The border crisis in Gaza brings out a previously concealed dimension of the Palestinian problem: the problem is not Israel’s only. Though many condemn Israel for blockading Gaza, Arab Egypt does exactly the same. Gaza is blocked both from Israeli and Egyptian sides.
Previously, Egypt blamed Israel’s control of Egypt-Gaza border for the Palestinian troubles. Later, EU border monitors were the pretext for hardships. But after the brave EU monitors fled the Rafah Crossing following Hamas takeover of Gaza, Egypt appeared one on one with Palestinians.
For some time, Egypt attempted to gloss over the obvious PR disaster: the major Arab country cooperating with Israel to oppress Palestinians. Hamas had to keep quiet on the matter in return for Egypt’s hands-down attitude to border security. Rafah was closed for commercial shipment, but Hamas enjoyed free flow of weapons and contraband goods through tunnels from Egypt.
Israel turned the heat on Egypt by pushing it to close the tunnels. After that measure strained Egypt-Hamas relationship, Israel completely blockaded Gaza, and left Hamas no choice but to abandon its tacit cooperation with Egypt. Hamas correctly chose the PR effect over being nice to Egypt, and blew the border barrier.
The border debacle placed Egypt into exceedingly uncomfortable situation: that country pushed the Gaza’s Arabs, besieged by Israel, back into the blockaded ghetto. Not even Mubarak’s regime, harsh and popular simultaneously, can withstand such PR assault for long.
Egypt realized it must divest of Gaza decades before Israel followed the suit. Gaza cannot form a viable state, throngs of uprooted refugees make it ungovernable, Arabs cannot maintain high-end agriculture there like Jewish farmers to make Gaza self-sufficient, and agriculture cannot employ most Gazans.
Egypt has great interest in isolating Gaza’s throngs. Just like the PLO destabilized Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia, Gazans would destabilize Egypt if allowed there. Egypt has hard time battling the local Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak loves to see his radical Muslims venting feelings on the Palestinian issue. The last thing he wants is Hamas, the militant offshoot of Muslim Brotherhood, and Qassam Brigades – the violent offshoot of Hamas – to roam Egypt.
Sinai is Egypt’s soft underbelly, flush with criminal Bedouin, militant members of Muslim Brotherhood, and ungovernable. Little has changed there since pharaonic times: the vast mountainous spaces are not susceptible to police or limited military control. Hamas in Sinai is Mubarak’s nightmare. If radical Muslims take hold of Sinai, Egypt would rather abandon the place, even cede it to Palestinians rather than try enforcing the law there and suffering Israeli diplomatic and possibly military pressure for Islamists’ actions originating from Sinai. Egypt’s response to Hamas invasion or infiltration is unpredictable because it entirely depends on one man’s – Mubarak’s – mind. The response can be anything from giving the Gazans Sinai to crushing them with tanks; intra-Arab atrocities are a brothers’ quarrel.
Hamas response is also unpredictable. Hamas might realize its threat of marching half a million Gazans through the border with Israel, marching perhaps on Sderot. Rallying them would be difficult: Gazans breached the border with Egypt for commerce. Much smaller numbers would be available for purely ideological intrusion into Israel; many will doubt the reality of plundering Sderot.
Hamas will try keeping the border with Egypt open at least for the trickle of goods and migration, if not wide open. If Hamas succeeds, the situation in Gaza would quickly normalize, greatly improving Hamas’ ratings. Given the threat of another mass breach, Egypt would probably allow minor traffic to/ from Gaza.
Egypt normalizes its relations with the almost-nuclear Iran, and Iran supports Hamas. If Egypt’s border with Gaza remains open, Iran would sneak in with fuel, money, and not so clandestine weapons deliveries. Egyptian charities, too, will deliver foodstuffs and fuel to Gazans.
Hamas’ stake in keeping the border with Egypt open is huge. The stake amounts to the difference between Hamas victory and demise. In breaching the border, Hamas again proved itself a capable, ingenious, daring organization. Fatah is dull, doomed, incapable of such brilliant operations.
Israel can do little to pressure Egypt into completely closing the border with Gaza. America can do more, but still cannot force Egypt to blockade the Arab enclave indefinitely.
We may not like Hamas, but there is no alternative to negotiating with it.
