People hate weak enemies, and so Jews despise Hamas and refuse negotiating with it. But note the two crucial things: Hamas doesn’t attack Jewish targets abroad or proclaim Palestinian statehood.

Hamas can easily achieve publicity and political advantage by attacking the Israeli soft targets: Jews, Jewish businesses, and community centers abroad. Protecting them all is impossible. Faced with persistent attacks, American Jews would pressure Israeli to accept whatever concessions Hamas demands.

Surely Hamas has plenty of means for low-level terrorist attacks against Jews in many countries, but especially in Western Europe and Latin America. Surely Hamas understands that Israeli won’t summarily retaliate against Palestinians. Hamas leaders are mostly hardened operatives unlike the Fatah hoodlums, and most of them don’t fear targeted assassination. It is clear from the February rocket attacks on Sderot that Hamas guerrillas refused scaling down their offensive to avoid targeted assassinations Israel threatens them with.

Israeli intelligence capabilities abroad are limited in comparison to the free pass Shabak enjoys in the West Bank. Hamas would find foreign attacks on Jews much easier than the operations in Israel.

The relations between Israel and Hamas imply a high degree of cooperation. Shabak now intercepts 99% of terrorist attacks. Even accounting for the immense Israeli intelligence network in the territories, it is incredible that the Palestinians can carry out just one suicide bombing per year. Not so many terrorists participate in the planning, and discovering a mole after a few failed operations should not be a problem. Evidently, Hamas and other terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah, willingly limit their operations to the level acceptable both to Israel and their supporters.

Nothing precludes Hamas from proclaiming Palestinian statehood in Gaza. The recent breach of border with Egypt demonstrates that Hamas is willing to risk alienating its major sponsor. Even though Hamas depends on Egypt for all its logistics, it still initiated a major crisis and presented the Egyptians as Israeli collaborators who blockade Gaza. Hamas won’t care about Muslim opposition to Palestinian statehood (Muslim governments depend on the burning Palestinian issue to sublimate the energies of their own radicals, and don’t want a Palestinian state). Someone like Haniyeh or Mashaal would love to go into the annals of Palestinian history as the founder of their state before Israel assassinates him; still, they do not proclaim independence.

Hamas offered Israel long-term truce. Any Muslim who says differently is a liar: Islam positively forbids non-Islamic state in this land, and Muslims may recognize the conquerors only temporarily. Hamas, therefore, offers as much as it can under the Islamic law. Hamas is an honest and, in its own way, decent Islamic organization unlike the Fatah thugs.

Hamas was the first Palestinian organization which tried to enforce order in Gaza, and could succeed – but independent and Fatah-supported militias refused to submit, and Hamas shrunk from civil war in Gaza. Stuck between Israeli sanctions, local militants, and discontent population, Hamas cannot do any better.

Hamas refrained from attacking Israel for long time. The attacks attributed to Hamas are actually perpetrated by Izz ad Din Kassam Brigades loosely connected to Hamas. There is no way Hamas can give an order to Kassam Brigades to stop shelling Israel. Their relations are cooperative rather than hierarchical. The militants have no part in the diplomatic process and naturally resist to be left out of the game; so they enter the game with rockets. The cycle of violence around Gaza is self-perpetuating: minor violence from Gaza, sanctions and reprisals from Israel, more attacks, more sanctions – until it’s hard for everyone to stop.

Israel has no alternative to negotiating with Hamas. Fatah is a bubble. It always was a bubble, a one-man’s operation. Hamas can easily replace assassinated leaders, but Fatah cannot. Short of Abbas, Barghouti, and a handful others Fatah has no popular figures. Palestinians support Hamas as an organization, but Abbas – as an individual leader. Fatah amply demonstrated that it cannot enforce security in the West Bank even with Israel’s help. For some odd reason Israel punishes Gaza (where Hamas tries to end the attacks), but rewards the West Bank (where Fatah payrolls the terrorists).

It is a big question whether Israel needs peace with Palestinian Arabs. But if she does, then we must be talking to Hamas.

The border crisis in Gaza brings out a previously concealed dimension of the Palestinian problem: the problem is not Israel’s only. Though many condemn Israel for blockading Gaza, Arab Egypt does exactly the same. Gaza is blocked both from Israeli and Egyptian sides.

