Settlers cannot oppose the army and not fight it; they cannot fight the army and depend upon it for protection; they cannot send their children to the army and blame it for treason. These half-hearted efforts are bound to fail. In the Peace House in Hebron, the defenders stocked lamp bulbs filled with paint, small rocks, and similarly useless childish weapons; Palestinian children can show them much more potent devices. To the chagrin of some, the kids also prepared a few potatoes spiked with nails; that’s about the strongest weapon ever prepared by settlers against military police. There is no decision to shoot even with plastic bullets. Can the army take away guns? They are doing it, anyway; often there is just a single rifle at an outpost. There are knives. It’s not the same army now as the one that gunned down Rabbi Uzi Meshulam’s insurrection attempt in 1994. Encountering resistance, or even the strong possibility of it, the government would retreat. But even by shooting, settlers cannot force the army to stay and guard them; in the disengagement, the army will simply leave.
Changes are coming, albeit slowly. The settlers first refused to negotiate the Peace House with the government, then softened their position and tried negotiation. Unlike them, the government doesn’t really negotiate: it asked Jews to leave the house to the army and wait an unspecified number of years until the court decided on the house’s ownership. The settler leaders cannot shake their penchant for showmanship: the Council of Settlements, a semi-official organization, negotiated on behalf of the supposedly unrelenting Hebron radicals and home owners.
For all the talk of violent defense, none was forthcoming. There was no attempt to prepare even basic defenses like barricades, window shutters, and barbed wire. There was no roadblock and heavy gate to be kept closed at all times. The organizers didn’t even bother to set up hidden video cameras to broadcast the army’s attack live on the Internet.
A bunch of unruly kids cannot stand up to regular army forces in a pitched battle. Despite the ample time, the kids were left to themselves rather than trained in basic counterattack techniques day and night. Idleness, fear, indecisiveness, and lack of food quickly demoralized the defenders. The opportunity was perfect for ideological training, as thousands of radicals went through the house; but no Kahane readings were organized and no inflammatory speeches were given by credible rabbis. The defenders, accordingly, split into many groups without much interaction. Hooligans pelted Palestinians with stones and derided Arab passersby. Yeshiva students continued their studies; Rabbi Akiva’s abandoned theirs. The house was ripe with provocateurs and certain Shabak agents—in fact, it was they, rather than the settler-leaders, who worked with the youth, and might be largely responsible for the stone-throwing contests.
The point cannot be reiterated enough: the Jewish hooligans, condemned by everyone, are some of the best people to prop up the Jewish ideal. They are not educated in the liberal ghetto nonsense of nice Jews. They simply hate those who hate them; they are normal—which is an incredibly unusual thing among Jews. That they wash rarely or lack table manners are all extraneous things. They hate Arabs and Jewish police, harbor no respect for the rodef state, and are prepared to go to great length for their nation. It is imperative to train and educate them.
The PR is not thought out. Again, as in Gush Katif, settlers engaged in a schizophrenic approach, presenting themselves both as attackers and victims of the attack. They cannot show strength and claim pity at the same time. The pity line might work: old Jews in prayer shawls near the house, a lot of small children playing inside without their mothers, girls bringing food to military police soldiers, soccer matches between Jewish and Arab kids, and small gifts distributed to nearby Arabs. This is not a permanent solution: soccer would not change Arab terrorism, and Palestinian moderates cannot stop the militants. But we’re not looking for permanent solutions; the PR effect would have been great, especially if the settler leaders would pay to bring TV crews.
With fifty MKs signing pro-Hebron petitions, and hundreds of other influential people supporting the settlers, how come only one MK lived in Peace House? The police would hesitate before throwing MKs out of the building.
Pity culminates in suicide. During the Gush Katif eviction, two people burned themselves in protest. Despite being smeared as psychos, they still earned considerable pity, and in the end the decision was made for the media to ignore them. In Yamit, Sinai, Rabbi Kahane’s people barricaded themselves in a bunker and threatened to blow it up with gas cylinders; even Sharon hesitated to remove them. There is no Kahane today, but neither is there Sharon. Threatened with mass suicide in Peace House, the government would have retreated. How un-Jewish is suicide? Ask Masada defenders or scores of Jews who committed suicide as an alternative to desecrating God’s name; if abandoning the Jewish city of Hebron doesn’t desecrate it, what does? Besides, there is not a chance that the police would push the defenders toward suicide.
On other hand, the alternative approach—extreme violence—could work as well. But that should be real violence. On the national level, passive defense cost Jews the country. As Jews clung to Tel Aviv and Arabs carped at them continuously with ever-increasing demands, the last thirty years saw unimaginable concessions: Sinai, Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria; Israel even conceded to Syrian occupation of the Kineret shore beyond the international border. That’s after the Arabs lost all the wars. On the national level, Jews should negotiate peace with Syria after bombing Damascus and offering to retain only the Golan Heights; settlers should act similarly.
Passive defense never works. The army can wait out the settlers or strike unexpectedly. Offense is the only proper defense. When tens of thousands Jews gathered in Hebron for Chayei Sarah reading, why didn’t they march on the Palestinian houses and army outposts to occupy them? Violence must be decisive; stone-throwing contests with Palestinians are ugly and useless. Instead, hundreds of houses might be torched, causing a massive death toll. That would leave an impression on all the adversaries. If the point is to prevent further evacuations, including the subsequent Peace House evictions after the defenders sneak in, the best way is to strike the Israeli government in its most sensitive underbelly: the welfare of the Palestinians. Amona was about Jewish injuries, thus of no concern for the government or foreign media. The Israeli government won’t risk another eviction that is certain to bring massive injuries and death to the Palestinians—which is a far cry from the current hooliganism in Hebron. Again, the decision to engage in such an approach is a moral one, and not easy at that. Palestinians bear no responsibility for anti-Semitic actions of Israeli leftists and the government. Whether to use the Arab lives and limbs as pawns, purely as a matter of expediency, is a substantial question. But should it be answered in the affirmative, it might end the evictions.
There is no point in worrying about the settlers’ reputation: it cannot be worse.
