Israel should not let potentially hostile Islamic regimes build Chemical Biological Nuclear arsenals

After World War I, the Allies humiliated Germany politically, supported it economically, and failed to insure permanent German demilitarization. When the Nazis came to power, they were ready to exploit the accumulated hatred and the military industrial capabilities, a situation much like that in the Middle East conflict today. Germany started the war, even though the Allies outstripped it economically, in natural resources, and in manpower. How much more likely is heavily armed, fundamentalist, aggressive Iran to start a war with Israel? It does not matter that Arab armies cannot handle the Israeli Defense Forces. A few missiles with non-conventional warheads or a sea container with a nuclear weapon unloaded at Ashdod or Haifa would wipe out the Israeli population crowded on the narrow coastal strip of the Jewish state. Buffer zones are useful against Islamic terrorists but not against Arab aircraft or missiles. Preventing an Islamic nuclear attack is hard but critical to Israeli survival. Neither Israeli anti-aircraft nor anti-missile defenses will provide total security against Arab attack; and nothing less than maximum security is acceptable to tiny Israel.

Any large, militarist country is a potential threat to others. Islamic countries in particular have “proven criminal intent,” repeatedly warring on Israel. Israel can deal with war at her borders. Israel survived the 1948 war with Arabs, fought deep in Israel's territory. Israel did not counterattack when Iraqi Scuds penetrated Israel's defenses. But Israel cannot tolerate the risk of an Islamic nuclear attack. Demilitarizing the Muslims is risky for Israel, but to do nothing is suicide for Israelis, now or in the next generation.

It is hard for Israeli democracy to gather support for pre-emption unless the threat is clear, as in 1967[3] Arab-Israel war or in the case of the Iraqi Osiraq reactor. Pinpoint preemptive strikes, however, do not ordinarily propel Israel into war. In the earliest years, Israel launched limited retaliatory attacks against her Arab neighbors without inciting all-out war. Such tactics are inexpensive and let Israel keep the Israel Defense Forces lean.

Israel must destroy not only Islamic nuclear and medium- and long-range missile facilities but also the relevant infrastructure of scientists, laboratories,[4] launching pads, and airstrips, without exception, even at the risk of Israeli-Arab war, as in the case of Egypt. Israel lost a chance for Middle Eastern nuclear ban offered in 1976 by Egyptian Prime Minister Ismail Fahmy. Israel fooled the International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of Israel's nuclear reactors before, sealing sections with false walls, and could have continued. In the worst case, Israel could simply conserve her nuclear facilities, or nominally convert them to civilian use, and rest assured by the considerable number of Israeli nuclear charges hidden. Egypt only needed a face-saving excuse to kill its expensive nuclear program, and Israel stupidly failed to provide that pretext.

If Egypt seems stable and peaceful, consider how peaceful Lebanon, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan, and many other states were just before a political volte-face, something that happens in autocracies. Egypt went through various stages and rulers in only half a century. Radicals often attempted takeovers. Israel should at least prepare to strike automatically at Egyptian nuclear facilities the minute a hostile Islamic regime comes to power. But consider that good Egyptian presidents accumulate nuclear weapons for a single bad one. Delay would cost Israel dearly. The Egyptian army is no match for the Israel Defense Forces and strong only compared to other Arab armies. Napoleon conquered Egypt with a small expeditionary force, and Ariel Sharon was posed to do the same in 1973, had Israel not yielded to United States pressure. Economically, militarily, and psychologically, it is better that Israel suffer a confrontation now than bear the cost of defensive readiness into the distant future. The West tolerates Chinese nuclear weapons destined for use in Asia; but Egypt has no enemy beside Israel, and Israel cannot let Arabs detonate nuclear bombs anywhere near Israeli borders. What beside political cowardice prevents Israeli government from confronting the issue sooner rather than later? Kennedy responded to the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba with immediate confrontation to defuse the threat. The world closes its eyes to Islamic countries arming with nuclear weapons, much as it trusted Germany until the outbreak of WWII. Islam is as aggressive as Nazism, with as little reverence for human life, theirs or their Israeli enemies’.

