Well-financed ultra-left organizations can change the voting pattern by bringing relatively large numbers of liberal expats to the voting booths.

But Netanyahu’s commitments might be weasel ones. The agreements require Palestinians to fight terrorism, which they won’t do. Besides the outposts, the commitments include doing something about illegal Arab construction, an obvious nod to the National Union.

The lesson is that however Israelis vote, the government and its programs remain the same.

Lieberman is trying to bind Netanyahu’s hands in negotiations with Avodah because Livni wants Avodah to join her in the opposition so that together they can create a meaningful bloc. Lieberman is obligated to Livni for the massive support he received from Kadima during the elections, enabling him to woo his voters from Likud so that Livni could beat Netanyahu.

If Likud MKs are so useless, why include them on the list? Because Bibi chose those who pose no threat to his leadership.

In terms of strategic vision, Moshe Yaalon would have made a better defense minister than Barak. In any event, the Defense Minister has very little influence on army matters, which are mostly controlled by the Chief of Staff.

The formation of a coalition with Avodah requires Netanyahu to expel the right-wing National Union from his government, which is the only fitting move for Bibi now that he has done away with Moshe Feiglin.

The National Union is sticking to its hardcore right-wing demands that the outposts be legalized. Western governments can do nothing against Israel if Netanyahu approves those hamlets, but he’s afraid of even nominal confrontation with them. But without the NU, Bibi cannot form his narrow coalition.

Bibi can bring Tzipi into the government, but then Peres could offer her prime ministry (she won the elections) and the right to form a coalition.

What major portfolios, then, can Netanyahu can offer Livni? He agreed to the crazy rotation scheme. It seems that Foreign Ministry is still up for grabs.

Netanyahu offered Livni the chance to head the Israeli negotiation team at the talks with the Palestinians. The post is offensively insignificant, but why is the right-wing Netanyahu conceding negotiations of national importance to his left-wing opponent?

Lieberman’s publicized campaign to gain the Foreign Ministry is highly suspicious. Regardless of his attempts to reshape himself into a supporter of a Palestinian state, he remains absolutely unacceptable to the Israeli leftist establishment, too right-wing to conduct peace negotiations. One wonders whether Lieberman was not erecting another straw man, just as he did with Justice Minister Friedman—this time to make Netanyahu embrace even Livni as Foreign Minister.

Netanyahu is still undecided whether he wants a narrow right-wing coalition or a dysfunctional government with his purported ideological opponents from Kadima.

As an apparent payback to Lieberman, the Olmert-Livni government approved his trademark welfare program for Russian immigrants.

On the positive side, it took Ariel Sharon to expel the Jews from Sinai, and then from Gush Katif. Weaklings like Tzipi or Bibi won’t be able to overcome massive resistance to eviction.

Netanyahu can reject their ultimatum and work to bring Avodah or Kadima into the coalition. Then the right-wingers would sit in opposition and watch the peace process unfold.

On the bright side, Netanyahu offered the Settlement Authority to the National Union bloc. The move is largely symbolic, as the NU would still need the Defense Ministry’s approval for beefing up outposts and settlement construction.

The reasons for bias are several. Left-wingers have at least a strong patriotic attachment to Small Israel, while right-wingers are commonly rootless jingoists who emigrate because they have no reason to stay. Many emigrants choose to blame Arabs, rather than themselves, for their emigration. Living abroad, they can afford militancy.

Lieberman additionally hopes for the votes of 150,000-300,000 Russian immigrants who left Israel after acquiring her citizenship. In practice, they are unlikely to vote.

The Knesset has defeated several similar bills out of disdain for emigrants who don’t share Israel’s burdens.

Peace rhetoric is Livni’s only way to differentiate herself from Netanyahu. Indeed, it is her only electoral platform, as she has nothing else to sell.

Unless Netanyahu fails utterly, life in opposition would disintegrate Kadima, as its more enterprising MKs would seek government posts.

In such a narrow coalition, the National Union—the Knesset’s only seriously right-wing party—gains serious influence; essentially veto power.

- Two states for two peoples (the second is Palestinian Arabs, mind you)
- Civil unions (more non-Jewish families in Israel)
- Electoral reform (which hugely benefits Kadima)

In reality, Tzipi is just offended: after winning the elections, she is refused even the Foreign Ministry.
The good news is that Kadima’a Mofaz won’t be the Defense Minister. The last thing we need there is another incompetent general.

