It was almost impossible to fail with Syria. The country is led by a strong dictator who would have no trouble implementing any agreement. Syria’s Alawite regime is isolated from the population and needs foreign support. Assad is secular and cynical: he can pragmatically accept an alliance with America and disregard its anti-Islamic connotations. Syria is dirt poor, without any significant sponsor—it was up for grabs for peanuts.

In no place was the situation rosier for Obama than in Syria. Mubarak, a strong secular leader, is highly dependent on public opinion because Egypt is a democracy. Mubarak, accordingly, cannot push Hamas or the PA too hard. The Saudi royals, strong authoritarian leaders, have to uphold their Islamic credentials, especially in face of Shia expansion. The Iraqi government is too weak to implement anything.

Assad wants two small things: Lebanon and money. On Lebanon, he is both right and makes sense. Lebanon is not a viable state, but must be divided in among Israel, Syria, and the Christians. At any rate, America has no interest in Lebanon whatsoever. The United States was dragged into the conflict by France, a long-time imperial power in Lebanon. To imagine Lebanon free of Syrian influence is unrealistic, and such a state would not be better off. Long gone are the days when Lebanon was the Middle East’s Las Vegas and Switzerland together; now it is a Red-light district at most. Productive middle-class Christians have fled the country, which is now prone to sectarian clashes. Lebanon’s real choices are a Shiite state aligned with Iran, an Afghanistan-type area of perpetual tribal conflicts, or a secular state under Syrian control. Lebanon was historically a part of Syria. Syria controls it by controlling the flow of arms and commercial cargo through Lebanon’s northern border. There is not a chance that Syria would abandon Lebanon.

In terms of money, Assad can settle for very little. He is so poor he could only afford four MiG-31E’s, two of them dead, for spare parts. Poverty has made Syria very economical: instead of fighting its own war in Lebanon, it prefers to allow Iran to do the job, and claims its chunk of influence by periodically closing down the flow of Iranian arms to Hezbollah. Assad employed similar tactics with Iraq: he obtained influence there on the cheap merely by intermittently allowing Al Qaeda fighters free border access and then clamping down on them. A billion dollars a year in American aid, coupled with access to Western markets, would cause Assad to abandon Iran. As an Alawite, he despises those extroverted Shiite nuts.

The price of failure vis-à-vis Syria would be astronomical. Assad Sr was right saying that there can be no war in the Middle East without Egypt, but no peace without Syria. Syria can destabilize every country in the vicinity by simply opening its borders to terrorists. Young Assad lacks the political acumen of his artful father, but he is far smarter, a sort of Michael Corleone to his father’s Vito. He understands that he does not need many weapons: Jews have a low tolerance to losses and are afraid even of his chemical arsenals, which have long proved useless in offensive warfare. So Assad concentrates on what can be termed nominal arsenals: a large number of outdated missiles and some chemical and biological weapons. His nuclear program could not produce more than a few bombs, and it is not clear at all whether the program was Syria’s or whether Syria was just hosting a part of Iran’s nuclear development. Assad’s danger lies in his rationality: he is equally comfortable working with the Americans and the Iranians and spends frugally without involving himself in the arms race. He prefers an alliance with the Russians, which brings him very little aid, but no commitments and some weapons, to deep involvement with Americans.

Israel cannot make peace with Syria on her own: Assad is interested in the Western world rather than the Golan Heights. Any agreements with Syria will remain on paper and will not lead to normalization, as indeed there is no normalization with Egypt. The absence of normalization is not Assad’s fault: he has noted correctly that popular Arab hostility against Israel precludes normal relations.

Since Syria is a major enemy, and making peace with it is impossible, Israel must resort to retaliation, containment, and forced demilitarization by relentless bombing raids in response to Syrian aid to Hamas and Hezbollah. Assad does not value those terrorist outfits highly enough to risk his presidential palaces, and the world would remain relatively quiet while Israel bombed the rogue state.

