Scholarly biblical criticism threatens Zionism’s ideological pillars. Much of the Bible is not revelation, not history, but saga, yet Israel flirts with Jewish theocracy, compounding the confusion of Israelis instead of resolving it. The people who lead the Israeli national revival, the rabbis, oppose it. Jewish fundamentalism is as assertive in Israel as Islamic fundamentalism in Islamic countries—coherent, confident, and funded, gaining support from the uncritical Israelis.
Cosmopolitan Western culture fills the resulting void. Israel has no nationalist ideology to promote state values, because the moral and material aspects of living in a state at war for half a century are unattractive. Better that Israelis admit honestly that the historical parts of the Torah are not factual,[3] get past the myths, and offer sustainable Jewish ideals—from Maimonides’ rationalization to Halevi’s poetry, from biblical minimalism to the Tanakh. There must be lively and honest discussion of Judaism. Jewish attempts to gloss over the weaknesses of Tanakh and the Talmud do not work in the light of modern criticism. Thoughtful Jewish criticism is better than unthinking acceptance. Criticism channels doubts which can lead to rejection of Judaism if they are repressed or not informed. Modern rabbis are like Shammai, who pushed the inquiring gentile away, while Hillel explained the essence of Judaism in a single sentence. Since most Jews never read the Tanakh, let alone the Talmud or the commentaries, rabbis should generate popular literature on Judaism—anthologies, commentaries, and anecdotes, like the short commentaries of the Lubavitcher Rabbi. The Israeli effort must be large scale. Some Christian foundations distribute their publications free, and both Christians and Muslims offer free religious instruction. Jews should do likewise. Synagogues in Israel and abroad should invite local Jews to participate in the events and provide background material on the ceremonies, even through bulk mail.
The present Israeli policy is indecisive. Another more practical strategy for Israel Defense Forces is air superiority with unhindered use of armor-piercing cluster and vacuum bombs,[4] chemical weapons, and tactical nuclear micro-charges to prevent extended military conflict in the Middle East and obviate Israel’s need for a large infantry. Israel's Defense Forces' intelligence and commando units can identify targets. Tank units and small contingents of mechanized Israel Defense Forces' infantry can perform clean-up operations. Israel should rely on nuclear weaponsfor deterrence, antiaircraft artillery for tactical defense, and a reasonable number of aircraft for strategic defense. Although Israel’s nearly six hundred combat aircraft are several times less than the cumulative assets of Israel's Islamic enemies, their planes are mostly outdated, and even earlier Israel usually destroyed at a more than a 10:1 shoot-to-loss ratio. Similarly, naval data are misleading: although Israel’s military maritime capabilities are minuscule compared to those of the U.S. or Russia, Israel does not have to protect her seas. Israel maintains 50+ ships only to boost the egos of the Israel Defense Forces' bureaucracy.
There is no need for Israel to spend a fortune getting ready for all-out war with Arabs. Armaments obsolesce. There is no reason for Israel to buy and stockpile readily available supplies for an unforeseeable future. Israel can buy arms when the Middle East conflict develops or, better, make treaties with major military powers to buy arms at any time. Israel cannot keep pace with the cumulative military spending of its Islamic enemies, almost ten times than Israel's.
Keeping masses of ground troops in Israel Defense Forces is an outdated and expensive approach to Israeli warfare. Israel Defense Forces of 175,000 costs the Israeli GDP in losses from lack of productive employment of about $3.5 billion, in addition to about $10 billion in direct costs of the Israel Defense Forces which could be decreased at least by a third by cutting the size of the standing Israeli army. Bureaucratic accommodation of Israeli military establishments and the military-industrial complex preserves large Israel Defense Forces; beside, Israeli soldiers are cheap and no commander ended up in jail for wasting them—though many should have. Israel should bomb the Islamic enemy into submission, either to terms or to an Israeli-imposed administration, and kept in line with the threat of Israeli violence. The Arab armies cannot compete with the Israeli Defense Force in high-technology warfare.
