Russia

Russian Jewish oligarchs seem to embrace Israel. The major reason behind their interest to the Promised Land is its non-extradition statute: Israeli law generally bans rendering a Jew to foreign prosecution. Israel is also notoriously lax on money laundering and foreign tax evasion: police investigate money laundering only when it coincides with a major tax evasion in Israel. Another reason why Russian oligarchs love Israel is because she is a backwater village to them susceptible to inexpensive takeover.

Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs invariably participate in those countries’ elections; large business there is inseparable from politics. The costs and difficulties involved in Russian and Ukrainian politics dwarf those of Israel. It is not unusual for a Ukrainian oligarch to spend $10-30 million for his own tiny party in parliamentary elections; contributions to large parties, especially in Russia run much higher. Parliamentary seats are sold at $4-10 million apiece. In comparison, the power in Israel comes on the cheap. Russian oligarchs see Israel as a political investment opportunity. For them, it is not only or even primarily a matter of profiting from politics, but mostly a way to realize their dreams of power. They come so close to power in Russia and Ukraine but are always vulnerable to anti-Semitic rulers. In Israel, the oligarchs can finally dominate.

Israeli politics is very provincial. Even a no-one called Netanyahu rose to power by hiring American campaign managers and investing relatively little in advertising. Peace Now became prominent by using forty-year-old tricks of political campaigning. Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs possess vastly more sophisticated experience of managing political campaigns and imagine they can influence Israeli politics efficiently.

The oligarchs are way smarter than average Israeli politicians; it’s hard to find a person sillier than an average MK. But it takes luck rather than genius to become an oligarch in Russia, and the magnates often overestimate their political power. The oligarchs are proverbially hapless in politics, consistently losing their political investment on the advice of cheating campaign managers.
Thus we see Michael Cherny and Vadim Rabinovich investment in Lieberman going sour: after short-term success, Lieberman the phony predictably loses his support base. Cherny and Rabinovich bet on a commonsense idea of militant Russian identity in Israel, but once that idea failed to bring Lieberman’s electorate substantial improvement, they weren’t able to redefine his platform. With Likud making inroads into Lieberman’s Russian audience, and ad hoc parties such as the Pensioners’ taking their share of Russian voters, Lieberman’s project is doomed. Lieberman will retain some supporters, bent on taking him for messiah, but their number would guarantee him only an insignificant position in the Knesset. It is possible that Lieberman can heat up his voters with demagoguery once again, but his trend is downward. Lieberman’s case is the first Israeli instance of a widespread Ukrainian phenomenon: parties which depend on lone oligarchs are doomed. The oligarchs cannot allow their parties to be strongly anti-government, and so the parties lose their opposition identity, become mild and unattractive for voters. Lieberman’s oligarchic sponsors do not rationally depend on Israeli government as they make money elsewhere, but so far they habitually avoid alienating the ruling establishment.

Or consider a Jew with an odious last name, Gaydamak (gaydamaks are the worst anti-Semitic strain of Cossacks). He partners with KGB/ FSB in many businesses, from Soviet foreign debts to weapons sales, but now miraculously converted into Israeli philanthropist. Gaydamak was always frank about his social and eventually political ambitions in Israel. After the years of being derogatory called “Arkasha” by his KGB overseers, Gaydamak wants to become a political boss. His entourage of Israeli advisors is laughable, though; they play the king rather than trying to make him. In Israeli political vacuum, Gaydamak’s bizarre political party can get even 14 seats, but will hardly enter the Knesset in subsequent elections. Messianically minded Jews have elected a number of such single-session parties, and almost none of them staged a comeback. Gaydamak’s sensible social slogans target voters across the political spectrum, thus making him dangerous to every politician. Upon entering the Knesset, Gaydamak would likely be ostracized by fellow politicians. He can make a decent political figure: not prone to petty corruption and not very left.
Like other very rich Jews, Gaydamak cannot be right or Jewish: such stance would offend his Gentile friends and business partners. Olmert likewise describes Bush whose peace process kills the Jewish state as very friendly; Jewish values and interests are an uncivil obstacle in the friendly chat of ex-Jews with fellow Gentiles. It is impolite to stubbornly insist on Abraham’s right to Hebron and Jacob’s right to Schem when a friendly powerful Gentile wants to help you out of that mess with Arabs that his predecessors set up. It is ludicrous to speak of Jewish choosiness, truth of Judaism, and religious right to the land at business meetings and debauch parties. Gaydamak, accordingly, spends money to alleviate the harm done by defeatism rather than helps to achieve the victory; he helps Sderot refugees rather than outpost settlers.

