How many Arabs are there in Israel? The latest publicly available brochure on ethnic distribution from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics is for the year 2003. It shows 15.6% of Arabs are aged 0-4, and 9.1% of Jews are in the same age group.
In 2007, Jews numbered 5,470,000, and Arabs 1,449,000. Accordingly, the number of Jews younger than five years is 5,470,000 x 9.1%=498,000; Arabs are 1,449,000 x 15.6%=226,000. In eighteen years, therefore, new Arab voters will be 226,000/498,000=45% the number of Jews.

There are also 4.4% of other peoples in Israel, or approximately 7,241,000 x 4.4%*9.1%=29,000 younger than five. That makes the Jews approximately 498,000/(498,000+226,000+29,000)=66% of Israel’s young population. Jews have already lost the supermajority status required for many legislative acts.

In truth, the ratio of Jews is much, much less. More than 300,000 Israelis registered as Jews are not Jews according to the traditional Jewish requirements. An unknown number of Israelis, estimated at 120,000–200,000, have only a Jewish grandmother, which hardly makes them Jewish for practical purposes. Close to 900,000 Israelis live abroad, many of them counted as Jews in the Israeli census as long as they keep visiting Israel once in a while. Therefore, the real number of Jews in Israel is 5,470,000-300,000-120,000-900,000=4,150,000. That makes the number of Jews younger than five 4,150,000 x 9.1%=378,000. Arabs of the same age constitute 226,000/378,000=60% of the number of Jews. Jews, realistically, constitute 378,000/(378,000+226,000+29,000)=60% among Israel’s young.

The trend toward the emigration of young, productive Jews exacerbates the demographic problem. The number of Jews includes many questionable ones, such as non-halachic Jews by paternal lineage and 120,000 Black Christians and fake converts.

The Arabs form 226,000/(378,000+226,000+29,000)=36% of young Israelis. Arabs can count on other non-Jews, the 4.4%, for support in many policies. Arabs are also supported by ultra-left Jews, who hold 5-8% of seats in the Knesset. In some situations, anti-Zionist ultra-Orthodox Jews would join them; that’s another 200,000 voters, or 3%. At the very least, those Jews generally abstain from voting, deducting 3% from the Jewish electoral base. That already GUARANTEES Israeli Arabs the Knesset majority in eighteen years.

Jews frequently travel abroad while Arabs stay in Israel because of their lower income, patriarchal habits, and visa restrictions. At any time of elections, more Jews than Arabs are absent on foreign vacations, further increasing the Arabs’ chances. In the 2009 elections, 650,000 Israeli voters, almost all of them Jews, resided abroad. Most of them wouldn’t vote even if allowed to. Thus, the ratio of Arabs among Israeli voters comes to 226,000/(378,000 x 0.88+226,000+29,000)=38.5%.

There is also the issue of life expectancy. It is 80 years for Jews (77.7 years for males and 81.6 years for females) and 76 years for Arabs (74.5 and 77.8 years, respectively). Among Jews, 15.1% are older than 60 years. Among Arabs they are 4.4%. Statistically, in twenty years these people will no longer vote. The Jewish voting bloc will contract by 15.1% while the Arab bloc will contract by 4.4% only. The resulting increase of Arabs among mature Israelis from 21% to 23%, in addition to the influx of young Arab into the voters’ ranks, assures them a solid majority.

Moreover, the Arab political spectrum is united in its most important goal, opposition to Israel’s Jewishness. That situation won’t change: naturally, Arabs prefer a Muslim or ethnic-blind state to a Jewish one. Aided by the highly fragmented nature of Jewish political parties, Arabs will reach decisive power in the Knesset long before they and their allies form the majority.

The bulk of the young Jewish population is concentrated in the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox sectors; the birth rate of secular Jews hardly breaks even. The birth rate among moderately Orthodox Jews, usually identified as religious Zionists, is rapidly declining as they integrate into secular culture. Ultra-Orthodox Jews maintain their high birth-rate due to their isolation from secular developments, but for the same reason they remain underproductive (often unemployed), unwarlike (often shrinking from IDF conscription), and contemptuous of the existing Jewish state. In some important respects, therefore, young Jews are becoming as inimical to Israel as Arabs.

The concentration of new Jewish births among the ultra-Orthodox makes the birth rate vulnerable to welfare policies. After the child-allowances for large families were reduced, a ten-child family, for example, found itself receiving merely $700 in subsidies per month instead of the pre-2001 level of $1,600, and ultra-Orthodox families appeared to be in dire poverty. In effect, the government cut the subsidies retroactively, as the cut affected the children who were borne with the previous level of subsidies in mind. The unruly ultra-Orthodox community frightens the government with its religious zeal, and the government works to decimate the community. In response to diminished subsidies, the ultra-Orthodox birth rate dropped sharply. Though the official statistics remains secret—itself a proof of the government’s malign intent—published pieces of evidence, such as the drop from 8.9 to 7.7 children in Beitar Illit, suggest a fertility reduction of 10-13%. The previous subsidies were not high: $160 per child, per month for a ten-child family translated into government expenses of $31,000 before the child reached seventeen years. That price is a bargain compared to state’s expenses for secular education. The reduction of child allowances disproportionally hurts the high-yield ultra-Orthodox community, and significantly diminishes the Jewish birth rate.

Israel’s Arabs were 150,000 in 1948. In sixty years, they bred to a tenfold increase.

The last time Jews constituted only 60% of the Israeli population was in 1947.