Arabs now can commit aggression against Israel safely. In the worst case, Arabs simply retreat to the territories they held without gaining Israel's land. Israel must counterattack. In Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, the Israel Defense Forces should have taken Cairo and Damascus and replaced the leadership with Israeli puppets. The United States restrained Israel to prevent major destabilization in the region. If Israel had changed the regimes swiftly, the United States would have acquiesced, as when the Northern Afghan Alliance it cooperated with but did not welcome took Kabul in 2001. The United States could have commanded Israel and her neighbors to sign an Arab-Israeli peace treaty long ago on terms agreeable to the Arabs’ Russian sponsors. On the other hand, America wants no involvement in a major Middle East conflict. Low-intensity Arab Israel conflict suits the American role of arbiter. Its aid lets both Israel and Arabs go on, though they would have settled otherwise from exhaustion. The United States would also accept Middle Eastern stability under Israeli dominance, as American policy supports Japan against the rest of East Asia. Sensitive Israelis, however, do not take American hints and try to persuade the United States government of Israeli concern for human rights and Palestinian aspirations, as well as Israel’s accommodation of other Arabs—things altogether not on the agenda of American administrations which support brutal dictators when expedient.
Limited victory is meaningless in war among comparable enemies. The enemy must be destroyed, his economy devastated, his will and ability to fight extinguished for the foreseeable future, and his warfare capability permanently dispatched. In case of aggression, even exhaustion does not achieve that result, but only the crushing blow. Carthage’s recovery led Cato to proclaim, Carthago delenda est. The few historical examples to the contrary are explained by peculiarities not present in Israel’s relations with her Arab neighbors. During the War of Independence, America, with a defensive advantage and offensive logistical disadvantage, did not have to finish off Britain on its island. But Israel cannot base lasting peace with Arabs on the balance of power, if she ceases hostilities at or near Israel's borders or returns to them or offers to return Palestinian territory for paper agreements. Peace is the product of force, not convenience. Israel must make the Arabs to sue for peace in desperation. No other path leads to an Israeli settlement with the Arab states, not in the real world of the Middle East conflict. Overwhelming Israeli force, not exhaustive urban warfare, is the ticket. The U.S. realized that when it A-bombed Japan, forgot it in a hopeless rural war in Vietnam, and lapsed in Iraqi towns. Only general devastation extinguishes the popular will to fight. People ignoring this are doomed to return to battlefield until exhaustion overtakes them. The Arab-Israeli conflict is nearing the span of the Seventy-Year War.
Can five million Israelis overcome a billion Muslims? They surely can. Numerous empires achieved close to a 200:1 ratio of acquisitions to their own population: Babylon, the Greek federation, Rome, England, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, inter alia. Like start-up corporations with innovative products rise to dominate markets, countries with innovative strategies establish empires and sustain them at subjects’ expense. In the end, quantity matters and empires dissolve, but they last for centuries before settling into a comfortable niche of respectable isolation.
Muslims are not a coherent body, and setting their countries and factions to fight among themselves is no problem for a determined Israeli security service. The involvement of non-Arab Muslims is a potential advantage for Israel. They should be incited to claim control of Muslim shrines in Jerusalem. Islamic socialists could be prompted to call for the socialization of oil resources for all Muslims. The first step toward that goal could be letting a pan-Islamic representative body, not O.P.E.C., set the price of oil and force the West to replace Middle East oil imports with Russian, Canadian, Mexican, and Venezuelan oil. Anti-Muslim countries, especially India, but also Timor, Nepal, Serbia, Angola, Kenya, and others might provide manpower support for Israel Defense Forces in major Middle East conflicts—if Israel shows them gain. Modern war requires not huge masses of infantry but technical advantage, and Israel can subdue the Arabs by destroying their chemical, biological, and nuclear arsenals. An Israeli policy of zero tolerance for Islamic nuclear arsenals would have Western support. Israel has beaten large Arab armies, and the Israeli military technological edge will maintain that superiority. If Israel used its dominance to protect the free world from the spread of nuclear terrorism, the Western public would pressure their governments to support Israel and embargo military sales to Islamic countries, making Israel the Cerberus of the civilized world, facing Arab armies down.
Unlike governments, terrorists do not make peace. They do not fear retribution, even death. Terrorists must be destroyed. Islamic terrorists' lives are so miserable that high purpose easily outstrips earthly benefits of living in the world of Islam, and the terrorists are ready to die. Bettering Arab conditions would shrink the Islamic terrorists’ conscription base, though it would take time. Ridiculing Islamist ideology and Islamic religion is much easier and happened to the U.S.S.R. There, as in the Islamic world, people were dissatisfied with the governing ideology and their rulers and cynical about anti-Western propaganda. Ridiculing religion is insulting, but it registers and undermines clerical pronouncements. Dumb advertising works if repeated enough. The U.S.S.R. debilitated deep-seated Orthodox Christianity in just a few years by offering a substitute ideology, and the West offers consumerism. Such policies would not eliminate Islamic terrorists altogether but would decrease their number.
Israel's non-response to their aggression encourages Arabs. If Israel had carpet-bombed Cairo in Israeli-Egyptian war of 1968, there would have been no War of Attrition. If the Israel Defense Forces had marched through it in 1973, the issue of Israel returning the Sinai Peninsula to Arabs would not have arisen. Overwhelming retribution does not always crush the will to fight and provokes a suicidal response in two situations. One is the will to die in the apocalyptic war with evil, hardly applicable to Arabs. Another is the hope of survival. Arbitrarily applied violence during the French revolutionary Terreur stirred people to revolt. It does not do so, however, when it is employed as cleverly as Stalin did, who assured the Soviet population that only others were threatened, not they themselves. Without mass media, the French revolutionaries could not tell that lie and were forced out. Israel must assure Arabs that only Islamic terrorists and their Islamist sponsors suffer and that good Arabs have nothing to fear. Like the United Arab Emirates, Muslim countries that do not support Islamic terrorists need not fear Israeli retribution.
Labeling such measures war crimes is tautology. War is a crime. If a country decides to go to war, it is pointless to try to humanize what is inhumane in the first place.
 Even if Soviets intervened in Sinai, the U.S. could revenge in Israel the defeats in Korea and Vietnam. Absent the Soviet or American ground troops in Egyptian-Israeli war, the warfare would have been aerial, where America hold advantage. Both sides would not have used nuclear weapons, fearing reprisal. Soviets did not stand a chance in confrontation with the U.S. and Israel over Egypt because the Russian doctrine of overcoming qualitative deficiencies with quantity does not work with airlift.
Some explain Israeli restraint by Scud-B missiles with nuclear warheads which the U.S.S.R. reportedly deployed in Northern Egypt in the war last days. This argument works against Israeli politicians: if Israelis considered the nuclear threat credible, Israel Defense Forces had to destroy the missiles or force Egypt to remove them by escalation Kennedy employed in Cuban missile crisis. Still earlier in the Egyptian-Israeli war, Israel must have shot Soviet supply planes flying to Egypt; Israel not attacking supply lines is ludicrous.