The Israel Defense Forces is more than sufficient to deter Muslim armies. Arabs are generally wealthier than in 1948 and not prone to anti-Israeli aggression. Israel need not enlarge Israel Defense Forces and bring on an arms race with the Arabs. Israeli war costs rise exponentially to maintain the Israel Defense Forces, build infrastructure in the Palestinian territories, cover social programs for Israeli veterans, suffer from little foreign investment in Israel, and cover the loss in GDP when productive Israeli workers are mobilized. The money Israel spends for war is needed for education, research, and culture. Young Israelis should be proud of those, not of military apparel.
Israel Defense Forces must become professional. Peacetime conscription of Israelis is economically and morally wrong. Young Israelis should not spend their most creative years in the Israel Defense Forces. Israel must reduce the term of service in Israel Defense Forces to a few months of basic training at most. That would allow for rapid mobilization of Israel Defense Forces in case of necessity. Conscription should target older Israelis. Most firepower of Israel Defense Forces is now concentrated in mechanized units, and so physical strength is not paramount anymore. Mature moral strength is more valuable on the battlefield. Fatalities among young Israeli soldiers are usually higher than among mature adults. Conscripting active Israeli voters from thirty to fifty years of age for both peacetime duty and first-response warriors might change many Israeli opinions. Currently, young Israelis are herded to the battlefield before they are old enough to stand for election and change the Israeli policy; most of them have not yet had a chance to vote against the Israeli politicians sending them to the slaughter. Lowering the voting age to bar/bat mitzvah is sensible in an honestly religious Jewish society but not a substitute for raising the draft age in Israel.
Drafting Israeli women for combat or as front-line support personnel of Israel Defense Forces is questionable. Girls should learn to be mothers, not killers. War changes people’s outlook on basic values. Being ready to kill an enemy child, even accidentally or in self-defense, is antithetical to the tenderness a woman feels for her own child. Equality before the law does not change the fact that men and women are different; if crime is predominantly a male occupation, war is even more so. Women are little represented in the Israel Defense Forces' air or tank divisions. Israel does not anticipate another all-out war like the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, where every Israeli counted since weapons were so scarce. Israel needs more mothers, not more soldiers.
After 1948, Israel won through mobility because Israel Defense Forces were better, not larger. A huge conventional Israel Defense Forces is obsolete and useless in Islamic terrorist warfare. Size of Israel Defense Forces compensates for the inefficiency developed both from self-restraint and Israeli’s unwillingness to fight for changing Israeli political doctrines, unlike 1948 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars when danger to Israel was clear and present. The Israel Defense Forces crosses a dangerous barrier toward the American-style bureaucratized saber-rattling monster, with expensive useless or insufficiently tested weapons, corps hanging onto similar weapons and losing specialization, commanders guided by self-aggrandizement instead of efficiency and demanding more weapons without cooperative regard to procurement needs of other corps and the capacity of the Israeli economy. The Israel Defense Forces became too big to retain its early venturesome spirit. Elected commanders of Israel Defense Forces instead of conformist Israeli political appointees, larger outsourcing of maintenance to private Israeli firms and tactical operation to mercenaries, and drastically reduced financing or increased participation in Middle East and other conflicts might slow the Israel Defense Forces’ deterioration.
It makes sense for Israel to change Israel Defense Forces in peacetime. Equipment maintenance can be outsourced to private Israeli companies, reducing costs to Israeli economy and creating an internationally competitive sector of the Israeli economy. Israel Defense Forces personnel can be reduced to a nucleus adequate to command, control, and gather intelligence, swiftly expandable by conscription if Arab-Israeli war looms. That would, however, mean Israeli pre-emptive-strike policy, since otherwise Israel’s Islamic enemies could easily disrupt Israeli economy by faking mobilization to keep Israel always mobilized.
[3] Talmud teaches that historical descriptions are given in the Bible only for their interpretation, Wajikra rabbah, 1.
[4] Restricted by various arrangements supposedly because of their extreme power, but actually a concession to states not possessing such powerful weapons and to advocates of humane war, preferably with boxing gloves. "Softening" warfare is a reaction to unwillingness of modern soldiers to fight for political objectives. The proper response is not fighting unnecessary wars; making them somewhat less painful only provokes more confrontations.