Previously, Egypt blamed Israel’s control of Egypt-Gaza border for the Palestinian troubles. Later, EU border monitors were the pretext for hardships. But after the brave EU monitors fled the Rafah Crossing following Hamas takeover of Gaza, Egypt appeared one on one with Palestinians.

For some time, Egypt attempted to gloss over the obvious PR disaster: the major Arab country cooperating with Israel to oppress Palestinians. Hamas had to keep quiet on the matter in return for Egypt’s hands-down attitude to border security. Rafah was closed for commercial shipment, but Hamas enjoyed free flow of weapons and contraband goods through tunnels from Egypt.

Israel turned the heat on Egypt by pushing it to close the tunnels. After that measure strained Egypt-Hamas relationship, Israel completely blockaded Gaza, and left Hamas no choice but to abandon its tacit cooperation with Egypt. Hamas correctly chose the PR effect over being nice to Egypt, and blew the border barrier.

The border debacle placed Egypt into exceedingly uncomfortable situation: that country pushed the Gaza’s Arabs, besieged by Israel, back into the blockaded ghetto. Not even Mubarak’s regime, harsh and popular simultaneously, can withstand such PR assault for long.

Egypt realized it must divest of Gaza decades before Israel followed the suit. Gaza cannot form a viable state, throngs of uprooted refugees make it ungovernable, Arabs cannot maintain high-end agriculture there like Jewish farmers to make Gaza self-sufficient, and agriculture cannot employ most Gazans.

Egypt has great interest in isolating Gaza’s throngs. Just like the PLO destabilized Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia, Gazans would destabilize Egypt if allowed there. Egypt has hard time battling the local Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak loves to see his radical Muslims venting feelings on the Palestinian issue. The last thing he wants is Hamas, the militant offshoot of Muslim Brotherhood, and Qassam Brigades – the violent offshoot of Hamas – to roam Egypt.

Sinai is Egypt’s soft underbelly, flush with criminal Bedouin, militant members of Muslim Brotherhood, and ungovernable. Little has changed there since pharaonic times: the vast mountainous spaces are not susceptible to police or limited military control. Hamas in Sinai is Mubarak’s nightmare. If radical Muslims take hold of Sinai, Egypt would rather abandon the place, even cede it to Palestinians rather than try enforcing the law there and suffering Israeli diplomatic and possibly military pressure for Islamists’ actions originating from Sinai. Egypt’s response to Hamas invasion or infiltration is unpredictable because it entirely depends on one man’s – Mubarak’s – mind. The response can be anything from giving the Gazans Sinai to crushing them with tanks; intra-Arab atrocities are a brothers’ quarrel.

Hamas response is also unpredictable. Hamas might realize its threat of marching half a million Gazans through the border with Israel, marching perhaps on Sderot. Rallying them would be difficult: Gazans breached the border with Egypt for commerce. Much smaller numbers would be available for purely ideological intrusion into Israel; many will doubt the reality of plundering Sderot.

Hamas will try keeping the border with Egypt open at least for the trickle of goods and migration, if not wide open. If Hamas succeeds, the situation in Gaza would quickly normalize, greatly improving Hamas’ ratings. Given the threat of another mass breach, Egypt would probably allow minor traffic to/ from Gaza.

Egypt normalizes its relations with the almost-nuclear Iran, and Iran supports Hamas. If Egypt’s border with Gaza remains open, Iran would sneak in with fuel, money, and not so clandestine weapons deliveries. Egyptian charities, too, will deliver foodstuffs and fuel to Gazans.

Hamas’ stake in keeping the border with Egypt open is huge. The stake amounts to the difference between Hamas victory and demise. In breaching the border, Hamas again proved itself a capable, ingenious, daring organization. Fatah is dull, doomed, incapable of such brilliant operations.

Israel can do little to pressure Egypt into completely closing the border with Gaza. America can do more, but still cannot force Egypt to blockade the Arab enclave indefinitely.

We may not like Hamas, but there is no alternative to negotiating with it.