Lev Levaev comes very close to being the fifth column. His major income source, trade in Russian diamonds, wholly depends on Putin’s whim; Levaev, therefore, have to carefully dance to Putin’s tune. And so Levaev sponsors the alien Russian culture in Israel; instead of integrating the Russian Jews into Israeli milieu, they are kept distinct. Levaev also fosters political ties between Israel and anti-Semitic Russia; his role is especially dangerous because of his contacts in the highest political echelons of Israel. Levaev cooperates with Putin and, for example, on Angola diamonds – with Mossad’s ex-chief Mossad Danny Yatom. It is plausible that he acts as a link between them, essentially abetting a high treason. Levaev, like other oligarchs, is left: an aggressive, religiously charged Jewish state is not good for his business. Superficially, Levaev supports Chabad charities, but his own shopping malls work on Shabbat. The Jewish schools Levaev sponsors in Russia and Ukraine are thinly disguised assimilationist shops which teach formalized religion, hateful to the children, instead of the real Judaism and Jewish values. Levaev is a typical religious atheist who separates God from business. Like Vyacheslav Kantor and so many others, Levaev chose the respectful position of Putin’s court Jew instead of simply being a person true to Judaism.

The latest Russian Jewish oligarch who established connection with Israel is Roman Abramovich. He survived Putin’s purges of Jewish oligarchs, and exhibits absolute loyalty to the Russian regime; a shred of loyalty to anti-Semitic Russia amounts to treason against Israel. Abramovich is far richer than any other Israeli oligarch and, considering his extravagant spending habits, can reach almost any political goal, if only temporarily. There is no doubt that Abramovich would be as left and pro-Russian as the other oligarchs. He has a history of social mega-projects in Chukotka, a far Siberian region where he serves as absentee governor. Abramovich is therefore likely to follow in Gaydamak’s steps, starting with huge cocktail parties and ending with pompous welfare projects. Given Abramovich’s track record of keeping low political profile in Russia, he is unlikely to exhibit political ambitions in Israel.

Putin’s tremendous influence on Russian Jewish oligarchs presents a problem. Putin is very different from previous Russian leaders: he is not a nomenclature bureaucrat who carefully charts his course, but a petty KGB officer turned corrupt businessman turned politician turned tsar. Putin is, in a sense, rootless; he lacks political fundamentals. His thinking is that of the proverbial “new Russian” businessman, entirely lacking strategic dimension. The nearest Western analogy is of a spoiled and not particularly bright child who suddenly became a large company’s CEO. Putin is unpredictable; he makes moves based on curiosity and desire to show his power. Now the Putin-controlled Jewish magnates can establish control over Israel. They can spend much more on elections than any Israeli party, and invest more in the electoral-oriented welfare than any charity. In all likelihood, the MAPAI-built security apparatus of Israel would grind the oligarchs. And we shouldn’t pity them.

It took the Russian Empire three centuries to develop a caste of professional bureaucracy by mass import of foreigners into that profession. By the late nineteenth century, Russia finally replaced most Germans on the government service with natives. Still, provincial bureaucracy was famously corrupt and inefficient. Bolsheviks killed out the tsarist bureaucrats but failed to create new ones. Communist officials throughout the existence of USSR were commissars rather than bureaucrats; they relied on arbitrary commands rather than professionalism and cooperation.

