To imagine that national mentality changes in decades is superficial. Russian people have traditionally supported imperialist government. In recent times, popular support for the 1905, 1914, the Cold and Chechen wars was very high. Majority of Russians support the authoritarian Putin against democrats. Russians are not some barbarians and understand the value of freedom; they rather realize that limited authoritarianism offers more personal freedom than lawless democracy. Yeltsin’s democracy offered common Russians as little say in political issues as does Putin’s authoritarianism; the latter is at least orderly and relatively safe.
In the absence of formal power continuity like in monarchy or a single-party communist empire, Russian powerful secret services emerge as the best candidate to provide the continuity. The KGB/FSB establishment controls everything from organized crime to criminal politicians, including the media. Touted Russian oligarchs are powerless. In fact, they are not oligarchs, but magnates subservient to president who replaces them at whim.
Secret services share a common trait: they operate on micro-level, never strategically. That peculiarity relates to their secretiveness: strategic planning requires the efforts well beyond the clandestine groups’ abilities. The series of terrorist acts staged by KGB/FSB that lead to the Chechen war show that Russian secret services operate one step at a time, without even considering the immediate consequences of their actions and not planning for failures, public relations campaigns, and subsequent political developments.
Turmoil is the best milieu for clandestine operations; FSB embroils its opponents in strife to create tactical opportunities for itself. Add a typically Russian penchant for vexing the opponents for the vexing’ sake. The deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba is one example, aid to Latin American communists is another; a recent case is Putin’s opposition to the American minuscule missile defense system in Poland.
Russian foreign policy in the Middle East has the goal of troublemaking. Putin’s KGB mentality precludes any strategic considerations; he only works to embroil the Middle East into strife to plague America and Israel.
Saddam was no friend of Russia whose rulers remembered him as an American client. Russia, however, supported Saddam against the American invasion both politically and with back-channel weapons sales.
Iran, run by ayatollahs, is a quintessential pariah state in the Soviet worldview. Iran seeds trouble in Russia’s Asian backyard, and nuclear Iran spells escape of the oil-rich Azerbaijan and likely other Central Asian states from the Russian sphere of influence. Russian financial interests in Iran are insignificant: $2-5 billion worth of contracts could be easily recovered with the US goodwill. Russia, nevertheless, supports Iran politically, opposes meaningful sanctions, and builds a plutonium-producing reactor in Bushehr.
Though the Russian problems with Islamic terrorists are largely invented, with the KGB/FSB responsible for most terrorist acts blamed on Chechens, fanning Islamism and terrorism is clearly not in the best interests of Russia which incorporates large Muslim population and borders unstable Islamic countries. Even so, Russia is the only major country which supported Hamas.
Weapons sales to Syria bring Russia little cash, but much resentment from America. Strategically, supporting the perennial loser Syria is senseless for Russia. Syria will always lean to France which is only tentatively aligned with Moscow.
Russian claims to property in Jerusalem are of the similar stock. Russian government is aware that no state entertained its claims for the property belonging to tsar’s family. The Jerusalem property belonged to Russian charity, not monarch. Russia, however, successfully pressed Olmert to accept its legally fictional claim to the prime land plots in Jerusalem.
The Middle East is just another playground for KGB/FSB. Russian secret services shore up conflicts and gain unwarranted influence. Russia likewise pushed Syria to war with Israel in 1967 with intelligence reports of Israeli threat to Syria. Israeli government cares listening to Russia only because it promotes Hamas and arms Syria. Russia lacks a French-type cultural appeal to Syria and establishes master-client relationship by propping Syria for a military encounter with Israel. Israel is nervous about SS-23 (Iskander-E) missile sales to Syria, but those are unimportant to the Russian establishment because the payment is relatively transparent. Russian security establishment profits more from inconspicuous sales of surplus common military equipment through third parties; such sales deliver unaccounted cash.
Russia’s involvement in the Quartet is most ridiculous. The Russians want arms sales to Syria, not peace for Israel. In the (impossibly) peaceful Middle East, Russian influence would be nil. Russian role in the Quartet is to deliver a peace that leaves the peace no chance: a narrow, indefensible Israel surrounded by heavily armed – Russian-armed – Muslims. Such Israel would hysterically brandish her nuclear deterrent, sparking the arms race and pushing the Muslims to embrace Russian protection.
