Clearly Abbas cannot purge corruption, which would require purging every official in Fatah’s government. The PA has issued an arrest warrant for Shabana. He can only hope to stay alive with Israel’s help. Shabana’s revelations are being published through Israeli media.

If Abbas’ government falls, Israel will be able to legitimately and indefinitely takes possession over the West Bank to protect it from a Hamas takeover.

The last we heard, it was Hamas— not really a staunch US ally—that walked out of the reconciliation talks.

The reconciliation, which will nominally reestablish Fatah’s rule in Gaza, will open the floodgates of foreign aid to the terrorist group.

Haniyeh and Shaath spoke in front of the background of the Dome of the Rock banner, leaving no doubt about their demands on Israel.

Hamas maintains good relations with the Red Cross, and uses its ambulances for smuggling. Perhaps the friends had a quarrel.

Palestinians issue their own passports, which are recognized by more than 70 countries and allow visa-free entry into more than 40 countries. But Israelis delude themselves into thinking that Palestine is somehow not a state yet.

If Dahlan believes that Hamas might renege on an explicit security promise to a guest, Fatah-Hamas reconciliation is very far off.

Abbas, whose presidential term has long expired, legally must step down and let Hamas’ parliament speaker rule. Supported by IDF, Abbas refuses to relinquish his post.

Abbas has recently suffered a series of blows to his credibility: he met with Netanyahu despite having vowed to avoid him; he agreed to resume peace talks without a settlement freeze; he agreed to ignore the Goldstone report; he rescinded his promise to avoid running for reelection; and now he has rescinded the elections themselves. Abbas’ chances in the elections, if and when they happen, are slim.

Hamas has refused to participate in the elections. If elections are held, they will cement the separation of Palestine into two enclaves, an outcome more than welcome for West Bankers, who would hate to have pauperized and criminal Gazans pouring into the affluent West Bank.

Abbas needs reconciliation, both to bolster his faltering position and to receive and steal the huge foreign aid package earmarked for Gaza reconstruction.

The US will betray Israel by welcoming a Fatah-Hamas government based on Hamas’ acknowledgment of Israel-PLO agreements rather than recognizing them as binding. Thus the Palestinians will get the best of two worlds: Fatah will demand Israeli concessions based on prior agreements, and Hamas will refuse to take  any corresponding steps because it does not recognize those agreements.

Hamas’ demarche reveals the extent to which it commands the Palestinian unity coalition.

Fatah reportedly agreed to include 3,000 Hamas guerrillas in its police force, which is financed by Israeli tax transfers. That influx would probably be limited to Gaza.

Hamas has previously rejected the PLO’s previous agreements with Israel, but has now agreed to “respect” rather than “recognize” them. European governments accept this transparent lie. They need Hamas back in the Palestinian government in order to regain a nominal partner for the peace process.

Very soon, the Hamas as we know will look like a moderate entity. Under pressure from young radicals, Salafi Muslim fundamentalists, and Iran, Hamas is drifting toward political and religious radicalism, which will hopefully preclude any settlement with Israel.

Hamas won’t share its power in Gaza, especially since recent polls indicate Hamas’ popularity has taken a nosedive there, and the terrorist group cannot afford elections.

Fatah cannot bring Hamas into the command positions of the US-sponsored Palestinian police forces.

International players won’t allow a Palestinian Hamas-Fatah government to get away with the formula of merely “respecting” the Oslo agreements rather than committing to them.

The Obama Administration also demands that those unofficial promises be made binding. At the same time, Obama denies the binding nature of Bush’s promises to Israel regarding American recognition of the settlements.

Abbas said that Fatah must at some point reconcile with Hamas, and the talks will resume soon in Cairo. Fatah’s old guard is currently jammed between its own young radicals and Hamas, and aims to break the impasse through an agreement with Hamas.

The Hamas-Fatah rift stops the peace process.

Israel would do well to likewise arrest a few thousand Fatah terrorists in the West Bank to teach big-mouthed Abbas a lesson.

Dweik, a Hamas member, is the speaker of the Palestinian parliament. When Abbas’ presidential term expired, Dweik automatically became acting president of the Palestinian entity.

Hamas confirmed that it views Dweik as the legitimate president.

Netanyahu needs a clearly dysfunctional Palestinian government to relieve us of the peace-process pressure. His policy is highly risky: left with no other peace options, the US may choose to engage Hamas on the Islamist group’s terms.

Someone—probably Hamas—assassinated Ahmed Khalil, Fatah’s leader in Lebanon.

Once Hamas controls the camps, it will reject any peace treaty which does not provide for their return to Israel.

Raed’s father and uncle tortured him before his death.

The woman apparently supplied Israel with information on Palestinian terrorists—the very information that Fatah undertook to provide to Israel and act upon according to the Oslo Accords and the Road Map.

