But that has been the historical norm. Our pilots have always been trained to fight superior enemy forces. The problem is that for 38 years they have had no real combat experience. Training is all very fine, but our pilots lack those daily encounters we used to have with Egyptians. IAF has become accustomed to slam-dunk raids against Palestinian and Lebanese targets.

The Saudi monarchy is as doomed as any monarchy. Saudi moderates are as doomed in the short term as any moderates in Arab countries. Saudi nuclear scientists will fall under the rule of Muslim radicals.

After a decade of Iran’s military nuclear program, Israeli still finds it politically problematic to bomb Iran, perhaps the most radical country on earth. Much less we would be able to attack the nuclear infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, the backbone of the world’s oil supply. Our chances are specifically minimized by Saudi Arabia’s claim that it needs nuclear weapons to protect its oil sources, and thus the world’s oil supply.

Iran will have to act quickly to realize its nuclear advantage. Suffering years of isolation in pursuit of nuclear weapons, only to see its new-found power balanced by Saudi nuclear capability, would be an unimaginable loss to the ayatollahs. The Saudi nuclear program could well trigger an Iranian nuclear strike. It remains to be seen where the strike will land.

And the West, which protects the Saudis against Iran, will tolerate that racket.

The Saudi army is irrelevant against Iran, mainly because of its lack of fighting spirit, but also because its low numbers and poor training. Our worry is that the Saudi monarchy is doomed to fail like other monarchies around it, and its weapons will fall into the hands of Islamic extremists, just as Qaddafi’s arsenals ended up with terrorist groups.

Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef promised Shiite rioters that failure to exhibit loyalty to the state would result in forfeiture of their citizenship—and the numerous welfare perks that go with it.

The Saudis all but lost their war in Syria when the NATO did not get involved and Assad wiped out the insurgency. The Saudis are also losing Jordan, which will fall to Iranian-supported Hamas. Coupled with the insurgency in its own east, those developments can break the region’s only moderate Islamic state, and the major Arab ally of Israel.

The Saudis dream of replacing Egypt, their decades-old ally, with another military behemoth. Their efforts to bring Pakistan on board failed and may backfire by introducing to the region the Taliban extremists who infiltrated Pakistani personnel shipped into the Middle East.

Now Saudi Arabia is trying a similar game with Turkey, relying on its military might. But Turkey is a NATO member and cannot cooperate with the Saudis against America’s wishes—and the two have recently diverged on every occasion. Moreover, Turkey is a democracy, unlike monarchic Saudi Arabia or autocratic Egypt. Turkey thus cannot conduct long-term strategies. Also, Erdogan is an opportunist and will switch alliances in a heartbeat, as he has done already with Iran, Syria, the US, and Israel.

The Saudis are about to realize that money is no substitute for power.

Assad would fight to his last soldiers in order to keep the Euphrates region, his strategic underbelly. Iraq, still propped up by the US, wouldn’t give up its bank of the Euphrates easily. Iraq will certainly rather turn to Iran for help than lose the region. Local militias, supported by Saudi money and arms-smuggling networks, would stand no chance against the combined interests of Syria, Iran, and Iraq.

Moreover, Middle Eastern politics are no longer dictated by sectarian divides. Shiite Hezbollah cooperates with Sunni Hamas; Shiite Iran and Iraq are at odds with each other; Sunni Pakistan and Saudi Arabia cannot get along any better than Pakistan gets along with Shiite Iran; the Wahhabite Saudis are not fond of the similarly religious Taliban. A Sunni state on the Euphrates is not at all certain to promote Saudi interests in the long term.

The Saudis similarly erred in Yemen, where they also banked on creating a buffer state. So far there is a stalemate with no imminent likelihood of Yemen breaking apart—though in a world where tribal chiefs make all the decisions, that can change in the blink of an eye.

One lesson for Israel is that Assad did not attack the Saudis for such a blatant plan to violate his sovereignty. Israeli intelligence consistently overestimate the hypothetical Syrian reaction to our attacks on their nuclear and missile facilities.

The Jordanian army is worthless against the Hezbollah-trained insurgents in Bahrain: not only because they lack anti-guerrilla training (or any training, for that matter), but again, because they lack the will to fight.

For all its oil wealth, Saudi Arabia is no match for Iran. No number of Chinese missiles armed with Pakistani nukes can compensate Riyadh for its lack of motivated troops, skilled pilots, and knowledgeable commanders. In proxy warfare, too, Riyadh lacks the experience, long-term policy goals, and most of all, the cruel determination which makes Iran so efficient at operating regional terrorist groups.

In their arrogance, the Saudis have abandoned US protection ( which has admittedly become unreliable with Obama), and believe they can buy regional influence. Events will prove that influence in this region can only be won on the battlefield. And it is only for a limited time that the very smart Saudi rulers will be able to buy the upper hand against the Iranian threat.