Israel's another option is to agree to mutual destruction of nuclear arsenals and then re-arm secretly, which is how Israel acquired nuclear capability. Discovering a rearmament program in Egypt would be an Israeli legitimate reason to strike Egyptian nuclear facilities. Israeli national security is no arena for mythical knightly honesty; actually it is when Israelis make the Islamic enemy conform to idealistic pattern.

When the threat of Islamic nuclear development becomes credible, Israel should strike. Right now Israel is heading into a problem with Iran: should America succeed in changing the regime there, it would be next to impossible for Israel to attack a United States-sponsored country. Egypt similarly developed its nuclear weapons under the umbrella of American military guarantees, protecting it from Israel. Destroying the Iranian nuclear program now is wiser for Israel than hoping the United States will keep Iran from acquiring WMD and using them against Israel. It is not that Iran would use nuclear weapons against Israel: mullahs are not so sure of Ibn Kathir's seventy virgins to rush to paradise through Israeli retaliation. Iranians would pass the nuclear wepons to Islamic terrorists. Iran would not even need to make the transfer; the threat alone would increase Iran’s bargaining power versus Israel's dramatically. The United States could do nothing if Iran threatened to supply nuclear weapons to Al Qaeda: a preemptive strike would not eliminate all the weapon stocks and would invite nuclear reprisal from Iran against Israel. Nuclear weapons became the ultimate equalizer of power. How much can the owner of nuclear weapons bargain for? Quite a lot: North Korea won political and economic concessions by threatening to develop a bomb—and is developing it. Ransom is inadmissible: American accommodation of North Korea sets bad precedents for rogue regimes to extort American cooperation. Islamic terrorists with several nuclear bombs could force the evacuation of Israelis from the Middle East without serious casualties by detonating one bomb in the Negev and another on a ship fifty miles from New York harbor, and claiming to have others hidden in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Washington, programmed to detonate in forty-eight hours. A Jew, suppose a radical Islamic regime threatened distributing nuclear weapons to buyers or Islamic terrorist colleagues and offered to relent if the United States abandoned Israel. Or imagine if Islamic terrorists spread biohazard in New York and withheld the antidote until the United States left the Middle East conflict. Acquiescence to such demands is likely. Israel should not let Iran have nuclear weapons, even to be used against against targets other than Israel. Having used nuclear once, Iran would eventually target Israel. The United States does not punish Pakistan for its support of Al Qaeda because Pakistan has nuclear bombs but rather pretends to believe that Pakistan is not involved in Islamic terrorism. Nuclear weapons provide next-to-perfect immunity for sponsoring Islamic terrorism. A nuclear Iran could carry on conventional warfare without much fear of Israeli reprisal. Owning nuclear weapons pays, and Israel must not let her Isamic enemies have them. Israel would gain politically if someone exploded a nuclear bomb in the United States, the likely destiny of the first bomb the Islamic terrorists get their hands on. A unique weapon goes against the Great Satan, not its Israeli affiliate. Americans would see that the consequences, though horrible, are statistically slight and mostly psychological. Small nuclear stocks would no longer deter anything, and nuclear weapon would remain the major tactical weapon of Islamic terrorists, even used for commercial extortion, but of limited political use against Israel. Such an Islamic nuclear terrorist attack, though aimed at pushing America to isolationism, would likely lead it to harsher retaliation and pre-emption. Israeli aim is to get the United States to disarm rogue nuclear states at any cost. Faced with a real ultimatum, hostile nations would open their nuclear facilities to verification and interrogation to uncover all stockpiles. This Israeli policy could bring on a nuclear showdown.

That fear of retaliation stopped the use of poison gas in WWII is doubtful. The Soviets in 1941 and the Germans in 1945 were sufficiently suicidal to disregard the threat. Rather, chemical weapons are inefficient in the open air, especially if the wind changes. The means of production were vulnerable, and transportation was precarious. Weapons once made are used, and human nature has not changed in the nuclear era. At least some of Israel’s Islamic enemies do not fear retaliation and will use nuclear weapons against Israel as soon as they get them, not at all implausible with Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Egypt, North Korea, and Iran in the club.