Hamas is Israel's best hope. The Islamic group stands as the bastion protecting Jews from the perils of peace process. Where the treacherous Israeli government is cowed down by the American-Saudi alliance, Hamas stands tall incidentally protecting Israelis from national suicide. Israeli politicians, Jewish barons of the Diaspora, and their foreign friends are ready to squeeze Israel into an 8-mile-wide strip. Hamas rejects that suicide on the part of Jews. It doesn't matter that saving the Jews is only a collateral product of the Hamas' Islamic policies. The current Jewish interests are best served by Hamas policies. Served at a very low cost, too. Rocket attacks on Sderot greatly diminished after Hamas took power in Gaza. Hamas cannot rein in the fellow Islamic fighters from Izzadin Kassam Brigades. Hamas-Kassam relationship mirrors the Muslim Brotherhood-Hamas relationship. Hamas was too militant for the Brotherhood, while Kassam is too militant for Hamas. But for ideological reasons, no party can dissociate from another. That's an Arab variety of the American "our scoundrels" policy. Hamas supports Kassam Brigades as "our scoundrel" against the Fatah scoundrels such as the Dughmushes. Hamas, moreover, honestly attempted to end the rocket attacks on Israel, and pressed PIJ and PRC as much as it could; Fatah never tried that much. Hamas offered Israel long-term truce. Being an honest Islamic organization, Hamas cannot sign peace with a non-Muslim state on the ostensibly Palestinian land. The insistence on truce only testifies to Hamas' honesty and dignity: according to Islamic law, Hamas can deceive its enemy even with peace offer, but it doesn't. In practice, long-term truce is no different from peace: no sane person doubts that Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty is really a truce. Given the recurrence of wars, historically most peace agreements appear to be truces. Hamas can guarantee Israel a decent security during the truce. Even now, during the extreme hostility between Israel and Gaza, Hamas behaves prudently and doesn't escalate the conflict. Hamas doesn't fear Israeli invasion of Gaza. Such an invasion would benefit Hamas by allowing it to present itself as a capable guerrilla organization rather than inept statesmen. Hamas negotiated with Israel reasonably: for example, offered Israel to guarantee security at the crossings so that Israel can open them. Fatah, by the contrast, heaped unrealistic demands such as dismantling all checkpoints and releasing all security prisoners without a trace of reciprocity. At the bottom line, Hamas are the honest and decent Muslims, while Fatah is a band of thugs. Hamas is a painstakingly homebred organization, developed from grassroots, unlike Fatah – conceived in Cairo, bred in Jordan, brought from Tunis and built into the top gang by Israel. Jordan erred with Fatah and evicted it in the Black September when bitten by the Palestinian guerrillas, and Israel grew similarly disenchanted with Arafat who finally refused peace – apparently moved by Israeli oligarchs and the establishment figures who have great economic and political interest in continuing the occupation. Instead of abandoning the Fatah, Israel decided recycling it. But Abbas proved no more a puppet than Arafat. Both eventually adopted nationalist rhetoric and refused concessions to Israel. Unlike Hamas' Haniyeh, Abbas cannot deliver on his promises and failed to deliver any security improvement in the West Bank even while enjoying tremendous Israeli assistance.

Two types of religious movements evolve into military force: truly mad fanatics and/or militants who are incidentally religious. Ayatollahs fall in the first category, Taliban – the second. Hamas occupies the unsustainable middle ground. It is a moderate Islamic organization which only looks radical to Israeli atheist analysts and secular Fatah gangsters. Unlike Taliban, Hamas lacks long-term military experience. Hamas' security achievements in Gaza are therefore disappointing. Hamas predictably failed on economic issues – who can expect economic genius from Islamic guys? - and nothing less than a genius can help Gaza's economy. Hamas, however, had a slight chance of imposing order on Gaza – and failed. Hamas initially cleansed Gaza's streets from unorganized violence and arranged truce with Gaza's organized criminal groups, most notably the Dughmushes. But Hamas seems incapable of sweeping security measures such as required to end Fatah's insurrection in Gaza. Assisted by Israel, Fatah is posed to engage Hamas in terrorist war – with car bombings, rocket attacks, shootings, and peaceful protests. It took Arafat an immense security apparatus to subdue rival factions. Hamas is less brutal and artful than Arafat, and refrains from mass arrests and assassinations. But nothing less would preserve its power. Common Gazans voted for Hamas as an alternative to thuggish Fatah; failure to deliver will turn them away from Hamas. Gazans now perceive Fatah as Israeli proxy capable of opening the borders, re-enabling the massive aid flow, and possibly even giving them back the Israeli jobs they lost after the outbreak of the Second Intifada.