Ceding the Golan Heights to Syria is overwhelmingly unpopular in Israel, and negotiations greatly worsen Olmert’s public standing rather than improve it. Unlike Judea and Samaria, which are off-limits to most Israelis, the Golan Heights are a popular destination, and have been for 2/3 of Israel’s history, forty years out of sixty. The sense that the Golan Heights belong to Israel is deeply ingrained in the public mind, and no politician would promote himself by giving them away.

Turkey announced that the Golan talks had reached a dead end just weeks ago. Neither Israel nor Syria has changed its mind since then. Israel’s conditions are unworkable for Syria: it doesn’t need the Golan Heights so much as to abandon Iran and Lebanon/Hezbollah. Syria’s condition of access to Lake Kinneret is suicidal for Israel as the water level is already below the critical line. Whatever meager trust Syria might have in Israel, it is not reciprocated: Israel cannot hope that upon signing a shred of paper Syria would honor its obligations and extinguish its support for Hezbollah, or at least forbid the guerrilla group to engage Israel. The similar problem of mutual distrust appeared in the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations, and was only solved by the US guarantees—but there is no one to guarantee for Syria.

The notion of a peace treaty is absurd. Peace is not a product of words on paper, but of boots on the ground. European states signed peace treaties which proved merely to be ceasefires lasting several decades. Critically, European peace partners were historically of comparable size; all of them had sufficient depth of defense to react to the other side’s breach of ceasefire.

Israel’s peace with Egypt proved disastrous. The level of Egypt’s support for Hamas far exceeds its support for the fellaheen guerrillas in the 1950s, which activity prompted Israel to launch the war of 1956. Behind the American guarantees and with American aid, Egypt amassed a very capable army whose only enemy is Israel. Should Egypt start a more or less covert nuclear program, Israel would find it hard politically to attack the Egyptian nuclear facilities and be condemned worldwide for breaching the celebrated but worthless peace.

To sign a peace treaty with Syria is simple: launch a preemptive strike, suffer some Syrian missile strikes, get Israeli tanks into Damascus, and bomb Syrian towns daily until the enemy surrenders. Then impose demilitarization on the Syrians and live happily, striking them again whenever they attempt to build an army. That’s the only true peace, through unconditional surrender.

The current peace talks with Syria are not dangerous: even if supported by everyone from the US to Iran, they will drag on for years, and in the current atmosphere of universal dislike for Assad, no progress in peace negotiations is likely.

Olmert re-launched negotiations immediately after receiving Bush’s commitment for harsh measures against nuclear Iran. The Israeli government is trying to discourage Syria from retaliating on Iran’s behalf after the US-Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. Such an attack is so far forthcoming amid Rice’s opposition. Israel will likely use Tomahawk-type missiles, and the US will employ stealth bombers (which have seen virtually no action before) and possibly Minuteman ballistic missiles. Using Israeli tactical nuclear weapons remains a wonderful possibility. Iran won’t seriously retaliate due to its characteristic mix of caution and cowardice multiplied by the absence of capable weaponry. A few missiles might slam through Israeli air defenses, and a few terrorist acts will be carried out abroad, but that’s it.

Even Olmert’s touted new criminal investigation may be a fiction aimed at convincing Iran that Israel is not ready to strike now. The investigation, for all its pomp, is legally meager. The police must realize that it is impossible to connect Olmert’s appropriations from the campaign donations to the token assistance he extended to Talansky, and so bribery cannot be proved. Moreover, no one in the establishment is really interested in creating a precedent of indicting a top politician for crimes every politician is guilty of.

The absence of a ground operation in Gaza is of the same stock: Barak cannot afford to be bogged down in urban battles and the inevitable international outcries while at the same time preparing both an attack on Iran and the home front defenses. Due to the upcoming elections in the US and Israel, Iran is going to be attacked this year.

It was entirely different with the Cold War. Tens of thousands of nuclear warheads made a hot war prohibitively destructive; the fear of the enemy was crushing. Theoretically, crushing fear can lead to desperate attack. That rarely happens in practice, for whatever is crushed, cannot rebound.

