To imagine that a nation’s mentality can change in a matter of decades is superficial. Russian people have traditionally supported imperialist governments. In recent times, popular support was very high for the wars of 1905 and 1914, the Cold War, and the Chechen War. The majority of Russians support the authoritarian Putin against the democrats. Russians are not barbarians and understand the value of freedom; they realize, however, that limited authoritarianism offers more personal freedom than lawless democracy. Yeltsin’s democracy offered common Russians as little say in political issues as does Putin’s authoritarianism; the latter is at least orderly and relatively safe.
In the absence of a formal system of power continuity such as exists in a monarchy or a single-party communist empire, Russia’s powerful secret services emerge as the best candidate to provide that continuity. The KGB/FSB establishment controls everything from organized crime to criminal politicians, including the media. The touted Russian oligarchs are powerless. In fact, they are not oligarchs, but magnates subservient to the president, who replaces them at whim.

Secret services share a common trait: they operate on the micro-level, never strategically. That peculiarity relates to their secretiveness: strategic planning requires efforts well beyond the clandestine groups’ abilities. The series of terrorist attacks staged by the KGB/FSB that lead to the Chechen war show that the Russian secret services operate one step at a time, without even considering the immediate consequences of their actions and not planning for failures, public relations campaigns, and subsequent political developments.

Turmoil is the best milieu for clandestine operations; FSB embroils its opponents in strife to create tactical opportunities for itself. Add to that the typically Russian penchant for vexing opponents for the vexing’s sake. The deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba is one example; aid to Latin American communists is another. A recent case is Putin’s opposition to the minuscule American missile defense system in Poland.

Russian foreign policy in the Middle East has the goal of troublemaking. Putin’s KGB mentality precludes any strategic considerations; he only works to embroil the Middle East in strife to plague America and Israel.
Saddam was no friend of Russia, whose rulers remembered him as an American client. Russia, however, supported Saddam against the American invasion both politically and with back-channel weapons sales.
Iran, run by ayatollahs, is a quintessential pariah state in the Soviet worldview. Iran sows the seeds of trouble in Russia’s Asian backyard, and a nuclear Iran would spell the escape of the oil-rich Azerbaijan and likely other Central Asian states from the Russian sphere of influence. Russian financial interests in Iran are insignificant: $2-5 billion worth of contracts could be easily recovered with US goodwill. Russia nevertheless supports Iran politically, opposes meaningful sanctions, and builds a plutonium-producing reactor in Bushehr.

Though Russia’s problems with Islamic terrorists are largely invented (the KGB/FSB are responsible for most of the terrorist attacks blamed on the Chechens), fanning Islamism and terrorism is clearly not in the best interests of Russia, which is home to a large Muslim population and borders unstable Islamic countries. Even so, Russia is the only major country which supported Hamas.
Weapons sales to Syria bring Russia little cash, but much resentment from America. Strategically, supporting Syria—the perennial loser—is senseless for Russia. Syria will always lean toward France, which is only tentatively aligned with Moscow.

Russian claims to property in Jerusalem are of similar stock. The Russian government is aware that no state entertained its claims for the property belonging to the tsar’s family. The Jerusalem property belonged to Russian charity, not to the monarch. Russia, however, successfully pressed Olmert to accept its legally fictitious claim to the prime land plots in Jerusalem.

The Middle East is just another playground for the KGB/FSB. The Russian secret services shore up conflicts and gain unwarranted influence. Russia likewise pushed Syria to war with Israel in 1967 with intelligence reports of an Israeli threat to Syria. The Israeli government listens to Russia only because it promotes Hamas and arms Syria. Russia lacks a French-type cultural appeal to Syria, and so it establishes a master-client relationship by prepping Syria for a military encounter with Israel. Israel is nervous about SS-23 (Iskander-E) missile sales to Syria, but those are unimportant to the Russian establishment because the payment is relatively transparent. The Russian security establishment profits more from inconspicuous sales of surplus common military equipment through third parties; such sales deliver unaccounted cash.

Russia’s involvement in the Quartet is ridiculous. The Russians want arms sales to Syria, not peace for Israel. In a peaceful Middle East (an impossibility), Russian influence would be nil. The Russian role in the Quartet is to deliver a peace that leaves no chance for peace: a narrow, indefensible Israel surrounded by heavily armed—Russian-armed—Muslims. Such an Israel would hysterically brandish her nuclear deterrent, sparking an arms race and pushing the Muslims to embrace Russian protection.