Hamas is too soft to impose its power on Gazans. Elections will allow Hamas to end the impasse created by its takeover of Gaza while saving face: it would step down according to the wishes of Gaza's people, not Fatah's. It is unlikely that Israel would end her support for Fatah or economic repressions against Gaza. Unless Hamas miraculously radicalize, it will lose the power. And Israel will lose the real peace partner.

Terrorist groups can do without large financing; they can extort or collect small donations. Weapons supply is also not tremendously important for them: glut of weapons helped no guerrilla group, but many fought with old rifles and hand-made grenades; Hezbollah receives rockets, Hamas makes them with fertilizer, and both shell Israel. Two things are critical for terrorists: popular appeal of their immediate goals and a territorial base. Popular appeal assures terrorists of dispersed financial sources and logistics. Territorial base, a safe haven however small, allows them to train, stock weapons, and relax. Governments can beat terrorists either by bloody annihilation of popular support or by taking over their safe havens. Barak gave Hezbollah the safe haven of Bekaa Valley, Sharon gave Hamas Gaza.

Terrorists can afford irresponsibility. They hide among civilians, accept retaliation against population and infrastructure, and pile up unrealistic demands. Hamas the terrorist group dreamed of control over Gaza. Days after taking over the place, Hamas faces drastically new situation: responsibility. Weeks ago, Hamas could recklessly fight Israel while leaving routine municipal job to Fatah. Suddenly, it is Hamas who must care of the transformers kicked out in Israeli retaliatory raids. Gazans now hold Hamas responsible for uninterrupted water and power supply from Israel, for the open border crossings, for continued foreign aid. Hamas is forced to abandon its terrorist ambitions and behave like a government. Iranian government, one of Hamas’ sponsors, utterly disregards economic needs of its citizens and ignores sanctions, but huge Iran with massive oil exports can sustain a period of hardship; Gaza cannot. Two weeks of blockade will force Gazans into the Bronze Age they claim they live in Palestine from. Like the PLO years ago, Hamas has either to abandon its patriotic rhetoric and accept Israel or provoke sanctions which will make it unpopular.

Hamas did not plan to take over Gaza. Internecine violence escalated blow-for-blow until Fatah tried to assassinate Haniyeh and Hamas reacted to the attempt. Fatah’s collapse in Gaza surprised Hamas which only meant to retaliate in style, not accomplish a coup. Hamas’ claims of Fatah’ deliberately withdrawing to stage Hamas’ coup are not entirely off the mark. Abbas hardly lured Hamas into the trap, but he and Fatah commanders knew they have no stake in Gaza. Abbas was only too happy to leave that giant inner city to Hamas. Neither Egypt nor Israel wanted to rule over the Palestinian throngs in Gaza; Abbas, too, would love to have a Palestinian state without Gazans.

After the unwanted takeover, Hamas acted to return to the previous situation. Haniyeh immediately offered to call on his supporters to cease the fire. He went so far as to propose a Hamas-free government of independent technocrats. Hamas cried of united Palestine. But it will be very hard for Haniyeh to get Gaza off his hands. Fatah will ask for a humiliating settlement which removes Hamas from the Palestinian political scene.

Hamas is close to hysteria. Decades of patient struggle are wasted through a single wrong move, the takeover of Gaza. Hamas’ hawks, unable to deliver positive returns, call for the total war with Fatah. Hamas politicians implore Egypt to accept their unintended rule in Gaza; closing of the Egyptian border is one of their many nightmares. Fatah, not Israel blockaded Gaza by requesting cessation of gasoline deliveries. Hamas fired no rockets on Israel after the takeover – only Fatah’s forces do to provoke Israeli reprisals.