Israel fears a Syrian military buildup on the Golan Heights. Syria fears Israel’s military exercises near the Golan Heights and political instability in Israel. Israel fears hundreds of Syrian mid-range missiles and tens of thousands of short-range rockets capable of showering Israel in spite of her missile defenses. Syria fears an Israeli attack against its missile sites and other military installations. That cycle of mutual fear cannot be discharged by diplomatic efforts. It should be escalated beyond the other party’s tolerance. Israel should threaten the immediate nuclear annihilation of Syria in response to any rocket shower on Israel.

Assad believes he can get the Golan Heights back without winning the war, just like Egypt got the Sinai even though it lost the war in 1973. The threat of regional destabilization will put US pressure on Israel to cede the Golan Heights to Syria. Assad, therefore, can start a war to lose it. Olmert needs a major victorious war for his career. Iran wants a war in the Middle East to distract attention from its nuclear program. IDF needs a war with a conventional enemy to recover its reputation after too many losses in fighting guerrillas. The stage is set for a senseless war that everyone needs.

The concept of crushing fear fully applies to the Palestinians. The British quashed the Palestinian insurrection in the 1930s by overwhelming retaliation, which included the razing of towns, mass killings, and other orthodox military measures. Instead of provoking Arab insurgents with tales of Palestinian statehood, Israel should crush the hopes of the Palestinians: kill every high bureaucrat and member of the Palestinian parliament, ban political associations, shoot suspected guerrillas, and transfer the population. Palestine with a hope is better for Israel than a hopeless Palestinian state.

It’s easy to sign a peace deal with Syria: take a pen and sign the agreement. The two sides’ positions are clear: Syria demands the Golan Heights and Israel (Lieberman included) agrees to relinquish them. The demilitarization of the Golan Heights is a non-issue: the place has in fact been demilitarized for the last forty years.

Syria’s support for Hezbollah has nothing to do with the peace deal: Hezbollah has no designs on Israel. Hezbollah evicted Israel from Lebanon and rested, except for isolated border incidents, which always happen between hostile states. Hezbollah’s military build-up is purely defensive: its rockets pose no strategic threat to Israel; Hezbollah doesn’t expect to prevail against the IDF in any offensive.

Syria’s support for Hamas is very limited, and is dwarfed by the aid Hamas receives from Egypt (which is at peace with Israel) and Iran. Hamas’ largest donors are not Muslims, but Jews and Christians who give money to Palestinians—Hamas’ voters.

Israel and Syria don’t sign a peace deal for a simple reason: they don’t need it. Both sides would gain nothing from peace. Israel and Egypt, at peace for forty years, have not reduced their armies, established meaningful commerce, or developed popular goodwill toward one another. Egypt plays nice with Israel only because of the IDF—as does Syria.

Assad would love to show his nation that he got the Golan Heights back from Israel, but the concomitant peace with the Zionist enemy would cost Assad dearly. In a similar situation, Sadat had a very hard time selling peace with Israel to common Egyptians.

Nations celebrate victories, not peace deals.

UN peacekeepers in the Golan Heights confirm that Syria does not conduct any significant military buildup. In the most unrealistic scenario of Syria attacking Israel, Syria would only aim at returning the Golan Heights. Israeli government hurries to give the land away before Syria starts fighting for it. Why? Wait and see if Syria succeeds.

Syria knows it stands no chance against Israel. Balance of military power with Israel was much more favorable to Syria in the 1970s than now. Russian anti-air and anti-tank missiles which Syria acquired recently are not a critical impediment to the IDF advance. Mere five cutting-edge MiG-31 interceptors purchased from Russia won’t save the day for Syria, especially since its pilots are poorly trained. Syria needs not confront Israel directly, but is better off waging peripheral wars through Hezbollah and Hamas.

Historically, Syrian aggression on Israel was only a sideshow of Egyptian operations. Today, Syria counts on Iran – but Iran failed recently to protect Lebanon. The Iranians proved themselves wise and didn’t allow Hezbollah to strike Tel Aviv with Zelzal-2 missiles. Syria can only depend on Iran’s protection when Iran goes nuclear. Though Iran assuredly won’t nuke Israel to save Syria at the cost of Tehran, Iranian nuclear blackmail won’t allow Israel to occupy Damascus and replace Asad. Nuclear Iran will allow Syria to invade the Golan Heights with only limited liability.

