Osama scored several PR victories, and Muslim media didn’t miss a chance to trumpet them. Contrary to the Western perception, Muslim media is often quite thoughtful, especially compared to truly ridiculous “expert analysis” in outfits like the New York Times. Poor societies, whose people are unable to realize themselves in the economic sphere, seem to have higher standards of journalism than consumerist societies; that relationship held true in the final years of the Soviet Union—years that were characterized by freedom but not affluence. Osama’s mere survival against the world’s superpower is equivalent to victory in the Arab mind. Osama the shepherd might not have killed the American Goliath, but he gave it a black eye. Why would America care what Muslims think? Because perceived weakness provokes assaults. Osama showed that America is indeed more likely to attack Muslims and Third World countries on flimsy pretexts such as Iraq.
Osama likely regarded the Taliban as expendable, and is delighted to see the US-propped government in Kabul failing and arousing far more popular hatred than Taliban. It was worth it for Osama to lose the Taliban in order for mujahedeen fundamentalists—his close friends—to form the Afghan government under US auspices. Now the US insists on turning a successful punishment expedition into an unsuccessful occupation: The Taliban insurgency is growing, threatening the government of US puppet Karzai. Instead of leaving Afghanistan victorious as they should have done five years ago, America is headed into another defeat—and Osama will claim its laurels. The Taliban are not especially close to Osama; they just cannot refuse hospitality to a prominent Muslim. The status of a guest is hugely important among mountaineer Muslims, and the US pressure to extradite Osama predictably made protecting him a matter of honor the for the Taliban. It took the US a century to quash the lawlessness of the Wild West, and civilizing the Afghans would take centuries. Osama’s power play with Musharaff came out excellently: Osama pointedly avoided criticizing Musharaff until the general embraced America against the pro-Pakistani Taliban. When Pakistani public opinion overwhelmingly turned against Musharaff, Osama too anathemized him. After the US, in its tradition of neglecting friends and rewarding enemies, spent tremendously in Afghanistan and Iraq but provided very little assistance to Pakistan in exchange for betraying the Taliban and Kashmir, Osama’s criticism of Musharaff was vindicated, adding to his tremendous popularity among Pakistanis. The strategic stupidity of Osama’s enemies plays into his hands.
It turns out now that Al Qaeda was the only force which consistently opposed Saddam during his rule, and now Al Qaeda in Iraq fights Baathist insurgents supported by the US. America consistently fails to employ simple and obvious methods for discrediting Osama: describing him as a frightened cave dweller, as a stupid Saudi, a donor not a fighter, a thief investing donated money into his businesses. Instead, successive American administrations have trumpeted Osama as a major threat to US national security, immeasurably increasing his standing in the eyes of Muslims. Every time an American president mentions Osama’s name instead of referring to him equivocally, Osama’s popularity rises. It’s a wonder that no advisor has ever told the Administration such simple things about Arab mentality.