Hamas resembles Taliban: a group of militant fundamentalists taking over a state. But Gaza is critically different from Afghanistan: in Gaza, there is no place to hide. Mullah Omar was very moderate in foreign relations, and even fought drug production, the main income source of Afghans. But, being a fundamentalist, Omar could not refuse to host the very Islamic Osama. In minuscule Gaza, almost any guerrilla group is a potential threat to Hamas. Hamas will annihilate competing militant groups, and Israel can easily extinguish the others. There is no danger of Talibanization of Gaza under Hamas. Rather, Hamas will go the way of its parent group, the Muslim Brotherhood, to become a relatively moderate Islamic organization.
Hamas can turn the tables at any moment by welcoming the Jews back to Gush Katif, to live under Hamas' protection. Many will go.

Leaving Gaza to Hamas is insufficient. Israel should allow Hamas to finish off Fatah in the West Bank. Then let Jordan deploy its peacekeeping forces in the West Bank. After Hamas and Fatah exhaust each other, with no political infrastructure of Palestinian statehood in place, Jordan will annex Palestinian enclaves in the West Bank into confederacy. Israeli will be left with Jerusalem, settlements, and possibly with Hebron.

Israel is utterly wrong to support Fatah. Peace with quislings is worthless. Israel signed a peace treaty with Amin Gemayel of Lebanon only to see it denounced months later. A peace treaty with Fatah will allow Israel to withdraw from the territories – which she could do anytime without the treaty. Fatah cannot and doesn’t want to crack down on anti-Israeli militants.
Hamas won elections in the West Bank. Aiding Fatah tremendously discredits America and Israel in the Muslim world: for all the rhetoric, the West aids mobsters against a democratically elected party. Palestinians hate Fatah – a bunch of gangsters, racketeers. Hamas, though our enemy, is way more decent than Fatah.
Unlike Fatah, Hamas will not readily sign a peace treaty, but it can offer Israel something more important – a de facto peace.

Israel could not hope for a better solution to the conflict with Palestine than Hamas’ takeover of Gaza. The Jewish political establishment, from the semi-dead Sharon to the regrettably alive Peres, is humiliated: the disengagement from Gaza and the destruction of the Gush Katif Jewish settlements has created a pure terrorist state at Israel’s border. The American administration received a powerful blow: for all the political and military support extended to the empty shell of Fatah, it lost Gaza to Hamas in only two days of total fighting. The Egyptian government lost to the Muslim Brotherhood: Hamas, the Brotherhood’s spin-off, soundly defeated Fatah, the Egyptian government’s agent force in Gaza. Arab dictatorships tremble: for the first time, a truly popular government came to power in an Arab country through elections and sustained itself through military effort.Hamas’ victory in Gaza is a milestone Muslim military achievement. The mojahedeen won in Afghanistan against the Soviet troops with the critical assistance of the US; that fact has always made them uneasy. In Gaza, Hamas, helped by the pariah states of Iran and Syria, won against the American- and Israeli-sponsored Fatah. Egypt persecuted Muslim Brotherhood for decades; now a mere branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has established itself as a ruling party. Muslims saw Afghan mojahedeen as violent animals well below Arabs; by contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood is seen as a respectable Islamic organization. Impoverished Gazans swarmed the streets cheering the Hamas victory: pride can be a feasible alternative to money.

The West Bank and Gaza had long developed into distinct cultural entities. The West Bank Palestinians are closer to the Jordanians than to the Gazans. Gaza developed into a huge inner city permeated by crime, welfare, radicalism, youth bulge, and unemployment. The West Bank and Gaza cannot form a single state; Gaza can hardly be incorporated in any state at all. Gaza was a liability for the Palestinian state all along: disconnected from the West Bank, susceptible to Israeli whims, and full of the worst kind of Palestinians who are themselves arguably the worst kind of Arabs.

