik was very active in the Hebron area, were Fatah enjoys very limited authority, and Israel arrested him as a favor to the Fatah, which in light of its reconciliation efforts with Hamas, cannot arrest Hamas leaders.

In fact, Hamas has maintained that position for about a decade. The problem is that it means uprooting three Jewish towns and dozens of villages in the West Bank… and abandoning Jerusalem. Hamas would still not abandon its demand for the right of return. In line with Islamic teaching, the terrorist group views the 1948 borders as a mere ceasefire line, to be breached when Muslims become sufficiently strong.

We very much doubt that such move is going to happen. Hamas, especially its foreign branch, has to remain a fighting machine; not only against Israel, but even more so against lesser terrorist factions, Salafists, and heavily armed clans. It is unlikely that in the near future the US will supply Hamas with arms as Israel supplies Fatah. Hamas, therefore, will remain dependent on Iran.

Now that Assad has begun to defeat the Syrian insurgents and no longer needs Hamas’ help, Mashaal has even less reason to move his HQ to Cairo. He would lose his independence there, under the watchful eyes of Egyptian, Israeli, and US intelligence, and  subject to political pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood. Even more problematic, all those players are anti-Iranian, which would necessitate an immediate and complete break with Hamas’ long-time patrons. A change in Hamas’ loyalty, from Iran to the US, could not be gradual as the CIA imagines.

And even if Mashaal were to move to Cairo, Iran would remain with its other forces in Gaza, including the PRC, PFLP, and PIJ, along with a considerable number of Salafists. Together, they are more than capable of staging a civil war in Gaza against Hamas.

This is the nature of a radical society: as one group moderates, the radicals fly to another group. When Fatah moderated, militant Hamas emerged. With Hamas’ moderation, the PRC and Salafists took to the scene.

Hundreds of miles of underground channels dug under Gaza would make another shock-and-awe Israeli operation there problematic. In any case, Abbas would be politically dead if he counted on Israeli bayonets against Hamas.

And so Hamas is poised for a victory against the US-trained Palestinian police.

The result of this will be that Fatah will be able to claim to be a moderate government, though it will be heavily influenced by Hamas. Hamas will be able to bring its people into the government as independents. Most importantly, Hamas will concentrate on its “resistance enterprise” (i.e., terrorist activity) which it has almost ceased since it has ruled Gaza.

The reason for this change is clear. Meshaal is under orders from Iran to avoid escalation while the ayatollahs finish the A-bomb. The Gazans, on the other hand, are being encouraged by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

Meanwhile, the Israeli government continues tax transfers to an increasingly militant and well-armed Hamas in Gaza.

It is a rather unusual parliament whose members are routinely arrested for terrorism—and whose leadership stands by those members.

But Abu Tir is right on this: if every Israeli prime minister for the last twenty years has agreed to give up East Jerusalem to the Arabs, who are we Jews there to deport the Hamas man?