Egypt needs the unity government to enthrone Fatah in Gaza and prevent the Strip from becoming a base for the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

The Americans want Hamas delegitimized in order to conduct Fatah-only elections and claim democracy in Palestine. Israel benefits from the Fatah-Hamas clashes because they stave off the peace process.

Abbas’ attacks on hugely popular Hamas frame him as an Israeli puppet, which dooms him in the next elections. Even if Hamas independents aren’t allowed to run, Fatah’s militant young leaders will make up the core of the Palestinian parliament.

The democratic-minded Obama administration approved the illegal government created by a chairman (called “president”) whose term in office expired five months ago.

Betrayed by the American administration and the Israeli government, we can only hope that Hamas takes over the PA and Hezbollah takes over Lebanon to stop the murderous “peace process.”

Right now, Hamas is using the ceasefire with Israel to beef up its arsenal. Despite their electoral promises, Netanyahu and Lieberman did not move to wipe out the terrorist organization.

In a clear sign of its intent to disregard the talks, Fatah continued its crackdown on Hamas loyalists in the West Bank. Abbas’ irrational behavior is probably paid for by Israel, who does not want a unity government of Palestinian terrorists.

Both Fatah and Hamas hate Fayad for somewhat restricting the terrorists’ access to Western aid, but they need him to continue milking the US and EU. Also, a new prime minister can only be appointed by Hamas, which won parliamentary elections, and that is not acceptable to Fatah and Obama.

Fayad’s reappointment signals the failure of Fatah-Hamas reconciliation talks. Now we will see Hamas’ renewed attempts to oust Fatah from the West Bank, and Fatah’s radicalization to remain popular with Palestinian voters.

Hamas and Fatah are engaged in a deadly battle in Lebanon for control of the Palestinian refugee camps. The battle is over UNRWA funds, indoctrination of residents, and international legitimacy. Hamas controls the Palestinian refugee camps in Syria and Gaza, and if it takes over the Lebanese ones, Fatah would be reduced to a sort of Israeli municipal staff in the West Bank.

Abbas’ chances for reelection are slim, and in the parliament Hamas would either win the elections or come so close to victory as to receive de facto veto power. If Fatah ends its repression of Hamas members in the West Bank, Hamas would gain still more seats and perhaps oust Fatah by military means before the elections.

Israel’s relatively right-wing government won’t sign capitulation to the Palestinians this year, and hopefully next year Hamas will take power and refuse to accept Israeli capitulation.

In short, Hamas and Fatah won’t fight each other, but both groups’ military wings will fight Israel.

On the positive side, the agreement won’t stand, as Hamas needs to topple the Fatah regime.

The dishonest Arafat renounced violence but condoned it. Hamas is straightforward, and for a reason: Arafat, an Israeli-American puppet, did not need to care about Arab street opinion. Genuinely popular Hamas, on other hand, is not eager to taint its reputation with collaboration.

Hamas, though, can afford moderation. It increasingly moves toward political dialogue while leaving terrorism to PIJ, PRC, and other militants. The absence of a ceasefire in Gaza shows that even if Israel reached an agreement with the Hamas government, terrorist attacks from other groups would continue.

The only solution is to expel the Palestinians.

According to the Palestinian Political Research Poll, Hamas’ Ismail Haniye increased his approval rating from 38 to 47 percent in Gaza and the West Bank. Still more popular is jailed Tanzim arch-terrorist Marwan Barghouti, whom Peres has promised to pardon. Barghouti offers Palestinian voters the best of all worlds: unrelenting anti-Israeli struggle à la PIJ, no Fatah-style corruption (thanks to being jailed), and no religious extremism of Hamas’ type.

Palestinian public opinion is this: they want neither Israel, nor trouble. When Israel makes no trouble for them, they feel free to vote for Hamas. If Fatah fielded a reasonably honest candidate like Barghouti, it would beat Hamas in elections hands down. If Israel opened the border crossings and allowed $5.2 billion in aid into Gaza, Hamas would win the elections.

But elections are not the problem. Whether they are a ruling party or in opposition, Hamas commands hundreds of thousands of active supporters, enough to man their terrorist war against Israel.

Hamas needs a semblance of quiet in Gaza in order to legitimize itself with Western politicians and form a unity government with Fatah.

Peres replaced him with Abbas, Israel’s other puppet. Abbas, too, had to adopt militant rhetoric in order to maintain popularity: polls indicate close to 60 percent of Palestinians support terrorism against Israel.

For some time, Israel was left with the Barghouti option. The jailed arch-terrorist is immensely popular among Palestinians because, having been in jail, he is not implicated in corruption. Barghouti is a pariah even among Arab regimes; Mubarak famously described him as the evil force behind Arafat.