Iran works fast to obtain the bomb. Contrary to my analysis, American officials estimated that Iran will build a nuclear bomb not before 2011, perhaps even 2017 while Israeli experts spoke of 2009. The Iranian Interior Ministry recently vindicated my estimates with the claim that Iran has already enriched 220 lbs of uranium. The most primitively designed bomb requires about a thousand pounds of enriched uranium, and advanced tactical nukes can weight as little as 35 lbs and possibly down to ten pounds. Iran, therefore, has already enriched enough uranium for an advanced nuclear bomb or, by the most conservative estimates, produced 20% of the uranium required for a primitive nuclear charge. That quantity was achieved on only 3,300 centrifuges in two months. Iran plans to run 60,000 centrifuges. The produced uranium is certainly stored away from the possible targets of the US and Israeli strikes. Iran received nuclear weapons designs from Pakistan, North Korea, and likely from China and is ready to form the enriched uranium into warheads.

The US rejected talks with Iran by demanding that Iran ceases nuclear enrichment as a pre-condition of talks – an evidently unworkable proposition. With the EU solidly opposing Iranian nuclear program, the US and Israel seem gearing for a strike. Short of the strike against Iranian nuclear facilities, neither Olmert nor a Republican presidential candidate stands a chance in elections. Thus the review date of the sanctions against Iran set for the end of 2007 to move the wildly popular attack closer to the elections.

Syria is irrelevant. Israel needs not peace with it. The keys to the Golan Heights are at Natanz.

Israel frets now about the war with Syria. What’s the problem? Unlike its ancient counterpart, modern Syria has repeatedly proved itself immensely inferior to Israel in military contests. Syria is afraid of invading even Lebanon, but funds Hezbollah and fringe militant groups like Fatah al Islam instead. Syria remembers well the times when IDF tanks were forty miles from Damascus. Assad understands that this time Israel – with US approval – would topple his regime. Syria is very different from Hezbollah: Syria cannot disperse among the civilians like a guerrilla group does. Assad is very different from Meshaal: Assad is formally appointed and could be removed from office. Syria could try small-scale provocations like conquering a beachhead on the Golan Heights but won’t massively launch SCUD missiles against Israeli targets for fear of retaliation. Syria has too few Russian anti-aircraft missiles, and they offer no absolute protection, anyway. Syria lacks the kind of air defense superiority Egypt had with SAM-5 missiles in 1973. Russian anti-tank missiles are good, and Syria possesses enough of them to repel the first counter-attacks, but Israel could shower Damascus with missiles instead of a ground invasion.

Syria realizes its weakness and clings to Iran as it clung to Egypt before. Egypt abandoned Syria and signed a peace treaty with Israel. Shiite Iran will all the more abandon Syria. Even a nuclear Iran won’t risk Israeli nuclear retaliation by protecting Syria.

In order to have a peace deal with Syria, Israel will have to abandon the Golan Heights. Demilitarized, they won’t be a huge strategic threat for Israel. Early warning stations will have to go, but then Israel has satellites and AWACS aircraft. Honestly, we want to keep the Golan Heights simply because we love them. The place is nice and enjoyable, compared to the moon-like Israeli landscape elsewhere – short of some places in Galilee, which is populated by Arabs so densely as to make the place scarcely useful for the Jews.

Judaism opposes symbols and pushes Jews to comprehend transcendent truths. The Israeli government lusts after symbols. A peace treaty is one such symbol. A peace treaty is no more a peace than a statue is a god. For the price of the lovely Golan Heights, Israel can have a peace treaty with Syria. Possibly, Syria would diminish its support for Hamas – though not for Hezbollah which furthers Syrian interests in Lebanon. But even Egypt under a very reasonable Mubarak spirals up an arms race with Israel and tacitly supports Palestinian terrorists by allowing unhindered cooperation with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Regardless of any peace treaty with Syria, Israel won’t be able to reduce her army; after the peace agreement with Egypt, the IDF has actually grown. Syria is irrelevant for Israel economically. The Syrians are the most ancient Jew-haters and won’t embrace their Israeli neighbors.

