Syrian dictator Assad proved himself smart in a recent BBC interview. With characteristically Arab evasiveness he condemned all attacks “against the civilians and the innocent in Iraq.” Implied, there are no attacks specifically against civilians but against enemy collaborators. Muslims understood and applauded. Westerners misunderstood and applauded, too.

Assad is prepared for talks with Israel but only through an “impartial arbiter.” Implied, no such arbiter exists, so no talks. Why an arbiter? Because Assad wants concessions he knows Israel won’t accept, so someone must pressure her. Quite a basis for negotiations. In fact, there’s not much to discuss. Beside relatively minor border rectifications, Syria wants nothing from Israel. Rather, Syria uses the usual Arab excuses for continued belligerence with Israel: partition of Jerusalem between Jews and the Palestinian non-nation, flooding Israel with fourth-generation descendants of the 1948 refugees, and perhaps some reparations from victorious Israel to the losing Arab aggressors. Syria doesn’t require an arbiter to discuss more relevant things: that since the Jews left Syria, it’s time for the Arabs to leave Israel, compensation for the property persecuted and escaping Jews left in Syria, and reparations for the several wars with Israel Syria started and lost.

Assad is practical and grieves over the Israeli doctrine of preemption. Obviously, he recollects the 1967 war. Just why Assad is worried about preemption? Preemption is not aggression but removes a clear and present danger. Assad wants to be able to assemble his forces at Israeli border in the safety of his sovereign protection, and then what? Send them home? More likely, strike at 60-mile wide Israel.

Assad calls on all parties to implement the UN resolutions. The problem is, all parties understand them differently, and neither party cares about them anyway.

According to Assad, the US accuses Syria of supporting terrorism to absolve America of the responsibility. Implied, the US oppresses poor Muslims (perhaps by paying too much for oil), and Hezbollah thrives on popular resentment, not on Syrian aid.

Assad offers Western leaders an example of practicality: “As long as Hezbollah is popular among the people, you have to deal with them.” So much for liberal claims that Hezbollah holds the poor Lebanese population hostage. Assad, a shrewd dictator with a keen sense of mob sentiment, is right: political platforms don’t matter, popularity does. The West, on the contrary, has a penchant for supporting ostensibly liberal but totally unknown guys, such as Karzai, and ignoring popular groups with hostile views, such as Hamas.

Assad refuses to cut ties with Iran and Hezbollah. He realizes that accommodation is a product of force, not of goodwill, weakness, and perpetual concessions.

Assad is in a better strategic position than Israel or the American government. Since Syria is already an outcast, he has nothing to lose and can expect only to gain. Syria’s allies—Iran and Hezbollah—are winning. Assad is not subject to re-election and can plan long-term.

Assad is a new type of ruler: knowledgeable, polite, ostensibly soft and liberal, but strong. He calls flouting public opinion a mistake. Young top managers of that type are seen in Arab companies. Assad is the first ruler of that new generation. He’s much more dangerous than his extraverted father.