Repeating exactly the sequence of events which led to the 1967 war, Israel and Syria profess peace and escalate the situation move-by-move. Suspicious of each other, Israel and Syria spiral the arms race and military preparedness.
Syria arms Hezbollah and financed Hamas to punish Israel for annexing the Golan Heights. Syria expects Israeli retaliation and beefed up its army to deter Israel and counter the Israeli offense. Israel sought to block Syria’s purchases of defensive anti-aircraft and anti-tank rockets from Russia. Syria increased its military presence in the disengagement zone at the Golan Heights. Though the Syrian buildup is within the ceasefire limits, IDF conducted massive exercises in the Golan Heights to deter Syria. Syria responded by dismantling roadblocks near the Golan Heights – a move that usually precipitates mobilization and rapid deployment of forces.
The US would love Israel to attack Syria to punish it for aiding the Iraqi guerrillas. A war with Syria offers Olmert a hope of re-election.
Syria might seek to repeat the Egyptian 1973 move: a limited war with the goal of regaining its former territory. Egypt lost the war (Israel increased her foothold to the other side of the Suez Canal), but won diplomatically: soon afterwards, the US pressed Israel to return the Sinai to Egypt. Similarly, Syria only needs to destabilize the region by attacking the Golan Heights. Even after Syria loses, the US and EU will urge Israel to relinquish the Golan Heights to avoid another war.
Syria needs not attack Israel first, but can launch guerrilla warfare on the Golan Heights, wait for Israeli retaliation, and then join the war with defensive stance.
One man – Bashar Assad – decides to launch a war on Syria’s side; a few politicians decide for Israel. The prospect of war hinges on several people’s (mis-)judgment.