The only option for Palestinian statehood is declaring a state in the West Bank immediately, before Fatah disintegrates and Hamas takes over the government. The Arab countries, however, don’t want a Palestinian state, but rather the burning Palestinian issue. Accordingly, they are pushing Fatah to accept the Hamas-majority government. Such a government would spell the death of Fatah: bereft of funding and legal status for its militia, Fatah would quickly lose militants, adherents, and civil servants to Hamas. Then add to the equation the Arab mentality of siding with victors and fearing association with losers for fear of retributive massacres. Egypt can run a Taliban-style operation: foster a Palestinian army and pass it through the Egypt-Gaza border to fight Hamas. Even if Egypt decides to run such an operation in conjunction with the US instead of accommodating Hamas, Fatah is the least likely candidate for the nucleus of the new army. Fatah was a weak organization all along. Arafat merely channeled donations and assassinated competitors. Fatah has never evolved into a true guerrilla organization but has mostly just claimed credit for the operations carried out by splinter groups. Arafat was virtually no-one in Tunisia - exactly the reason Shimon Peres brought him back to Palestine; Peres needed a Palestinian dummy to sign a peace treaty with. Hamas, on the contrary, was painstakingly developed as a grassroots organization with a lot of popular support.

Hamas’ takeover of Gaza fulfills Israel’s wildest dreams. The Hamas rule brands the Palestinians as terrorists, shows them incapable of statehood and hostile to Israel, and removes the peace process from the agenda. The worst thing Israel could do now is to invade Gaza to clean out Hamas for Fatah’s benefit and to justify Israeli leftists and the American Administration bent on peace with Palestinians.

A hazardous guess is that Hamas and Fatah will split Palestine for now, with Abbas enthroned in the West Bank and Haniyeh in Gaza. Weak Abbas will be further swayed by Jordan’s king Abdullah and, in the best-case scenario, will accept confederation with Jordan with himself as the West Bank viceroy. Gaza will become a terrorist base and a zoo for the world media. At some future time, Israel will be forced to cleanse Gaza of Hamas as she has regularly cleansed the West Bank of the PLO before.
Israel would be wrong to support Fatah except in the context of a confederation with Jordan. Such a confederation reduces the issue of Judea and Samaria from the basis of Palestinian statehood to a border dispute with amenable Jordan. If the confederacy doesn’t work out, Israel would want Hamas to permeate the West Bank to end the peace process and justify annexation of wide security zones.

Israel’s current reflexive moves aimed at bolstering Abbas are wrong. Hamas already expropriated huge amounts of Israeli, Egyptian, and American weapons stored at Fatah’s bases in Gaza. Money given to Abbas will only relieve the unpaid Palestinian civil servants’ pressure on Hamas. Supporting phonies is not a viable policy, in any case.

People who are used to dealing with neighbors equate rationality with being right. Neighbors share basic values, and a neighbor who acts rationally is generally right. He proceeds from the same axiomatic values as we do, employs the same rational deductive models, and arrives at the same conclusions as ourselves. This attitude is erroneously projected on foreigners. They can be rational, but wrong – from our perspective. Haniyeh is no more brutal than James Brown or Avraham Stern; he rationally defends his people and the land he considers theirs. Haniyeh, however, bases his deductive reasoning on different axioms than Jews do. He considers Palestine to be Arab land; we – Jewish. There is no need to vilify Hamas; it is more honest and determined than the Israeli government. It acts rationally, and does not oppose peace per se but rather peace through capitulation to Jewish enemies. Among neighbors, understanding leads to compassion; not so among nations. We understand Hamas and need not hate them; killing them, however, is a rational thing to do.

It is very convenient to imagine that Hamas does Syria’s bidding to divert the West’s attention from Syrian wrongdoings. Or Iran’s. Or the Arab League’s. It doesn’t. Afghan mujahedeen had interests similar to American interests, and took the American money and weapons. Afghan insurgents critically depended on America, but followed nearly none of its orders. If not for America, the Afghans would have fought communists with old rifles and long-term terrorism. Suicidal young Arabs, locked in Gaza with no life prospects, objectively need an outlet like Hamas. Palestinian insurgents benefit from Syrian money and hideouts, Iranian money and training, the Egyptian blind eye to weapons’ shipments from the Muslim Brotherhood, and Saudi money. But there are also Palestinian splinter groups that enjoy very little institutional support. They rely on small donations, racketeering, and occasional kidnappings to purchase cheap explosives and send suicide bombers; the Saudis will pay their families later. Hamas needs money and support for training and weapons suitable against Fatah. The anti-Israeli part of Hamas’ job is inexpensive: Hamas makes rockets in common metal workshops with basic explosives routinely made from fertilizer.