In terms of professionalism, Russia has lost two generations which graduated from mid-1980s until now. The quality of education greatly deteriorated in the last twenty years with brightest students and many professors leaving universities for entrepreneurship. Russia’s universities offer very poor education now and there is no chance of changing that situation soon: there are too few good teachers to educate a new generation of professors. The diversity and complexity of modern knowledge made it very fragile. There could never be enough good teachers to staff mass education, but Russia lost the great educational potential it painstakingly developed over the previous century.

Why do we need Israel? It is sickening to see Israelis electing the governments that trample upon every commandment. Israeli rulers made it into a habit conducting peace process negotiations on Sabbath, introduced ultra-left school education whose atheist brainwashing exceeds the policies of Russian communists, welcomes the “inhabitants of the land” instead of driving them away, and now gives the Land of Israel to idol-worshipers.

In a highly symbolic move, Olmert’s government agreed to transfer a major piece of real estate in Jerusalem, the Russian Courtyard to Russia’s government. It is not even an issue of legal rights – the Russians have none, as the property was purchased by the long-defunct tsarist charity. Israel had previously dispossessed scores of Arab villagers who had incredibly stronger rights to the land than the Slavs. Faithless Israeli government fearfully avoids demolishing many Christian Orthodox churches that dot Jerusalem landscape, though it isn’t clear how those churches are different from Hitler’s monuments. It was Christians rather than Muslims, Hindus, or Martians who exterminated the Jews for centuries. The churches in Jerusalem are a political symbol of the institutional oppression of Jews. Nazis held power for years, but the Orthodox Church conducted anti-Semitic propaganda and organized massacres for centuries. The Russian and Ukrainian pogrom mobs with Orthodox cross in hand annihilated Jews. Besides the political issue, there’s an explicit commandment to refrain from selling Jewish land to idolaters. And are the Orthodox Christians not idolaters? They revere the weeping icons! That’s right, some of the most revered Christian icons “weep” occasionally, and are worshiped for that very behavior. Let’s not presume ancient Greeks so stupid as to believe that their statues are really enlivened; ancient idolaters worshiped the images as a symbol of divinity – just like the Orthodox Christians worship their icons which feature their deity (a good Jew, actually). Worse, the Orthodox Christian churches in Jerusalem picture what they believe to be God. However one interprets the prohibition of graven images, it doubtlessly covers the false images of God.

Tolerating the Nazi-like, idolatrous Orthodox Christian churches in Jerusalem is, moreover, worthless. Russians refuse to return hundreds of thousands of Jewish properties they confiscated after the Nazis massacred their owners, or to restore to Jews thousands of synagogues confiscated by communists. Russians eagerly appropriate real estate, such as the Russian Courtyard, but supply anti-tank and -aircraft missiles to our Muslim enemies, work with Iran on its nuclear program, and resumed massive Navy presence in Syria.

Jews don’t gain anything by brazenly violating the commandments.

The Russians’ pro-Putin sentiment can quickly change. Many opted for Putin as seemingly the only alternative to Yeltsin-era chaos. After the several years of orderly statehood under Putin, many voters no longer see the strong-hand policy as the priority. Putin’s rape of Russian constitution, whether by remaining in the office for the third term or switching state powers to Putin-the-prime-minister, won’t be popular. Russians vividly remember the lawless Soviet years, and many won’t welcome Putin’s illegal moves to stay in power. Putin a perpetual leader painfully reminds many adults of the Soviet Secretary-Generals. Putin has no opportunities to continue showing his attractive strength. Oligarchs are humbled, the war in Chechnya entered the truce phase, and Putin is on the brink of falling into the cognitive mold of petty generalissimo. Putin’s only remaining sphere for show of force is anti-American politics but Russian people, though enjoying it, are unwilling to enter the arms race or political standoff.

