Seizing another’s territory does not necessarily preclude a peace arrangement. Examples to the contrary abound. The French-German dispute over Alsace-Lorraine was not resolved but rather faded into insignificance. The United States took British, French, and Spanish territories. Saudi Arabia was born of conquest and annexation. Virtually no country occupies its original borders. Few borders survived the last century intact, and even core territories were established by force at the expense of some other country or an indigenous population.
Formally annexing the Palestinian territories would give Israel a freer hand to deal with the Palestinian terrorists and their supporters, since Israel would be defending Israeli territory. The legality of Israeli annexation would remain in dispute, but as the similar issue of Jerusalem annexation by Israel demonstrated, the Western powers do not worry much about the legal details of acquiring land; they all acquired their land more or less illegally. They worry more about current depredations on another nation’s (Palestine’s) territory only while the Palestinians exist—or are perceived as—a nation. The West would object more to Israeli seizure of a few hilltops for Jewish settlements than about Israel grabbing whole Palestine. Americans would tolerate Israeli annexation of the whole Palestine sooner than of some parts. Liberals, ignoring their countries' experience, would scream bloody murder, but the politicians at the helm are more realistic: Algeria, Tibet, the Falklands, Afghanistan, and Iraq are not the names from half-forgotten medieval books.
Becoming culturally attractive would facilitate Israeli annexation of the Palestinian territories. A nation will hardly cede valuable territory people it deems inferior, though loss to someone it admires might sting less. Arabs do not admire Israel; they attribute Israel's military victories to United States support,[8] and Israel's economic situation is feeble, especially contrasted with the oil-rich Arab economies. Britain was culturally attractive even to Muslims who trust the ideological superiority of their final revelation. Jews, second-rate dhimmis in the Muslim world for centuries, will achieve that goal only with difficulty. Arabs will make peace only when Israelbecomes a major economic power.
Israel, possibly the fourth strongest military power in the world,[9] is wasting Israel Defense Forces' potential and paying for it without using it. Israel Defense Forces could, however, be put to Israel's profit. Israel could establish herself as Middle Eastern empire undergirded by military might of Israel Defense Forces. Israel can seize territory from the Arabs (and perhaps others) or convert it into tribute-paying protectorates, prohibited from arming or mobilizing under the threat of Israeli retribution. Hordes of fellahin, though armed, would be powerless against an Israel with secure borders.
Colonialism, suppression, and repression of Arabs would impose a huge burden on Israeli morale. Using force for material gain does not set well on the Jewish conscience. To justify themselves, Israelis would treat their subjects as inferiors, as Israelis treat Palestinians now. But colonialism exists in other forms; Israel must investigate it and either accept with full knowledge of the moral consequences for Jews or reject with full understanding of the economic losses for Israel. Since the protection racket varies by degree, Israel may shrink from the extreme of direct colonialism for the milder option of using the Israel Defense Forces to protect the existing Arab regimes against their neighbors—for a fee.
Israel may find the natural resources of failed African states attractive. Israel need only occupy resource-rich areas, fence them off, and send Israeli companies to exploit them. The Africans receive no benefits from their resources, which are plundered by corrupt politicians or tribal strongmen. To save face, Israel might use a part of the proceeds for humanitarian purposes among the local population which would be better off under such an arrangement with Israel than they are now. The West tries to suppress the black market of diamonds, ostensibly to suffocate the terrorists financially—nicely protecting De Beers’ monopoly. Israeli occupation, by this logic, would extinguish many tribal wars.
Israel might play the balance of power game in the Middle East, supporting or protecting weak Arab states against the stronger, as when Israel defused the Syrian-Jordanian conflict. Israel replicates the peculiar position of Britain vis à vis Europe: strong enough to influence any process yet not immediately part of it. Israel might play that role in Africa, whose countries bear Israel no prejudice. Latin America and Asia are also attractive for Israel Defense Forces' involvement, but Israel should placate local powers, the United States, and China, by assuring them that such involvement is mercenary without political ambitions on the part of Israel.
Israel Defense Forces' protecting small to mid-size nations would pay Israel and win the Jewish state a place in the international arena. Because an army relies on the threat it poses and so does not have to jump into actual conflict, the job would not be unduly risky. The Israeli Defense Force, further, could hire infantry elsewhere and fight not for Israeli nationalism but for profit. Foreign mercenaries joining a strong Israel Defense Forces would not despise Jews, since anti-Semitism is provoked by Jewish weakness. Mercenaries in Israel Defense Forces are suited for moderate conflicts, even preferable to distance Israeli principals from their allies’ cruelty. Democratic, relatively open Israel cannot play the balance of power game, sending the Jews of Israel Defense Forces to support regimes regardless of moral merits; mercenaries can do this job.
Israeli legalizing private armies would bring armies of “war consultants” to Israel. The Jewish state has plenty of room for camps in the Negev, and the resulting competitive edge in warmongering would promote Israeli exports of military equipment.
[8] The Arab view is inconsistent with the facts. The U.S. first provided major aid to Israel in the closing days of the 1973 war to counter the massive Soviet aid to Egypt. The effect for Israel was largely psychological, since aircraft and tank reserves of Israel Defense Forces proved almost sufficient. Israel won her other wars without critical assistance of foreign powers.
[9] The second place for the Israel Defense Forces is justified better. Ramshackle Russian army lacks fighting capability, unless resorting to nuclear option which is unlikely: even without American military reprisal, economic boycott would ruin Russian economy hinging on oil and gas exports. Chinese forces are not tried in any major confrontation, and fared badly against Vietnamese. Chinese crude infantry power is of limited value. Chinese-made sophisticated weapons are as unreliable as Soviet. Many bad planes are worthless against few great ones Israel possesses. Technological advantage of the American and Israeli armies over those of other countries is overwhelming. Israel Defense Forces enjoys the same kind of advantage new high-tech factories have over the larger old ones: new is better than modernized. Financial restraints made Israel Defense Forces relatively lean, much more cost-effective than mammoth U.S. Army burdened with Stealth bombers, aircraft carriers, and the like.