Direct elections stand to benefit Avodah and Kadima, who have many popular personalities on board; their candidates can easily win local (majoritarian) elections. Lieberman has no candidates who would unquestionably win local elections; his support base is dispersed throughout the country. Thus, Yisrael Beitenu supports country-wide (proportional) elections.

Political theory views regional elections as expedient, but national ones as more just as they better reflect the will of all citizens.

Why is this dead-end diplomacy with Palestinian terrorists so important for pragmatic Kadima? Because that’s what their puppeteers from Obama’s Administration ask for.

Kadima officials speak too well of Netanyahu: that he won’t give up a single settlement, and that he will stop the “peace process.” He’s obviously not that firm, but they demonize him before their American masters.

Netanyahu offered Kadima nine ministerial portfolios and promoted Livni to vice premier, assuring that the unity government will be paralyzed. Netanyahu lacks the guts of Olmert to force government decisions against Livni and Barak’s wishes.

Lieberman is not deterred by the fact that Kadima ignored his “No loyalty, no citizenship” demand. In fact, there was no such demand in the first place: Lieberman suggested a moderate, “No national service, no national insurance” slogan, and the loyalty-citizenship slogan was developed by an advertising consultant who worked for Yisrael Beitenu.

Lieberman’s acquiescence to Likud’s vague promises shows how little is he concerned with his electoral platform.

Haim Ramon confirmed that Kadima did not even discuss the citizenship/loyalty issue with Yisrael Beitenu, though both parties claimed agreement on all of Lieberman’s demands.

Kadima’s acceptance is superficial: Livni is unlikely to become prime minister and does not expect to have to carry through her commitments. She can safely promise Lieberman civil unions and easy conversions—knowing that Shas won’t allow Bibi to pass them—and promise to dislodge Hamas, even though she would have no influence on the matter.

Netanyahu is working hard to drag Kadima into the coalition despite Livni’s opposition to a token role. Bibi squanders the victory the voters handed him. In this, he’s supported by fearful voters: polls indicate that 65 percent of them favor a unity government.

One can pity Peres. Both Netanyahu and Livni will almost certainly blackmail him now with the re-opening of the probe into Rabin’s death.

Kadima could have gotten more votes from Arabs than the polls had predicted; naturally, Arabs tried to look tough with pollsters by rejecting Jewish parties. Also, Kadima and Avodah notoriously arranged for entire Arab communities to vote for them in return for sinecures. But where did Lieberman’s expected eighteen seats go?

The only explanation is that Kadima stole three-seat votes from Lieberman, which is exactly what it needed to overcome a two-seat gap with Likud and come out one seat ahead. Considering Lieberman’s silence on the evident election fraud, he probably received a kickback from Kadima, which is not implausible when we recall that Kadima’s election managers worked hard for Lieberman, trying to woo voters away from Likud.

The explanation that Lieberman’s seats went to Likud, and Kadima took votes from Meretz and Labor does not hold because Likud received fewer seats than polls indicated it would. It is also impossible that ultra-left Meretz supporters switched to Kadima.

Another confirmation of the fraud came out when soldiers’ and prisoners’ ballots were counted on Thursday. Normally, both groups exhibit strong right-wing leanings, but not this time.

Yet another confirmation came from the post-election poll of Russian-speakers: Lieberman and Likud miraculously lost 2 and 3 percent, respectively, while Kadima gained the same 4 percent. Considering that merely 10 percent of Russian Israelis voted for Kadima, a 4 percent rise in their number in just two days since the latest polls could only be the result of fraud.

In the West Bank, Kadima received slightly more support than Lieberman, and the National Union dropped from 31% in 2006 to merely 20%. Given the Kadima’s plans to evict Jewish settlers, its 8.5% support in Judea and Samaria, just 1% below the 2006 result, likely reflects election fraud.

Election fraud is common in Israel, but normally limited to Arab communities. This was the reason the Attorney General protested right-wing observers in Umm al Fahm: closed to independent election monitors, the town supplies fake ballots for leftist parties.

The crumbling leftist establishment, supported by the American administration, resorted to across-the-border fraud to save itself and the peace process scam.

I can understand the people who vote for Meretz—okay, they have a strong anti-Semitic identity. The traditional leftists who vote for Avodah are also comprehensible. What defies explanation is how any Jews could have voted for Kadima, an amorphous entity bent on complying with the wishes of their American masters and financiers?