Putin the outgoing leader aroused sympathy among Russians. They remembered his achievements such as curtailing the rampaging theft of state property, and valued his decency of leaving the presidential office within the constitutionally set time frame. The Putin who betrayed their hopes for a law-abiding leader would be much less popular.

More Russians will vote for Putin in the presidential elections than have voted for his party. But among the third of the population who voted for the party, many were intimidated into doing so, others succumbed to massive propaganda whose influence is fleeting, and still others saw Putin’s party as the only credible political force on the background of Russia’s despised liberals. Only perhaps a quarter of Russians strongly back Putin. That’s far short of the support required to maintain benevolent authoritarianism.

Death often comes with pangs and recessions. That’s true for individuals and societies alike. A wonder drug buys terminally ill patients some time, and so do oil revenues for societies. Cultures die. That notion is anathema to nation-states which pose themselves as eternal, but even Rome proved not eternal. Modern Iranians, Italians, and Greeks have nothing in common with their ancient cultures. The West largely accepted the death of Islamic culture, but academics resist that notion about Russia. The case of Russia is too personal for Western leftists: from Dostoevsky to Stalin, scores of ugly Russian characters inspired them. But the Russian culture is doomed. Masochistically soul-searching, inefficiently communal, leader-oriented to the point of totalitarianism, xenophobic, cruel, criminal and corrupt culture cannot survive economic competition. Economically efficient Russians move abroad; those who stay in Russia abandon the famed Russian culture of gilded church domes and barbarous government. Totalitarian societies are different, but economically efficient societies are very similar: affluent people want freedom, resist communalism and usurpation of power, and are not eager to fight. Paupers need ideology to sustain self-respect; insignificant and unable to achieve on their own, they cling to masses. Economically efficient societies are always individualist; their members just don’t need the masses of their compatriots.

Oil revenues gave Russia a respite from the death agony which started in the late nineteenth century. The communist experiment in Russia was not about progress. It was a desperate effort by nostalgic intelligentsia to turn the clock back, to return Russia to communalism. The October 1917 revolution was actually a restoration of communalism, despotism, and militancy. The communist rule was reactionary; it sought to reverse the liberal economic policies of 1870s-1910s. Tsar Alexander released Russian serfs, and communists turned the peasants back into serfs. Collective farms were similar to feudal servitude. The masses of arbitrarily convicted Russian people who built the major Soviet channels and dams would look familiar to feudal industrialists like Demidovs who operated their vast factories with serf labor. Russia heavily employed forced labor, both serfs and convicts, from the time immemorial. Communists returned to the fundamental Russian policy of keeping the state rich by pauperizing the population. Even by the late Soviet estimates, only 29% of the GDP was disbursed to the people. Even of that portion, the state expropriated the major part through latent inflation and forced savings. The figure was still less during the Stalinist years. The communist state, as tsarist Russia before it, depended on the almost free labor of the society of serfs.

In order to reverse the clock of history, Russian government needed to keep its subjects in dark. That isolation failed in the late nineteenth century when Russian intelligentsia started traveling a lot to Europe and encountered the wonderful freedom. The communists immediately closed Russian society. The second shock came in the 1956 when Khrushchev invited scores of young foreigners for a sport competition in Moscow. The show of their unimaginable freedom and affluence broke the Russian hubris. Communists could no more sell their lies about the achievements of Russian proletariat; now the Russians knew how much better the life in the West is. With the isolation broken, the Russian clock moved fast forward. The Soviet regime was dead in the 1956.
And here is the answer why Putin cannot re-create Russia into the threatening monster: he cannot close the society. Government propaganda can make some Russians skeptical of the Western achievements they see on the Internet and satellite TV but, “you cannot fool everyone forever.” The abundance of information in modern society makes it impossible to close Russian society, and short of closing nothing would return it to communalism.

