Bush’s decision to crack on the insurgents in Baghdad is apparently inspired by the success in Fallujah.

A peaceful place under Saddam, Fallujah became a hotbed of insurrection after the US invasion. After the world saw the photos of the burned Americans hanging from the bridge, the US was forced to act. The first battle of Fallujah was stalled amid indecisiveness and civilian losses. Though US troops fought bravely and had unquestionable tactical edge, it proved impossible to extract insurgents from the civilian masses. Soon after the assault ended, guerrillas again took over the city. The confrontation was won by the militants as well as by the Arab media, particularly Al Jazeera.

The second battle of Fallujah was conducted more realistically with the goal of inflicting unbearable losses on the guerrillas. Civilian casualties were treated lightly, and the operation recalled Saddam’s Dujail affair. Marines at times blocked escape to local males, civilians or not, used white phosphorus, and devastated the city. The harsh measures were necessary. Even then, only two to five thousand Iraqis were killed, a minor fraction of local militants. Marines suffered heavy casualties, about eight hundred. Insurgents moved to nearby villages and, while Fallujah remains relatively pacified, Anbar province came under the control of insurgents.

Bush’s selling point is the prevention of re-infiltration. That was tried in Fallujah. After tactically defeating the militants, US troops restricted Iraqis from entering Fallujah to the point of issuing biometric IDs. That slowed infiltration, but did not stop it. Attacks on American personnel in Fallujah continued.

The methods grudgingly possibly in the remote town of Fallujah won’t do in Baghdad which teems with reporters. Going after insurgents necessitates attacks on civilians, and both Muslim and Western media would trumpet the sufferings. Baghdad, even the Sadr district, is too large to cordon off. Urban environment of Baghdad slums drastically differs from Fallujah; concentration of population precludes air strikes and makes house-to-house combat extremely costly in terms of American lives. Marines, who conducted the Fallujah assault, are the finest American troops, daring, adaptive, and, critically, with open-minded commanders. The Army is very good, but lacks flexibility – a crucial component of anti-guerrilla operations.

US troops have many strengths, but one weakness spells the failure: moralism. American troops skillfully kill and are ready to die, but politicians want them to fight under unrealistic restrictions. The goal of terrorists is to instill terror. To that end, they will mix with population and attract the American strikes. They disregard – in fact, welcome – losses, whether their own, Iraqi, or American. Insurgents are well funded, religiously and ideologically motivated, and ruthless. It would take years of extreme repressions to extinguish their support base and ultimately prevail against them. American troops, on the other hand, have a short time span: the assault would end when media, Senate, and leftists start screaming bloody murder. The politically correct liberal democracy performs badly in dubious wars.