“The alien who lives among you will rise over you higher and higher, and you will sink lower and lower” Deuteronomy 28:43.

Sam Huntington could not be more wrong with his Clash of Civilizations thesis. Civilizations, in fact, clash rarely, and their confrontations are limited to border conflicts. Even the famed Islamic jihad in Europe and the subsequent Reconquista targeted a narrow strip of Southern Europe. On the contrary, intra-civilization wars are ubiquitous. The more culturally close are the opponents, the bloodier is their conflict. The two world wars, which were fought between culturally similar European countries, took an unprecedented number of lives. Civil wars are generally the bloodiest.

Contrary to Fukuyama’s dream of a post-human liberal world without wars, globalization works the other way around: people become more culturally homogeneous, interact more—and clash more often. Globalization caused Japan to take offense at American trade restrictions in the 1930s, globalization made the Pacific front technically possible, and globalization accounts for some Afghani terrorists planning the 9/11 attacks halfway across the globe. Global projection of power is a function of globalization, which allows any two groups to fight, no matter the distance. Still more importantly, globalization pushes foreign images into our homes. Indonesian Muslims learn about evil Zionists they would otherwise never have encountered in their lives. This virtual contact amounts to intrusion and gives impetus first to xenophobia, then hatred, then war.

If anything, we would see more conflicts rather than less, as was indeed the case in the twentieth century. The conflicts would become more and more irrational. In antiquity, resources were scarce but people still used them on economically irrational wars of honor. In our time of economic surplus, economically motivated wars have almost entirely given way to ideological ones. Irrationality makes modern wars unpredictable, common, and cruel. This kind of ideological war is only possible in a culturally homogeneous world: one can kill chimps, buffalo, or natives to gain unrestricted access to local resources and plunder them profitably, but no one would fight Polynesian aborigines for ideological reasons. One only enforces his ideological views on people who are at least remotely similar.

This shows how misguided are those who appeal to the similarity of common Jews and Arabs. Leftists send children to mixed camps to interact with Arabs and see them as the people similar to themselves. The organizers presume to eliminate hatred and mutual suspicion in that way. How wrong. There is a Ukrainian saying, “My Jew is no Jew.” Goebbels of cursed memory made a similar remark in his diary—that probably every German had come to him and pleaded for his Jewish friend who was unlike other Jews. On a personal level, people of hostile groups get along perfectly because they have no personal squabbles. Their problem arises only on a group level. There is no reason for a Jew who wants falafel to hate the Arab provider of it; there is every reason for Jews to hate Arabs who want to take our land. A nation is not sum of its people, but an entirely different body with its own goals, hatreds, and allegiances. It is counterintuitive, but such relationships are typical of synergistic systems: consider how an airplane is unlike the heap of its parts—the airplane flies, its parts don’t. The moral theory recognizes synergistic differences: killing is a crime for an individual, but heroic for a nation.

Cultural homogenization of Jews and Arabs works against coexistence. Just as Jewish assimilation in Europe sparked a major wave of anti-Semitism in the late nineteenth century, so Arab assimilation, especially if forced by the Israeli establishment, is bound to inflame hatreds. Many Jews don’t care about Arabs living in closed communities such as Tulkarem or Umm al Fahm, but resist them moving into Haifa and Yaffo. Not surprisingly, Sephardi Jews, the most culturally close to Arabs, hate them the most.

Educated in Israeli schools and universities, the Arabs might seem similar to Jews, but the similarity is actually anti-parallel: both groups have similar goals and approaches, and are thus bound to clash. Jews learned of a noble nationalist struggle for their homeland, and so did the Arabs—incidentally, we’re talking about the same piece of land. Jews are educated in the spirit of dwelling safely “in our own land,” but so are the Arabs—they don’t want to live prosperously in a Jewish state, just as good Jews don’t want a prosperous life in Switzerland, but choose Israel instead. Both groups want to make this land “their own” and will accept nothing less.

Cultural homogenization causes intermingling, which in turn inflames hatreds, which push moderates from the scene. Since Oslo, Israeli Arabs don’t fear and have no reason to be moderate. They can safely support the most zealous leaders. Moderation is not rewarded, nor is it there any ostensible scheme for rewarding Israeli Arab citizens of some political views over those with diverging opinions. Arab society quickly radicalizes to the point of no return. The radicals might not be many, but few are required; riots, civil wars, and revolutions are started by insignificant minorities.

Transferring the Arabs is the only solution.