Itzhak Shamir ventured a reasonable policy: wait and do nothing, let de facto become de jure. De facto, however, was unsustainable from the beginning: Arabs kept breeding and pushing for independence. The longer Israel has waited, the stronger became the pressure for a Palestinian state. Two generations of Arabs were born with the idea of a state, and two generations of Westerners learned from the media that Palestinians deserved a state. A policy of waiting works when no one seriously claims nominally debated assets; Britain could not wait out the Indian or Irish independence movements. Pauses allow a weaker but determined side to grow strong. Palestinians were submissive in 1967 and a few years afterwards, but situation kept deteriorating since then.
Inaction is viable when every infringement is resolutely suppressed. Israel so far successfully waits out the problem of the 1948 refugees because the Arabs don’t press it much and Israel rejects any accommodation on that issue. In Judea and Samaria, the basis for Arab claims becomes stronger, not weaker as the time passes.

Democracies are bad at the “wait out” policies. Government must show the voters action. Some governments retract from hard-line opposition to concessions and instill hope in the contenders. The stronger were the original opposition, the stronger hope is produced by the smallest concessions. And the concessions are often big.

The real choice is between crushing the opponent’s hopes and abandoning one’s own.