Now it’s up to Lieberman. If he refuses to sit in Livni’s government, she cannot establish a coalition and Peres will pass the right to form the government to Netanyahu. Not only has Lieberman replaced Shas as the linchpin, he holds more power: almost any government could bypass Shas by involving unsavory ultra-leftist and Arab parties, but Lieberman is almost indispensable. It is unlikely that Livni can draw Shas, UTJ, ultra-leftists, and Arabs together to gain majority support.

What would Lieberman ask for supporting Livni? The problem is that he has nothing to ask for because his party has no immediate goals. Livni will promise him support on political reform and civil marriage, but continue with the peace process.

Alternatively, Lieberman may choose the path of fame, and reject Livni’s overtures. She understands the problem and would try to bring Netanyahu into the coalition to prevent Lieberman’s defection. In any case, Israelis have gotten what they voted for—an unoperational hodgepodge of ruling parties instead of a government.

Israeli law bans the use of IDF photos in election campaigns, for obvious reasons of national unity.

Avodah and Kadima resorted to other desperate measures. They drag out ceasefire talks with Hamas to prevent the population from realizing that while the army won the war militarily, the government lost it diplomatically. The government also accepted far-ranging concessions for Shalit’s release.

Lieberman’s nineteen seats bring Israel Beitenu into the major leagues. Traditionally, third (non-establishment) parties do not break through 12-13 seats.

In any government, Avodah is assured of a Defense Ministry portfolio despite Barak’s strategic errors in Gaza, where he squandered the IDF’s quick victory in three weeks of indecisive fighting.

Even if Likud receives the most seats, Shimon Peres can hand the victory to Livni. In Israel, the president gives the right to form a government not to the winning party, but to the one he deems most capable of forming a coalition. Livni can form a government with Avodah, Lieberman, ultra-leftists and perhaps Arab support.

In a time of Iranian crisis, Israel is faced with the prospect of another Golda Meir: indecisive, opinionated, easily influenced, prone to mood swings, full of ideas for great projects, but without firm goals that can be reached.

Less polite Palestinians staged a small rally nearby, accusing Livni of shamelessly fishing for Arab votes. Good Jews can say the same thing.

Elections in Arab towns are commonly rigged.

Haaretz accused him of being a former Kach member. Lieberman and his associates avoid media questions on the issue, but the information is correct, he was indeed an active supporter of Rabbi Meir Kahane, which makes a great reputation for a Jew. After Kach was banned, Lieberman broke relations with figures in the post-Kahane rightward movement. He is working to exclude right-wing fringe competitors from the Knesset with a bill to increase the election barrier to 4%.

So far, Lieberman adheres to Rabbi Kahane’s ultimate policy, albeit in a watered-down version: Israeli Arabs must be non-voting residents rather than citizens. To that end, Lieberman would grant Israeli citizenship only to Arabs who accept an oath of loyalty to Israel as a Jewish state. The problem is, many Arabs would lie.

Lieberman’s election campaign manager was placed under ten-day house arrest on suddenly-activated ten-year-old charges—that is, exactly until the election campaign is finished.

Ben Ari’s election would mark the first time an open Kahanist has entered the Knesset, which is great news.

On TV-2. Some answers are worth noting.

Netanyahu supported the uprooting of “illegal” outposts, albeit via an agreement with the settlers. Never mind that they won’t agree. Bibi claimed to disagree with the Gaza disengagement, though he voted for it while in Sharon’s government.

Livni was concerned about the Gush Katif evacuees. Why, then, does the Kadima government do nothing to rehabilitate them now?

Barak expressed his support for Hamas’ terms for prisoner release (“difficult decisions”): 1,400 terrorists for a corporal.

According to Rivlin, electoral propaganda need not be truthful.

Sneh attributes the arson to criminals angry at him for calling for a police war on organized crime as part of his election campaign. More likely Sneh’s associates burned his car to show the seriousness of his anti-crime efforts and salvage Israel Hazaka.

In the spineless world of Israeli politics, Lieberman may indeed be the least worse mainstream politician.

Evenly matched in polls before the war, Likud now leads Kadima by a margin of 31 to 23 expected seats.

Kadima launched the war as part of its election campaign, and expected the public to pay it back in electoral support. The campaign managers grossly miscalculated because the war could only strengthen the defense minister’s Avodah or the center-right Likud.

