Hamas is Israel’s best hope. The Islamic group stands as the bastion protecting Jews from the perils of peace process. Where the treacherous Israeli government is cowed down by the American-Saudi alliance, Hamas stands tall incidentally protecting Israelis from national suicide. Israeli politicians, Jewish barons of the Diaspora, and their foreign friends are ready to squeeze Israel into an 8-mile-wide strip. Hamas rejects that suicide on the part of Jews. It doesn’t matter that saving the Jews is only a collateral product of the Hamas’ Islamic policies. The current Jewish interests are best served by Hamas policies. Served at a very low cost, too. Rocket attacks on Sderot greatly diminished after Hamas took power in Gaza. Hamas cannot rein in the fellow Islamic fighters from Izzadin Kassam Brigades. Hamas-Kassam relationship mirrors the Muslim Brotherhood-Hamas relationship. Hamas was too militant for the Brotherhood, while Kassam is too militant for Hamas. But for ideological reasons, no party can dissociate from another. That’s an Arab variety of the American “our scoundrels” policy. Hamas supports Kassam Brigades as “our scoundrel” against the Fatah scoundrels such as the Dughmushes. Hamas, moreover, honestly attempted to end the rocket attacks on Israel, and pressed PIJ and PRC as much as it could; Fatah never tried that much. Hamas offered Israel long-term truce. Being an honest Islamic organization, Hamas cannot sign peace with a non-Muslim state on the ostensibly Palestinian land. The insistence on truce only testifies to Hamas’ honesty and dignity: according to Islamic law, Hamas can deceive its enemy even with peace offer, but it doesn’t. In practice, long-term truce is no different from peace: no sane person doubts that Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty is really a truce. Given the recurrence of wars, historically most peace agreements appear to be truces. Hamas can guarantee Israel a decent security during the truce. Even now, during the extreme hostility between Israel and Gaza, Hamas behaves prudently and doesn’t escalate the conflict. Hamas doesn’t fear Israeli invasion of Gaza. Such an invasion would benefit Hamas by allowing it to present itself as a capable guerrilla organization rather than inept statesmen. Hamas negotiated with Israel reasonably: for example, offered Israel to guarantee security at the crossings so that Israel can open them. Fatah, by the contrast, heaped unrealistic demands such as dismantling all checkpoints and releasing all security prisoners without a trace of reciprocity. At the bottom line, Hamas are the honest and decent Muslims, while Fatah is a band of thugs. Hamas is a painstakingly homebred organization, developed from grassroots, unlike Fatah – conceived in Cairo, bred in Jordan, brought from Tunis and built into the top gang by Israel. Jordan erred with Fatah and evicted it in the Black September when bitten by the Palestinian guerrillas, and Israel grew similarly disenchanted with Arafat who finally refused peace – apparently moved by Israeli oligarchs and the establishment figures who have great economic and political interest in continuing the occupation. Instead of abandoning the Fatah, Israel decided recycling it. But Abbas proved no more a puppet than Arafat. Both eventually adopted nationalist rhetoric and refused concessions to Israel. Unlike Hamas’ Haniyeh, Abbas cannot deliver on his promises and failed to deliver any security improvement in the West Bank even while enjoying tremendous Israeli assistance.
Two types of religious movements evolve into military force: truly mad fanatics and/or militants who are incidentally religious. Ayatollahs fall in the first category, Taliban – the second. Hamas occupies the unsustainable middle ground. It is a moderate Islamic organization which only looks radical to Israeli atheist analysts and secular Fatah gangsters. Unlike Taliban, Hamas lacks long-term military experience. Hamas’ security achievements in Gaza are therefore disappointing. Hamas predictably failed on economic issues – who can expect economic genius from Islamic guys? - and nothing less than a genius can help Gaza’s economy. Hamas, however, had a slight chance of imposing order on Gaza – and failed. Hamas initially cleansed Gaza’s streets from unorganized violence and arranged truce with Gaza’s organized criminal groups, most notably the Dughmushes. But Hamas seems incapable of sweeping security measures such as required to end Fatah’s insurrection in Gaza. Assisted by Israel, Fatah is posed to engage Hamas in terrorist war – with car bombings, rocket attacks, shootings, and peaceful protests. It took Arafat an immense security apparatus to subdue rival factions. Hamas is less brutal and artful than Arafat, and refrains from mass arrests and assassinations. But nothing less would preserve its power. Common Gazans voted for Hamas as an alternative to thuggish Fatah; failure to deliver will turn them away from Hamas. Gazans now perceive Fatah as Israeli proxy capable of opening the borders, re-enabling the massive aid flow, and possibly even giving them back the Israeli jobs they lost after the outbreak of the Second Intifada.
Hamas is too soft to impose its power on Gazans. Elections will allow Hamas to end the impasse created by its takeover of Gaza while saving face: it would step down according to the wishes of Gaza’s people, not Fatah’s. It is unlikely that Israel would end her support for Fatah or economic repressions against Gaza. Unless Hamas miraculously radicalize, it will lose the power. And Israel will lose the real peace partner.
