Olmert and Assad perform an odd dance around the fire of peace. Both sides intermittently hint at their readiness to reach a peace deal and renounce media reports of back-channel talks, offer peace and beef up their border contingents, publicize their peace efforts and refuse open negotiations. Both accuse each other of torpedoing peace talks. Wherever Olmert offers negotiations, Assad refuses them, and vice versa.

It’s easy to sign a peace deal with Syria: take a pen and sign the agreement. The sides’ positions are clear: Syria demands the Golan Heights and Israel (Lieberman included) agreed to relinquish them. Demilitarization of the Golan Heights is a no-issue: the place is in fact demilitarized for the last forty years.

Syria’s support for Hezbollah has nothing to do with the peace deal: Hezbollah has no designs on Israel. Hezbollah evicted Israel from Lebanon and rested, except for isolated border incidents which always happen between hostile states. Hezbollah’s military build-up is purely defensive: its rockets pose no strategic threat to Israel; Hezbollah doesn’t expect to prevail against the IDF in offensive.

Syria’s support for Hamas is very limited, dwarfed by the aid Hamas receives from Egypt (at peace with Israel) and Iran. Hamas’ largest donors are not Muslims, but Jews and Christians who give money to Palestinians – Hamas’ voters.

Israel and Syria don’t sign a peace deal for a simple reason: they don’t need it. Both sides gain nothing from peace. Israel and Egypt, at peace for forty years, did not reduce their armies, established meaningful commerce, or developed popular goodwill toward one another. Egypt plays nice with Israel only because of the IDF – but so does Syria, too.

Assad would love to show his nation that he got the Golan Heights back from Israel, but the concomitant peace with the Zionist enemy will cost Assad dearly. In a similar situation, Sadat had very hard time selling peace with Israel to common Egyptians.

Nations celebrate victories, not peace deals.