Does Israeli-forced nuclear disarmament bring on an otherwise unlikely confrontation? Only confrontation between states is unlikely. The Islamic terrorists mean to attack Israelis, are not afraid, and do not care about Islamic collateral damage, as Osama's African bombing demonstrated. The question is not if nuclear confrontation with Israel is likely but if the Islamic terrorists are likely to get nuclear weapons. The A-bomb is based on technology everyone, including Muslims, understands. Its important parts are available from private firms for civilian purposes. Underpaid servicemen guard the nuclear stockpiles of irresponsible regimes with a proven record of supporting Islamic terrorists. Who in his right mind can say the Islamic terrorists will not get nuclear weapons and fairly soon? Tackling the problem now offers Israel advantages. Some nuclear states might be coerced or bribed into cooperation, but once Islamic terrorists use nuclear weapons, countries will be reluctant to give those practical weapons up. Forced disarmament is risky, but it eliminates loose nuclear arsenals that threaten Israel. Leaving things to their own devices accumulates the risk to Israel perpetually: after the first nuclear explosion in Israel, more are probable.

Israeli and American government procrastination aggravates the threat. Better that Israel forces North Korea to get rid of a few nuclear warheads than dozens. Better that Israel Defense Forces annihilate the reactor in Algerian desert now than resist nuclear blackmail of Israel when the reactor goes hot. The urgency for Israel is greater with nuclear aspirants like Iran, which has nuclear facilities but not the weapons targeting Israel, not yet. Any war, any pressure, involves the probability of reprisal, as would Israeli demand for nuclear disarmament. Why keep huge Israel Defense Forces, then shrink from using it against credible threats to Israeli national existence?

A nuclear strike against the United States or Israel in response to Israeli demand for the disarmament of a minor nuclear power is unlikely, since one or two bombs would not wound America critically but would elicit an overwhelming response. Israel's best bet is a pre-emptive strike against all possible nuclear storage facilities and a simultaneous airborne assault to capture the enemy leader and military officials, torturing them in Israel to reveal loose stocks swiftly.

Israel might effect nuclear disarmament by non-military measures. Bribes, threats of Israel Defense Forces' deployment, face-saving treaties could do the job. India and Pakistan would happily succumb to international pressure to dismantle nuclear facilities and destroy stockpiles, with a NATO guarantee of intervention in case of major conflict. North Korea would make nuclear concessions to buy international respect and aid which would push it toward integration with South Korea. Egypt could agree to regional nuclear demilitarization. The political options are numerous, but Israel and the West do not want to exploit them relentlessly. Buy-out programs should offer immunity and exorbitant Israeli payments for fissile material to black market operators, rising the tag beyond Islamic terrorists’ abilities. Even a billion dollars per nuclear head is a price to pay to clean up stolen weapons which would used otherwise against Israel.

The Israeli security belt is not limited to the neighboring Islamic states but also includes other countries likely to engage in nuclear proliferation, like Pakistan and North Korea who might sell nuclear arms to Islamic terrorists and actually sent combat aircraft to Syria and Egypt, respectively, during the 1973 war with Israel. Pakistan does not even need to sell the bomb: the Islamic fundamentalists in its nuclear programs will get the know-how out to terrorists soon enough. Israel should return to assassinating research fellows in hostile countries’ nuclear laboratories. They are enemy soldiers on duty against Israel, and Israel should treat them as such. Scientists are formally military in all rogue nuclear states. Israel should advertise her objectives, pursuing nuclear scientists from anti-Israeli everywhere and offering rewards for their heads. Israel would enjoy tacit support of other countries concerned about proliferation. Israel could persuade India to attack Pakistan’s nuclear facilities and stockpiles. After superficial objections, the West would applaud Israeli elimination of any rogue menace. Except for world opinion the United States would have long since done away with the North Korean, Pakistani, and Iranian nuclear programs. Seeing the Israelis doing the job for their benefit would only strengthen the American attachment to Israel.