Hamas is not a hit man for evil powers, but a genuine national liberation movement which enjoys wide support among the politically active strata of the Palestinians. Israeli peace-seekers ignore the grassroots Palestinian desire to claim back the ancient Arab land in its entirety.

Hamas is impossible to extinguish, but easy to suppress. There is no need for politically questionable actions against Hamas’ civilian supporters. Hamas politicians are the perfect targets for Israeli retaliation. Israel currently avoids harming the high-status enemies, though in every war the enemy’s politicians are prime targets. Instead of hitting empty areas called “Hamas training camps” and Hamas shacks, the Israeli Air Force could keep destroying the villas of Hamas officials, preferably with their families, in retaliation for suicide bombings and rocket attacks against Israel. The Palestinian population has little regard for their corrupt politicians and warlords, and would also tacitly welcome the Israeli tactics. Foreign governments cannot condemn attacks against leaders of terrorist group. The Hamas leadership isn’t concerned with Israel destroying shacks or killing rank-and-file members. Personal retaliation against the Hamas leaders and their property would quickly change Hamas’ attitude toward Israel. Many splinter groups such as the PIJ and Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades won’t care about the damage to Hamas’ officials. Israel can target those groups by bombing major houses of their leaders’ extended families. The Israeli-Palestinian war is now personal only to the common Jews of Sderot and common Arabs of Gaza. Make it personal for the rulers.

In the Lebanon war, Israel lacked political objectives, thus the Winograd report asserts that the army led the government. The IDF staff knew what should be done on a tactical level, but the lack of strategic planning doomed the war to indecision. I argued that in July 2006.

Hamas plays the northern scenario in the south and piggybacks on Hezbollah’s every move: digs tunnels, brings dozens of tons of explosives, launches massive numbers of cheap primitive missiles, and openly trains its quasi-government militia. Just like Hezbollah, Hamas won the elections and nurtures popular loyalty through welfare programs, the clear and appealing objective of reclaiming Arab land and punishing the Jewish state, and an anti-foreign-influence anti-corruption stance. Hamas and Hezbollah tested Israel’s nerves with low-level violations of cease-fire while hiding behind supportive Arab civilians.

Israel reacts to Hamas just like she reacted to Hezbollah: with a sledgehammer against a sliver. Dead Arab civilians make great advertisements for the guerrillas. In Gaza and Lebanon, Israel fought ostensibly over nothing: Hamas and Hezbollah demanded what Israel had already agreed to – a withdrawal from Arab lands. Hezbollah had only demanded the ridiculously small Shebaa farms and perhaps the Golan Heights, which even the lame hawk Lieberman agreed to return to Syria. Hamas demands Israeli withdrawal from Judea and Samaria, which Israel has agreed to long ago.

If Israel withdraws from Shebaa, the Golan Heights, Judea, and Samaria, peace won’t ensue. Hamas and Hezbollah have no reason to abandon the tactics that have proved so effective. If rocket attacks forced Israel to abandon relatively huge territories, then all the more will the continued shelling make Israel transfer East Jerusalem to the Palestinians, especially since they control much of it, anyway. Hamas and Hezbollah have no reason to end the attacks, but will resume them after every Israeli injustice from the closure of her borders to Palestinian migrant workers to prosecution of Arab traitors like Bishara. Israel confronts Hamas and Hezbollah superficially over nothing - things that are already agreed to – but substantially over everything.

Minuscule Israel cannot sustain wars. Even primitive Arab militias shell her cities. Iran and Syria could surely do better than that with their arsenals of mid- and long-range missiles. Israel’s only feasible choice is credible deterrence. Whether the enemy’s demands are sensible or not,doesn’t matter. Israel has to periodically remind her enemies that attacks on her cities are a big no-no. Retaliatory bombing of south Lebanon or Gaza won’t solve the political problem of Israel’s half-hearted withdrawal from the territories. In strategic terms, the IDF’s incursion in Gaza will achieve nothing: Hamas, a popular party, cannot be eradicated with a gentlemanly invasion; only massive, cruel repression of civilians will eradicate popular support for the insurgents. In strategic terms, a military operation in Gaza could drive a lesson back home to Arabs: don’t shell Israel.