There can be no peace with Syria.

Solana’s case is easy: Israel only needs to voice her support for the Basque people. If the Golans are rightfully Syrian, then the Basque country belongs to Basques. If the EU helps Syria, Israel has every reason to help Basques with safe haven, training, and the UN representation. America played that tactics with Iraqi Kurds. Supporting separatists is a common way to pressure a state into more amenable policy. Don’t allow the EU to kick Israel around.

Dealing with the devil is not only immoral but also useless, far beyond the skills of ordinary politicians. America dealt with the Shah, Saddam, Fahd, Arafat, and lost every time, earning popular hatred in the process. The US refused to negotiate with the Nazis but talked with the Soviets; what’s the difference? One talks to strong, politically tolerable enemies; destroy the rest. Assad is weak. Is he tolerable? Only if the US tolerates his support of the Iraqi insurgents, Hezbollah, and Hamas.

America is not at war with Syria but in direct confrontation short of belligerency; sanctions are sometimes the last measure before war. America clashes with Syria on a host of issues. Kerry’s olive branch, offered to Syria in defiance of government policy, amounts to betrayal and criminal collaboration with enemy.

What could Kerry offer Assad? Pressure on Israel to return the strategically important Golan Heights. An international role for the Syrian regime despite its support for Hamas and Hezbollah. Aid? Weapons?

Kerry’s attempt at peacemaking is pathetic: a person with no knowledge of military or regional realities, lacking power or expertise, what could he do? Kerry is only making PR for Assad.

Israel could deport Jordanian Arabs a hundred kilometers to Iraq whose weak government would be unable to counter the relocation. Population transfer is hard. Dealing with an aggressive Palestinian Jordan thirty years from now willf be much harder.

Christian-Muslim Lebanon is a state of wolves and – well, not exactly sheep. The two inherently hostile religious groups cannot live together. Catholics and Protestants fought civil wars in Europe, and Christians and Muslims will fight in Lebanon. Dismantling that state would be a favor to its inhabitants.

Israel needs a buffer zone in the north. Lebanese Christians want their own state – an extremely welcome development for Israel, otherwise the lone non-Muslim entity in the Middle East. Syria rightly considers North Lebanon Syrian territory.

Expansionist Syria is Israel’s natural ally. Israel and Syria share the goal of correcting the colonial powers’ geographical errors. Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq are not viable states. The sooner they are taken off the map, the less blood spilled there.

Talk to Syria? About what? To return the strategically important Golan Heights is to commit military suicide. Beside, Syria doesn’t need them; their occupation does not prevent peace. Assad formulated his demands to Israel: a Palestinian state, a partitioned Jerusalem, and the return of the descendants of Arab refugees. He also implied that Israel and the US should stop treating terrorists as terrorists, and Syria as a terrorist state. No basis for negotiation. Assad is comfortable with the current situation. He needs talks only to boost his political position in the Arab world and rescue Syria from being an international outcast. For Assad, talks with Israel are a way to break Syria’s diplomatic isolation.

If, however, Israel attacks weak Syria because it hosts Hamas and aids Hezbollah, peace could ensue. With Israeli bombers over Damascus, Syria would have to agree to a peace treaty.

Other than an attack on Syria, a do-nothing policy is best. Israel doesn’t need economic cooperation with backward Syria. No peace treaty will let Israel disarm, since Syria would break the treaty if Israel became weak. A century of non-belligerence would be a better basis for peace than a paper peace treaty.

Neither should Israel conduct incessant negotiations with the Palestinians. Israel must act according to her enemies’ mentality: a strong power dispersing favors and blows. Set the terms for the Palestinians. If they do not comply, bomb them. Protracted negotiations and intermittent ceasefires allow the Palestinians to re-arm and dig in. Arms are trafficked into Palestine? Bomb the security offices. Rockets fired on Sderot? Clear the no-pass zone along the border with Israel and shoot anything that moves. An Israeli soldier is kidnapped? Shell Palestinian towns randomly until he is returned. So long as Israel owns a gun, she does not need to negotiate with a pen.