Well-financed ultra-left organizations can change the voting pattern by bringing relatively large numbers of liberal expats to the voting booths.

But Netanyahu’s commitments might be weasel ones. The agreements require Palestinians to fight terrorism, which they won’t do. Besides the outposts, the commitments include doing something about illegal Arab construction, an obvious nod to the National Union.

The lesson is that however Israelis vote, the government and its programs remain the same.

Lieberman is trying to bind Netanyahu’s hands in negotiations with Avodah because Livni wants Avodah to join her in the opposition so that together they can create a meaningful bloc. Lieberman is obligated to Livni for the massive support he received from Kadima during the elections, enabling him to woo his voters from Likud so that Livni could beat Netanyahu.

If Likud MKs are so useless, why include them on the list? Because Bibi chose those who pose no threat to his leadership.

In terms of strategic vision, Moshe Yaalon would have made a better defense minister than Barak. In any event, the Defense Minister has very little influence on army matters, which are mostly controlled by the Chief of Staff.

The formation of a coalition with Avodah requires Netanyahu to expel the right-wing National Union from his government, which is the only fitting move for Bibi now that he has done away with Moshe Feiglin.

The National Union is sticking to its hardcore right-wing demands that the outposts be legalized. Western governments can do nothing against Israel if Netanyahu approves those hamlets, but he’s afraid of even nominal confrontation with them. But without the NU, Bibi cannot form his narrow coalition.

Bibi can bring Tzipi into the government, but then Peres could offer her prime ministry (she won the elections) and the right to form a coalition.

What major portfolios, then, can Netanyahu can offer Livni? He agreed to the crazy rotation scheme. It seems that Foreign Ministry is still up for grabs.

Netanyahu offered Livni the chance to head the Israeli negotiation team at the talks with the Palestinians. The post is offensively insignificant, but why is the right-wing Netanyahu conceding negotiations of national importance to his left-wing opponent?

Lieberman’s publicized campaign to gain the Foreign Ministry is highly suspicious. Regardless of his attempts to reshape himself into a supporter of a Palestinian state, he remains absolutely unacceptable to the Israeli leftist establishment, too right-wing to conduct peace negotiations. One wonders whether Lieberman was not erecting another straw man, just as he did with Justice Minister Friedman—this time to make Netanyahu embrace even Livni as Foreign Minister.

Netanyahu is still undecided whether he wants a narrow right-wing coalition or a dysfunctional government with his purported ideological opponents from Kadima.

As an apparent payback to Lieberman, the Olmert-Livni government approved his trademark welfare program for Russian immigrants.

On the positive side, it took Ariel Sharon to expel the Jews from Sinai, and then from Gush Katif. Weaklings like Tzipi or Bibi won’t be able to overcome massive resistance to eviction.

Netanyahu can reject their ultimatum and work to bring Avodah or Kadima into the coalition. Then the right-wingers would sit in opposition and watch the peace process unfold.

On the bright side, Netanyahu offered the Settlement Authority to the National Union bloc. The move is largely symbolic, as the NU would still need the Defense Ministry’s approval for beefing up outposts and settlement construction.

The reasons for bias are several. Left-wingers have at least a strong patriotic attachment to Small Israel, while right-wingers are commonly rootless jingoists who emigrate because they have no reason to stay. Many emigrants choose to blame Arabs, rather than themselves, for their emigration. Living abroad, they can afford militancy.

Lieberman additionally hopes for the votes of 150,000-300,000 Russian immigrants who left Israel after acquiring her citizenship. In practice, they are unlikely to vote.

The Knesset has defeated several similar bills out of disdain for emigrants who don’t share Israel’s burdens.

Peace rhetoric is Livni’s only way to differentiate herself from Netanyahu. Indeed, it is her only electoral platform, as she has nothing else to sell.

Unless Netanyahu fails utterly, life in opposition would disintegrate Kadima, as its more enterprising MKs would seek government posts.

In such a narrow coalition, the National Union—the Knesset’s only seriously right-wing party—gains serious influence; essentially veto power.

- Two states for two peoples (the second is Palestinian Arabs, mind you)
- Civil unions (more non-Jewish families in Israel)
- Electoral reform (which hugely benefits Kadima)

In reality, Tzipi is just offended: after winning the elections, she is refused even the Foreign Ministry.
The good news is that Kadima’a Mofaz won’t be the Defense Minister. The last thing we need there is another incompetent general.

Direct elections stand to benefit Avodah and Kadima, who have many popular personalities on board; their candidates can easily win local (majoritarian) elections. Lieberman has no candidates who would unquestionably win local elections; his support base is dispersed throughout the country. Thus, Yisrael Beitenu supports country-wide (proportional) elections.

Political theory views regional elections as expedient, but national ones as more just as they better reflect the will of all citizens.

Why is this dead-end diplomacy with Palestinian terrorists so important for pragmatic Kadima? Because that’s what their puppeteers from Obama’s Administration ask for.

Kadima officials speak too well of Netanyahu: that he won’t give up a single settlement, and that he will stop the “peace process.” He’s obviously not that firm, but they demonize him before their American masters.

Netanyahu offered Kadima nine ministerial portfolios and promoted Livni to vice premier, assuring that the unity government will be paralyzed. Netanyahu lacks the guts of Olmert to force government decisions against Livni and Barak’s wishes.

Lieberman is not deterred by the fact that Kadima ignored his “No loyalty, no citizenship” demand. In fact, there was no such demand in the first place: Lieberman suggested a moderate, “No national service, no national insurance” slogan, and the loyalty-citizenship slogan was developed by an advertising consultant who worked for Yisrael Beitenu.

Lieberman’s acquiescence to Likud’s vague promises shows how little is he concerned with his electoral platform.

Haim Ramon confirmed that Kadima did not even discuss the citizenship/loyalty issue with Yisrael Beitenu, though both parties claimed agreement on all of Lieberman’s demands.

Kadima’s acceptance is superficial: Livni is unlikely to become prime minister and does not expect to have to carry through her commitments. She can safely promise Lieberman civil unions and easy conversions—knowing that Shas won’t allow Bibi to pass them—and promise to dislodge Hamas, even though she would have no influence on the matter.

Netanyahu is working hard to drag Kadima into the coalition despite Livni’s opposition to a token role. Bibi squanders the victory the voters handed him. In this, he’s supported by fearful voters: polls indicate that 65 percent of them favor a unity government.