The Israeli government resists the invasion of Gaza because of the international pressure to continue the peace process under the fire. Hamas and Hezbollah, faithful to their voters, don’t give way to international pressure, which therefore concentrates on Israel. Foreign governments don’t care about Israeli security, and Israeli rulers value their European contacts and American aid above Jewish interests. The invasion of Gaza would stamp the destruction of Gush Katif as a security error: the settlements provided a security belt for Israel proper, and the army was protecting Israel rather than the settlers. In the garbled political milieu of Israel, brainwashed voters would keep silent about a withdrawal from Judea and Samaria even after the military operation in Gaza, but leftists don’t want to take chances, and so they try to avoid the invasion.

Hamas has overplayed its hand. It’s not a Hezbollah. Hamas lacks a reliable supplier of weapons, such as Syria is for Hezbollah. Gaza’s external borders are short compared to Lebanon’s, and the IDF can substantially close off Hamas’ arms trafficking. Hamas lacks Hebollah’s independent financing such as heroin, and will run out of funds soon after the IDF takes over Gaza. In Lebanon, the IDF relied mostly on army intelligence, but in Gaza, the Shabak will efficiently identify the guerrillas. In Lebanon-2006, the IDF had to do the entire job itself; in Gaza, Israel will have Abu Mazen’s equivalent of the South Lebanon Army, trigger-happy against Hamas members.

The ease of invasion makes it easy to ruin. If the government, satisfied with the immediate result of stopping the rocket attacks, decides to end the invasion without substantially eradicating Hamas, Arabs would claim a victory as they did in Lebanon. Israel should invade Gaza only if she firmly resolves to crush Hamas.

Hamas is a blessing to Israel. If not for the external threat, Israeli society would roll still faster to the left, decomposing in the process. If Arabs are no longer the enemy, the bourgeoning Muslim population of Israel is not a threat. If the Palestinian state is formed, the Jewish state loses Judea and Samaria.

If Hamas becomes weak to the point of acknowledging Israel, Hamas will no longer represent the Palestinians, and their society will be torn between various factions, creating a tumultuous state at Israel’s borders. Palestinians lack a work ethic and the culture of education and will remain perpetually poor - the ideal breeding ground for terrorists. Hamas employs Palestinian radicals; if Hamas ceases to be anti-Israeli, the radicals will dissolve into many groups, and the Israeli security apparatus won’t be able to reign in such a multitude.

One good thing about non-belligerent Hamas and the Palestinian state in general is that the Israeli government would lose its excuse for totalitarianism, mismanagement, skyrocketing taxation, and the general license to destroy the Jewish state in the name of national security. After Palestine settles down, Israel could free the resources to rise up. That is unrealistic.

America has a penchant for choosing one set of scoundrels against another. That happens when you mess in countries that are all scoundrels.

Now the idea is to strengthen Fatah against Hamas. Come on, did you learn nothing from Iraq? Neither the US nor Fatah can win a guerrilla war. Fatah, like just anyone given enough funds and weapons, can extinguish the opposition. Will the West, however, close its eyes to the means necessary to do that? Will the West wait the several years needed for Abbas to do the job? Will Hamas wait instead of assassinating Abbas?

It is delusional to imagine that Fatah seeks peace with Israel. Abbas possibly does, but his party doesn’t. Abbas was elected president because he is personally popular. When party programs competed, Hamas won. Israel supplies weapons to Fatah, but Hamas still has the upper hand. Sending more weapons to Fatah won’t stabilize the Palestinian Authority and could threaten Israel. There is a certain inconsistency between promoting democracy in Palestine and arming Fatah to destroy democratically elected Hamas.

Hamas represents the Palestinian people, their true aspirations: to get rid of Israel without a large-scale war. Hamas is very sensitive to Palestinian wishes: it even foreswore Islamic fundamentalism and refused to participate in worldwide jihad. A coup can overthrow a ruler but not a popular party. Palestinians might vote for Fatah in the next elections, but Hamas won’t dissappear. It will go underground and continue fighting; Syrian and Iranian money amply provide for its needs.

Curiously, the State Department asserted that Palestinian law does not prohibit extraordinary elections which are therefore permitted. That principle applies only to private business; governments enjoy only specific rights - what is not permitted to government is prohibited.