Then there is the economy. Russian economy is miserable. Oil revenues, concentrated in the state’s purse, look significant, but no developed country can finance its ambitions by selling raw materials only. Russian oil revenues are negligible compared to GDP of developed countries such as the United States or Great Britain. Even in the best-case scenario, it takes centuries to build a modern economy, but Russian case is far from being the best. America pulled the most enterprising people from around the world. England is the cradle of modern liberalism and entrepreneurship. Russia retains its communal mentality which precludes the economic endeavors, efficient on large scale. Russian people produced many geniuses but none of the brilliant managers and CEOs like Ford. Russian state can only thrive by robbing its subjects, whether entrepreneurs or workers. But in the open society, subjects won’t submit to robbery, and Russian government, therefore, cannot attain the prosperity of the communist times.

Russian efforts at flexing its muscles are lame. Putin is quintessentially a minor KGB functionary, one of those officers implanted as agents of influence into various government bodies shortly before the USSR collapsed. He is corrupt at least from his years as an export licensing official in St. Petersburg. Before becoming a president, Putin was subservient to the superiors such as Yeltsin and Berezovsky. Putin tries presenting himself as tsar, but managed only to project an image of a petty KGB official who licked his way from dregs to riches. The stability of Putin’s regime is superficial. A billion dollars pumped into the opposition would buy massive protests in Moscow and Petersburg, publicized over the international media. Totalitarian governments are notoriously fragile; Putin’s Russia, like Gorbachev’s Russia or tsarist Russia would succumb to a coup which need not even extend beyond the two capitals. Russian province won’t notice the changes in Moscow.

Putin’s plot to establish himself as prime minister under amenable president after his own presidential term ends is doomed. Russians are not likely to elect a no-one even if Putin endorses him. Russians want leaders with charismatic potential, not the dull figures Putin promotes for nominal presidency. A dull presidential candidate won’t win Russian elections if conducted with the least transparency – assuming, of course, that the opposition fields a popular candidate rather than some liberal marginal. Even if Putin succeeds at installing a weak president, such weakling would soon become strong and arrogant, a center of gravity for Putin’s opponents. Putin himself was weak at first. New president won’t tolerate the all-powerful Prime Minister Putin.

Russian military threat is exaggerated. The Soviets built a huge army, just like they built a huge economy, on the nearly free labor. For decades, military research offered the best conditions to the brilliant minds of Russia. Not anymore. Russian military cannot compete with private employers for the best minds. Creative people resist discipline, particularly the discipline of government or military jobs. Russian military doesn’t pay competitive salaries, provides unattractive work environment, and no fame, such as research papers. Russian military R&D facilities are staffed by people of respectable age with very few young people joining. As the Internet and migration extend employment opportunities to young scientists in faraway regions of Russia, they too abandon the military jobs. Russian military R&D budget is lower than Israel’s, and the procurement of new military systems is comparable between the two countries. Putin’s Russia attempts the Soviet imperial policy but lacks financial capabilities. Russia can no more buy the allegiance of barbarous regimes with massive aid. In the absence of communist threat, Russian political weight worldwide has dwindled. Russia only thrives now on its past glories. Locked in our minuscule state, Israelis are snobbishly respectful of Russia, but no deference is due. Russian weapons sales to Israel’s enemies are irritating, but in the end the truly ingenuous Russian-made weapons never work as advertized; the samples are great while production quality is abysmal.

The Russian Empire, whether tsarist or communist, is over. Huge totalitarian societies never survive affluence. Just like in China, economic development will cause the Dark Age and internal breakdown in Russia. It’s a matter of guesswork, for how long will the KGB manage to hold the crumbling Russia together, but surely not for long. Russia won’t lose much territory in the breakdown: an independent Siberia is an unlikely prospect. The Russian state would probably become a chaotic conglomerate with quasi-independent regions and huge inequality between the developed cities, resource-rich areas, and the utterly impoverished 95% of the country. Russian nukes will go on the black market, and the world must be prepared to buy them off from dealers.
The dying body of Russian communalism need not be feared. Containment is the proper policy against contagious diseases and ideologies.