When Iran, which has promised to wipe Israel off the map, supports peace talks between us and Syria, there must be something very wrong about that peace.

If Syria, as he claims, continues to pose a security threat to the United States, why did he cede it Lebanon and engage Syria as the mediator with Iran on Yemen?

Not a big secret, huh? Intelligence leaks concerning SCUD transfers persisted for a year, prompting occaisional futile warnings from Israeli leaders.

Syria reportedly moved SCUD-D missiles first close to Lebanon, then into that country. It is not apparent why Syria would divest itself of its newest models, which were tested successfully only three years ago. Syrian SCUD-Ds are unlike their Russian counterparts: they have no efficient optical guidance and are less precise, but they have a longer range—400 miles, compared to less than 200. There is little reason for Syria to target Dimona, Ashdod, Ashkelon, and Eilat from Lebanon rather than Gaza.

Syria would be expected to pass its old and numerous SCUD-Cs to Hezbollah. Parting with SCUD-Ds only makes sense if Syria is really preparing for a war and seeking to spread out its arsenals, which were previously concentrated heavily at Al Safir base.

If there ever were a casus belli, it is the transfer of SCUD-Ds to a terrorist organization, which clearly signals an imminent war and an alliance among Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah. Yet, Israel does nothing, and the US has humbly asked the Syrian ambassador to stop further shipments of SCUDs.

In order to deal with Israeli Druze, the Red Cross has to identify them as an occupied population.

Obama’s error is his hallmark confidence-building approach, which calls for incremental steps. But in order to embrace Washington, Assad has to abandon Iran and Lebanon. Certainly, he would require much stronger incentives for that than ambassadorial relations. Obama can woo Assad away from Iran with really big money, but no money has been promised yet, while Iran continues to finance Syrian military expenditures.

Young Assad won’t give up his emotional ties to Nasrallah or his political designs on Lebanon for peanuts, or even for the Golan Heights, which are of little importance to him.

After the meeting, Assad proclaimed that Israel might attack at any time. Just the words he needs to say if Syria is looking to preempt.

Syria knows that it cannot defeat Israel, but it does not need to. Following Sadat’s 1973 example, Assad may be planning a surprise attack on Israel with mid-range missiles to deflect Israel from attacking Iran and force meaningful talks on the return of the Golan Heights.

Looking at Europe’s condemnation of the Iranian nuclear program, Netanyahu must be busy preparing for a strike on Iran, and does not want to alienate Syria any further. But no doubt, at some point we will have a government which values a piece of paper with Syria’s signature more than it values land, and that government will return the Golan Heights.

Indeed, tens of thousands of Gazan extremists won’t cooperate with Fatah, which only fakes resistance; instead they follow radical Salafist groups which belong to the Al Qaeda franchise.

After 1973, Israel acceded to the demand Egypt had been making since 1971—to return Sinai and live in peace.

Regrettably, Barak is right on this. Syria will attack with a thousand mid-range missiles, and Israel will defeat it, but the shock will force Israelis to negotiate away the Golan Heights.

No peace is expected soon.

Assad is very fond of the ayatollahs, and there is a high probability that he will allow his country to be dragged into the war against his better judgment.

A war with Syria might greatly benefit Israel by ending negotiations over the Golan Heights. But if Syrian rocket strikes were overwhelming, leftists would use it to convince the Israeli public to sign a peace treaty with Syria.

Such a stance on the part of Syria is unlikely. Syria’s confidence is astonishing: having started and lost three wars, and having accomplished nothing by decades of terrorist fighting with Israel, the Syrians are sure that Israel will give back the Golan Heights, and even Lake Kineret.

But what difference does it make whether Syria demands the Golan Heights before negotiations or during them?

This is indeed a big discovery. Media have long reported that Iran is demanding the return its nuclear stockpiles from Syria.

The real question is, how did spy agencies miss the tons of uranium rods produced for Syria by North Korea and Iran?

Whoever will be the leader, an Islamist alliance between Iran, Turkey, and Syria is in works.  Saudi king Abdullah’s recent visit to Syria suggests that the Sunni kingdom is considering joining the alliance.

Turkey and Saudi Arabia, formerly close US allies, are drifting toward Islamist geopolitics. Iran, too, used to be a major American ally.

If that sounds illiberal, consider that Israel sentenced a Jewish girl, Tanya Soskina, to a similar prison term for drawing a cartoon depicting Muhammad as a pig. During Sharon’s regime, voicing opposition to the Gush Katif disengagement was a crime punishable by jail.

Syria does not need aircraft for intelligence purposes: it cannot overfly Israel or the US-controlled Iraq.

Rather, the non-offensive version of the MiG31-E is used for intercepting cruise missiles. Money for the jets comes from Iran, which is probably the end user of the MiGs.

Syria’s policy is a repeat of its actions in Lebanon in the 1990s, multiplied by Assad Jr’s adventurism. When Israel scaled back her military effort in Lebanon, Syria immediately stepped in to occupy the power vacuum. Just as in Iraq today, Syria acted in cooperation with Iran.

Young Assad converted Hezbollah from a religious fundamentalist organization into a Lebanese nationalist one, and similarly reoriented Iraqi Al Qaeda.

After America created a power vacuum in Iraq, it was foolish to hope that the country would be left alone.

The Iranian ayatollahs have a theological problem with Al Qaeda, and also detest its radicalism, but they cooperate with it through the Syrians to undermine the US-propped regime in Iraq.

It seems like the American sanctions are having little effect on the three countries.

If Israel agrees to abandon the Golan in a peace deal with Syria, the situation will become similar to that of the West Bank: Israel will position itself as an admitted occupier who must relinquish the occupied lands, no questions asked.

Israel-the-occupier cannot demand any concessions from Syria in order to return the land. In any case, Syria’s promises to part with Iran and avoid major militarization would be hollow, and could be renounced at any moment.