Confusing the unfamiliar with the improbable, Israeli politicians doubt that Arab states or Islamic terrorists will use nuclear. Israeli commentators even say the Iranian program is less than some suspect, as if Israel cares whether Iran has five nuclear warheads or fifty. Israel’s rulers will not try to disarm Israel's enemies absent imminent threat, letting them accumulate or develop nuclear weapons, and ultimately use them against Israel. That absence of policy on part of Israeli government correlates with Israeli public opinion which is to take harsh action only when absolutely necessary—and too late, too difficult, or too costly. Israel should not let the natural weakness of a peaceful democracy mask the need for Israel to preempt to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The case of China and Russia is difficult. Both are certain to engage in proliferation, China later, but cash-strapped Russia’s military personnel and politicians are corrupt, and Russian nuclear warheads will eventually wind up in hands of Islamic terrorists. They will use the first one or two against the United States for maximum effect, but Israel is next. Israel can hardly attack China or Russia at this point, nor would the United States government take pre-emptive action against either. Israel should use public opinion to pressure America into buying up Soviet nuclear stockpiles and requiring the destruction of biological agents without compensation. Though the United States paid for the destruction of some Soviet weapons, many remain. Russia would probably insist on retaining some warheads to preserve her superpower status, though they are virtually useless without modern aircraft. Russia would probably give up her mobile intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, which are not very accurate and suitable only for large civilian targets. America may let Russia retain some silo-based missiles which are relatively open to control.

Luring China and her weapons into NATO and under central command is possibly the best option, though the pragmatic Chinese would likely hide a few. Economic sanctions would not help, as the aftermath of Tiananmen showed. Communists care more about ideology than people or the economy. That underscores the importance of undermining communism in China, fomenting democracy, and breaking the country up into reasonably-sized states dependent upon America and the West. A boycott aimed at establishing international control over Chinese nuclear weapons would be effective only if important Western countries participate. China needs many concessions from the international community, and every request should be used to gain further control over Chinese nuclear weapons. The United States could set an example by accepting international control of its nuclear weapons.

Any country with pieces of nuclear technology is a danger to Israel, even without threatening her. A host of unscrupulous proliferators—China, India, North Korea, Russia, Pakistan, Iraq, France, Switzerland, Argentina, even Morocco—helped Egypt mount a nuclear program. Some of them participated directly in what was clearly a war program. China enriched Egyptian uranium on its Russian-built centrifuges. Israel cannot control all those countries, but the world should. Anyone would worry about a neighbor storing dynamite; a postman would worry about delivering a book on bomb-making; ex-criminals may not buy firearms. Why does the public accept the dissemination of military nuclear technology and let rogues stockpile nuclear weapons? Americans accepted the inviolability of borders, a self-serving doctrine of European nation-states, as an excuse for not punishing nuclear proliferators. A country like Pakistan threatens the whole world with nuclear proliferation, protected by the fiction of sovereignty. No one who stores dynamite can expect to be left alone; a country building nuclear weapons may not claim sovereign immunity.

Nuclear proliferation through private companies acting as proxies for various governments is commonly ignored. After the United States pushed France out of the arrangement to build a nuclear fuel plant in Egypt in 1976, the private French company Robotel gave Egypt the hot cells essential for its plutonium extraction complex in 1980. Punishing private entities is simple even for Israel alone. Similarly, Israel should have pressed or bribed Niger not to sell uranium to Egypt.

To make things go more smoothly in Arab-Israeli war, Israel should force her Islamic neighbors to demobilize, citing fear of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of religious fanatics. While the United Nations would doubtless condemn such attacks, aiming to destroy the strategic weapons of sovereign Arab states, the United States and its allies would support Israel’s establishing Middle Eastern stability under American control. That kind of imposed peace kept the Roman Empire relatively safe for centuries.