To achieve minimal direct involvement of Israel Defense Forces, some Arabs must be induced to take Israel’s side. That is not impossible. Bedouins regularly attacked their settled brethren. Arabs in one country regularly fight Arabs in another. So do clans within a single country. Israeli psychological warfare professionals will provide suitable smokescreens. Although it will be hard to get Arabs to fight for Israel, they will not hesitate to act against the Palestinians or Iran-supported fundamentalists or any kind of intra-Arab - and incidentally anti-Israeli - antagonist. Israel can easily flare Sunni-Shiite strife. The murder of peace-seeking imams would provoke protracted conflicts in Islamic countries for Israel's benefit. Wealthy Arabs could wage a vendetta against an Islamic terrorist group which incidentally killed their relatives.
It is hard for Israel to recruit Muslims from ideologically motivated intelligence services and terrorist groups. Israeli solution is to induce potential Muslim traitors to infiltrate the Islamic organizations on their own. Advertising Israeli rewards for sabotage or intelligence and killing Islamic terrorist leaders would help Israel. Infiltration takes years but can earn big rewards from Israel in the end. Israeli individual rewards to Arabs in the millions are not high compared to the reductions in Israeli military expenses they buy. Israeli operation should be easily accessible, a website where collaborators can contact Israeli intelligence services or Arab organizations opposed to particular Islamic terrorist groups. Big Israeli pay can buy sabotage from Arab mercenaries. Israel should learn to get Arabs to wage war for Israel. Israeli efforts to conquer the Middle East without war should be financed on military scale, comparably to the Israel Defense Forces' budget.
Islamic terrorists tempt Israel with an attractive way out: give up some non-essential land to Palestinians. The temptation to end the Arab-Jewish war expeditiously undermines Israeli resolve, already leaning toward the dead-end of concessions to Arabs.
Hamas is driving Israel from the Palestinian territories the way Hezbollah pushed Israel's out of Lebanon: a step at a time. Giving way to the Islamic terrorists' demands is an embarrassing option for Israel. But the Islamic terrorists' demands are elastic: withdraw from Sinai, then from Lebanon, then from the Golan Heights, then from Judea and Samaria, leaving Israel with Israel's 1948 borders. Israeli territorial losses in fewer than forty years show that Israeli policy of accommodating the Arabs is wrong—and endless. If Israel gave back all the Palestinian territories, a demand for the partition of Jerusalem would be next—and not just for administrative autonomy for Muslim shrines. After that, Israel would have to deal with the Palestinian refugees’ right to return to Israel—with reparations. Nothing precludes Arabs terrorists from fighting until Israel vanishes; indeed, the Arabs admit that every agreement with Israel is an intermediary step to that end. Acceding to their demands, Israel presumes they will stop after the Arabs meet their reasonable goals. Not so, not the least because the Arabs understand reasonable objectives differently from the Israelis.
Arab-Israeli peace would not necessarily solve the Islamic terror problem for Israel, at least not for many years. Many Muslims will remain who do not accept Israel’s existence. Islamic terrorism will become more sporadic as Arabs become wealthier and less prone to aggression against Israel, but it will remain and grow deadlier for Israel.
There is no possibility Israel can root out all the Islamic terrorists. Islamic terrorism is Arabs' effective political and military tool against Israel. Arabs are predisposed to it by a long history of Bedouin hit-and-run tactics. Even with the Middle East conflict ended, fringe Islamic groups and others will engage in anti-Israeli terrorism, and Israel will always be an attractive target for anti-Semites. So Arab-Israeli peace will not necessarily end Islamic terrorism. Unlike other countries, tiny Israel with a crowded population cannot tolerate even a single large-scale terrorist act, like hit the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001. Israel cannot avoid Islamic terrorism absolutely, so Israel must find pre-emptive countermeasures to nip it in the bud.
 Israel should give big rewards only to valuable spies who spend years or decades positioning themselves in Islamic establishments and know the price of their services. Rank-and-file traitors are inexpensive.
 While this book was being written, Mossad finally opened a Web site inviting recruits and tips. Mossad still needs to plant proxies to offer Arabs undetectable access to the site.