Fayad increasingly looks for Israel like a viable alternative to Abbas. He created a decent—by Arab standards—and transparent government, independent of both Hamas and Fatah. Fayad’s resignation is timely: he leaves the Palestinians enough time to suffer under the new government and regret his leaving, but not enough time to forget him before the presidential elections.

Israel’s only problem with Fayad is that, like Arafat and Abbas, he is increasingly nationalist and anti-Israel.

A Fatah-Hamas unity government is taking shape despite Hamas’ flat refusal to accede to American demands that they recognize Israel and renounce terror. Netanyahu’s government might end tax transfers to such a government, but the US and EU would continue financing it as they did before, with a legal fiction of transferring funds to the Fatah-controlled Finance Minsitry.

Hamas would also protest Fatah’s monopoly on brute power and demand legitimization of its own forces.

Like Hezbollah, Hamas would eventually take over the government, or at least receive veto power in it, and would appear to be in control of two military forces—its own and the US-trained Fatah’s.

Obama would welcome a Fatah-Hamas unity government, as it would allow him to continue the peace process and wire funds to Gaza.

Crisis-stricken Europeans seek to shell out money to Fatah, but only Hamas can actually distribute it. The Israeli war on Gaza provided the two terrorist groups with an excellent reason for reconciliation.

Abbas released throngs of Hamas supporters from Fatah jails, which was Hamas’ precondition for reconciliation talks. Earlier, Israelis had praised Fatah’s crackdown on Hamas.

The reconciliation is likely, as Abbas is under heavy pressure from younger Fatah leadership for his collaboration with Israel during the Gaza operation. A unity government with Hamas would boost Abbas’ reputation among radicals.

On other hand, Dahlan and Barghouti, two likely successors to Abbas, vehemently oppose the reconciliation, which would bring Hamas back into the political process and diminish their own electoral chances.

Fatah’s support is also low, at 43 percent in Gaza and 39 percent in the West Bank.

The report greatly damages Dahlan’s reputation among Palestinians and significantly weakens his chances to succeed Abbas. Israeli leftists support jailed arch-terrorist Marwan Barghouti to replace Abbas in the next presidential election.

An alternative umbrella organization, supported by Iran and Syria, would spell the end of the PLO’s  legitimacy, especially as Fatah cannot win elections.

Israel faces a choice of allowing Fatah to form a unity government with Hamas and legitimize the terrorist group as she legitimized Fatah earlier, or watching the disintegration of the now-cooperative PLO.

Fatah does not want reconciliation with Hamas because Abbas is happy to abandon the criminal nest of Gaza. Hamas, propped up by Iranian promises of aid, waits for Fatah to discredit itself with Palestinians so that Hamas can take over the West Bank in the elections.

Fatah’s police chief in Jenin clarified that his forces did not arrest Hamas and PIJ resistance fighters, but that the fighters had sought protection from IDF reprisals in Fatah jails, which is a common practice among Palestinian terrorists.

Foreign media, usually so sensitive when Israel restricts their brethren from visiting war zones, paid no attention to Fatah’s brutalities against Hamas-friendly journalists.

Jews must be crazy to seek peace with Fatah thugs.

Hamas, accordingly, rounded up hundreds of Fatah members and tortured them. Good luck, we say; let one set of terrorists torture another one.

Nevertheless, Israel and other countries are working to bring the expired Fatah president into Gaza on Jewish bayonets to replace democratically elected Hamas. The attempt is pathetic: Fatah’s tentative victory in the West Bank is only due to the fact that IDF suppresses Hamas there. Unless Israel enjoys the same freedom of operation in Gaza—essentially, re-occupies it—Hamas will quickly dislodge Fatah there. Hamas may be crumbling now under Israel’s onslaught, but it will rebuild itself soon.

Fatah troops on the border with Egypt cannot prevent weapons smuggling through tunnels simply because of corruption—smugglers would bribe them. The presence of French troops would only inhibit Fatah’s operations against Hamas smugglers, as the French will insist on at least some observance of human rights.

Israeli politicians, including that sham of a president called Shimon Peres, demand the release of Tanzim leader Marwan Barghouti from an Israeli jail to replace Abbas.

Accordingly, an Israeli military court sentenced the Palestinian parliament’s speaker Abdel Aziz Dweik to a minor jail term. If Abbas steps down now, there’s no one to legally replace him, and so the Fatah thug will stay in power for some time. Hamas has vowed to ignore Abbas’ jurisdiction after his term expires.

Hamas demands that Abbas steps down and duly announce presidential elections. Short of Israel releasing the arch-terrorist Marwan Barghouti from jail to run for president instead of Abbas, Hamas’s Haniye will win the elections. Which is a great thing for Israel, as Hamas would freeze the peace process capitulation.