On one hand, the CEC decision is utilitarian: Avodah and Kadima hope to get the Arab votes which would have gone to the banned Arab parties. On other hand, it was unthinkable a few years ago to ban two mainstream Arab parties: in a backlash from the Oslo years, Israeli society is clearly moving to the right.

Balad and UAL representatives confirmed that their goal is to destroy the Jewish state: they admitted seeking total equality and ethnic-blind democracy in Israel. Arab MK Tibi vowed to never accept Zionist goals. Fair enough. He put it excellently: “The State of Israel is democratic for Jews and Jewish for its Arab citizens.” That’s how it should be.

The reason for the delay is unclear: the war doesn’t distract Barak and Livni from the election campaign: the war is their campaign.

The Kadima-Avodah government wasted six days of the unique window of opportunity to invade Gaza. The supportive US Administration, Saudis and Egyptians, and other anti-Hamas governments cannot endure domestic protests forever. In a week or so they will start pushing Israel toward a ceasefire.

In an interview with Newsru, Livni confirmed her allegiance to the disengagement from Gaza, even though it led to rocket barrages.
Livni said she believes that Hezbollh adheres to Resolution 1701 on ceasefire in Lebanon, though the terrorist group violates it daily by reinforcing its arsenals.
Livni supported the Israeli ban on Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount.
She avoided a request to state the points of difference between Kadima and Avodah.

But the trend seems to be real. Tzipi committed a few well-thought slips of the tongue, which brought her gains with right-of-center voters. She promised to topple Hamas in Gaza and suggested that Arabs must be moved out of Israel to a Palestinian state. Those slips don’t obligate her to anything but attract credulous voters.

At the same time, right-wingers are disaffected with Netanyahu. Not only the Wye River and Hebron capitulation are on the agenda; many blame him for economic liberalization. The squabble with Moshe Feiglin cost Netanyahu quite a few votes. Most of all, the voters have realized that his political attitudes are no different from Livni’s: the same peace process, more or less gradual.

Fragmentation has taken its toll upon the right-wing camp. While the left consolidates, right-wing parties run alone, and lose many votes in between them. The National Union has split again, decent right-wingers like Feiglin, Uri Ariel, Eldad, and Marzel cannot find a good place on the list for themselves even though each of them can bring plenty of votes.

After every electoral defeat, right-wingers promise to consolidate, but again that didn’t happen.
On other hand, Likud in the opposition is better than in the government. Victorious Likud would have conducted a policy as defeatist as Avodah’s, but in opposition it will criticize the peace process sharply.

Shalom Wolpe is a maverick Chabadnik. Among other things, Wolpe publicizes the Rebbe’s saying, “A Palestinian state is a danger to Israel.” The Rebbe famously gave Wolpe his blessing to be poor and spend all his money for the benefit of Jewish people—which he does. Wolpe leads efforts to convince IDF soldiers to refrain from evicting fellow Jews.

Feiglin let his colleagues appeal the Likud committee’s decision while staying away from the legal mess.

For some reason, Feiglin remains bent on taking over Likud, instead of joining a proper right-wing party or creating one of his own. Even if he makes it into the Knesset in Likud, Moshe would still be constrained by party discipline in major votes. Likud will lose many of its voters if Feiglin saturates the party list with his candidates.

But right-wingers are afraid to unite and take power. A firm majority puts them into the uncomfortable position of having to make good on their rhetoric. A Likud-Lieberman-Shas majority would have no excuse for avoiding the transfer of Arabs and similarly politically incorrect measures.

Israeli newspapers are hysterical over Feiglin’s ticket to the Knesset on the Likud list. Besides journalists’ traditional leftism, the well-funded Kadima pays handsomely for a media witchhunt against Likud.

It seems unlikely that the court would block Moshe Feiglin from the elections on the basis of his conviction during the anti-Oslo events a decade ago.

Netanyahu will attempt to change the primaries’ rules retroactively to push Feiglin into an untenable position. Presumably, Feiglin drives some voters, who see him as too radical, away from Likud. It is only in perverted Israeli politics that Feiglin, a non-violent centrist, can be seen as ultra-right.

Other good guys will become Likud MKs, as well. One is Danny Danon, a reasonable man who rejects the Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria. Less likely to join the Knesset is Likud’s 36th Boaz Haetzni, who runs the attempts to repopulate Homesh with Jews.