The idea of Judea has proved remarkably sustainable. Two decades after the first Kahanist government of Judea received suspended sentences, the general population is sufficiently frustrated with the treacherous government of Israel to return to Project Judea.

Head-on opposition to the government is dangerous to your job. Married people cannot easily give up their jobs. Several other strata are more likely to join the secessionist movement: young people who don’t want to attend universities after the army, university graduates without good employment opportunities, lone (mostly divorced) people, and retirees.

While participation in semi-peaceful protest carries only a moderate threat to employment and the probability of a few hits by police, radical opposition to the state is totally different—it is suicidal. The Israeli government staged the murders of remotely dangerous politicians such as Kahane and Ze’evi, and would surely hunt down radicals who insist on overturning the corrupt state which audaciously calls itself Jewish. The precondition for joining radical action is recognizing oneself as dead. Any harm which one could inflict on the treacherous government and its leftist and Arab supporters before actually descending into the grave adds to the balance of positive deeds. Radicals are unlikely to live to see their dream of a truly Jewish state fulfilled. Their goal is very short-term: cause as much damage to the establishment as they can. Yes, that’s the attitude of suicide bombers, and also of the Soviet heroes who undertook suicidal missions during WWII, and of the Jewish youths who went to the British gallows instead of asking the Mandate Administration for a pardon.

Would the struggle’s suicidal character limit the number of volunteers? Compared to a corporate outing, perhaps. Many zealots are not afraid to give up their lives. Terminally ill people might prefer blowing themselves up in government buildings or Arab villages to a painful death in a hospital. Jews who want to commit suicide for personal reasons could end their lives in a manner more beneficial to the community—in suicide attacks against leftist and Arab targets. There are many deeply distressed Jews around, deeply resentful of the government; those who loathe suicide per se might opt for sensible suicide missions. Many takers are not necessary: hardly two hundred Palestinian suicide bombers wreaked havoc on Israeli security and politics. Is suicide un-Jewish? Who cares, as long as it serves Jewish purposes? Muslim theologians scream that suicide bombing is hiraba, a heinous crime of fighting society, but terrorists persist and achieve political victories.

Society’s reaction to suicide bombings is of paramount importance. Palestinians officially honor their martyrs who killed Israeli civilians, but Israelis shamefully condemn Baruch Goldstein and even shun the Lehi group, which efficiently retaliated to stop Arab violence.

A group that decides on radical measures has to be decentralized. Israeli security services would quickly penetrate any noticeable group. Operating units must be limited to one to three men who can trust each other, a truly grassroots movement with no centralized planning or orders. Any radical can just go out and shoot a leftist or Arab, or blow propane cylinders, ammonium, or petrol tanks. Jewish terrorists could operate only through distributed decision-making. When only a single person knows about his plans, police cannot intercept him. Anti-government violence would succeed without huge bombings. Persistence is the key.

Faced with persistent, violent radicals, moderate conservatives would demand an autonomous or independent Judea.